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ABSTRACT 
This thesis traces the development of insubordination in the employment relationship. The essence 
of the relationship is that the employee, by contracting out his or her productive capacity, occupies 
a subordinate position. The primary aim is to locate and define the nature of subordination and to 
investigate how the breach of this position would justifY dismissal as interpreted and applied by 
the courts. This is achieved by investigating dismissal for insubordination under the common law 
contract of employment, the unfair labour practice jurisdiction and the 1995 Labour Relations Act. 
Initially the obligation of the employee to be subordinate, an essential term of the contract of 
employment, is located and defined by using the tests of Control, Organisation and Dominant 
Impression, which theoretically indicate the true nature of insubordination. Insubordination under 
the common law is equated with disobedience to the lawful and reasonable instructions of the 
employer which were given in good faith and fell squarely within the contractual relationship. 
Insubordination under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction was equated with a challenge to the 
authority of the employer of which disobedience was a manifestation of such intention. Instructions 
given by the employer under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction had to be lawful, reasonable and 
fair. What was fair depended on the surrounding circumstances of the dismissal and a wilful and 
unreasonable refusal of the employee to obey the valid instructions of the employer justified 
dismissal Under the 1995 Labour Relations Act it is submitted that insubordination will be dealt 
with in essentially the same manner as under the previous jurisdiction, subject to the Act's 
objectives and purposes. The disobedience of the employee is to be tolerated if that employee is 
attempting to achieve the Act's objectives, and any dismissal as a result of the disobedience could 
be unfair, because the employer's conduct fiustrates the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the 
contractual right of the employer to expect subordination from the employee may have been 
whittled away to such an extent over time that it seems superficial to regard subordination as an 
essential term of the contract of employment. 
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1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 
"If your employer was to ask you to do a task, would you obey?" The majority of employees 
would respond that they would obey. The majority of employees would see themselves as owing 
their employer an obligation to obey their instructions. The employer is usually the one who gives 
instructions and sets out what the employee is to do during working hours. For performing the 
instructions the employee is remunerated. 
The thesis contends that the essence or nature of the employment relationship, which indicates 
the unique role of each party in the contract of employment, is that the employee, by contracting 
away his or her productive capacity, assumes a subordinate role in the relationship. It is this 
position of "subordination", or more specifically its breach, insubordination, that is the topic of 
investigation. 
The aim of the study is to locate and define the nature of "subordination" in the employment 
relationship, and then to investigate how the breaching of this "position" would justify dismissal, 
as interpreted and applied by the courts. This is to indicate indirectly the restrictions placed on 
the "legal right" of the employer to ensure that the employee does not breach the "position" of 
subordination. What has been deemed a fair reason to dismiss for insubordination is set out al1d 
this in turn will clarify both the employer and employee's duties toward each other. 
Because the thesis deals with the way in which insubordination has been understood and 
developed by the courts; the main sources are case law and the thesi s has been set out according 
to three periods in the history of labour Jaw. These periods are basically; insubordination under 
the common law contract of employment, insubordination under the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction and, finally, insubordination under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
The reader is firstly introduced to "contract" and to the contract of employment. 1t is then 
highlighted that contract is the source of the employment relationship. The contract of service is 
set out historically to introduce the reader to the nature of the relationship. Definitions of the 
employment relationship are then offered and it is through this that the reader is introduced to the 
employee's obligation to be subordinate. 
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It is from this foundation that the thesis turns to the location of the nature or essence of the 
employment relationship - which it will be shown is "subordination". This will primarily be 
achieved by an analysis of the three common law tests - Control, Organisation and the Dominant 
Impression - which have been used in both locating and distinguishing the contract of employment 
from other relationships. In discussing the common law te~ts it will be shown that the tests are 
merely tests which tend to focus on indicators that represent the essence or nature of the 
relationship. The nature or essence of the employment relationship win be argued to be 
"subordination", the breach of which would be insubordination. This will include, though not 
exclusively, disobedience and disrespect directed towards the employer. Any conduct that 
breaches the employer's right to demand that the employee act according to the position of 
subordination is insubordination. 
Chapter 3 discusses how insubordination was understood and applied under the common law 
contract of employment. Essentially this will focus on the requirements that justify dismissal for 
disrespect or disobedience. It will be shown that disobedience on1y amounted to a material breach 
of the contract of employment justifying dismissal where the order was given in good faith, fell 
within the parameters of the contract between the parties and was lawful and reasonable -
reasonable was narrowly construed and was not of such a wide application as under the unfair 
labour practice. Further, the refusal must be wilful - that is deliberate in a legal sense. 
Chapter 4 discusses insubordination under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. Once the nature 
of insubordination has been identified the requirements for the offence will be discussed. 
Essentially the common Jaw understanding of dismissal is extended to fall with in the requirements 
offaimess, which demand that the order should be reasonable - that is fair- and the refusal, though 
wilful, must be unreasonable. The misconduct will be discussed in relation to the requirements of 
lawfulness, fairness and reasonableness. 
Chapter 5 sets out insubordination as a dismissible offence under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, wherein the statutory requirements for a fair reason to dismiss will be set out. 
The Conclusion, Chapter 6, summarises and presents the nature and manner in which each period 
treated dismissal for insubordination. This is to indicate the resultant limitations placed on the 
3 
employer's contractual right to demand that the employee occupies a subordinate position in the 
employment relationship. 
1.1. Introduction. 
Chapter 1 
BASIC CONCEPTS 
4 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the contract of employment. To achieve this, 
the chapter will look firstly at what contract is, and then highlight the relationship between 
contract and employment. 
Various "tenns" will then be discussed in order to introduce and define terminology that is used 
throughout this thesis. Following the discussion of terms, the characteristics of the contract of 
employment are discussed from an historical perspective, from Roman through Roman Dutch to 
the current South Africa law. Thereafter, a list of definitions of the contract of employment as 
offered by respective authors is supplied. Throughout the section the employee's duty of the 
subordination, characteristic of the employment relationship, is highlighted as this element of 
subordination is the primary object of investigat ion. 
1.2. The contract of employment. 
1.2.1 Contract. 
Contract "belongs to the species of legal facts known as juristic acts .... A juristic act is the lawful 
act of a legal subject which has at least some of the consequences which its author intended to 
bring about.") Therefore contracts belong to the category oflegally relevant agreements, which 
are agreements entered into to achieve intended consequences. 2 In short, a contract is an 
agreement that is intended by the parties to have legal consequences. 
Contract is the means for structuring private transactions essential for the distribution of 
commodities and services. 3 Most contracts are reciproca1. 4 Reciprocal contracts are known as 
mutual or synallagmatic contracts, and examples of these are: contracts of sale, exchange, letting 
and hiring of things (locatio conductio rerum) or of service (locatio conductio operarum), and 
IVan der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 5. 
2Ibid. 
)Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 6, citing Harker Acta Juridica 1980 
page 6] at page 62. . 
4reciprocal- ie, pcrfonnance is owed in excbange for performance from the other party, therefore a 
party sued for perfonnance may refuse to perform unless the plaintiff has performed properly or tenders proper 
performance when suing. See Van der Merwc et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 9. 
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giving out of work (locatio conductio operi~). 5 Their common characteristic is that one party is 
bound to perfonn in exchange for the perfonnance of the other party. Performance in tenns of 
the one obligation is a prerequisite for the enforceability of the right to demand performance of 
the other obligation6 
1.2.2 ilrm.s 
A contract, giving rise to obligations, is expressed in tenns. Terms are used to describe all 
obligations, both essential and non-essential, which the parties assume. Tenns may be express, or 
implied or tacit, or any combination thereof 
Express terms are obligations actually stated in the contract, either written or verbal, which convey 
an intention. Tacit terms and implied tenns are more difficult to locate in the relationship. 
Tacit tenus are derived from the common intention of the parties, as inferred by the court from 
the express temlS of the contract in conjunction Vv1th the surrounding circumstances, including the 
conduct of the parties. These tacit terms are attributed to the common intention of the parties 
based on the facts of the case,7 while implied terms are implied by law.s 
An implied term is " ... an unexpressed provision of the contract which the law imports therein, 
generally as a matter of course, without reference to the actual intention of the parties."9 Implied 
terms are usually associated with "named", nominate, contracts. That is, contracts with a 
particular content wruch occur frequently in market transactions that have become known by 
reference to their specific nature. 10 Examples are the contracts of sale, lease and employment. 
The implied term is a rule oflaw, II but the intention of the parties is not totally ignored: 
"Indeed, terms are often implied by law in cases where it is by no means clear that the 
parties would have agreed to incorporate them in their contract.,,12 
5Jbid. 
6Scc in this regard BK Tooling (E:dms) BpI.: v SCope Precision Engineering (Edms) BpI.: 1979 (I )SA 
391 (A) at 415-417, Nesci v Meyer 1982 (3) SA 498 (A). 
7Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v SCholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A) at 197. 
%is terminology is also used by Christie The Law oJ Contract 1991, and is approved by the Appellate 
Division, Alfred McAlpine and Son (ply)Ltd Transvaal Provincial Administrator 1974 (3) SA 506 (A), sec also, 
Delf<; v Kuehne and Nagel (Ply) Lid 1990 (J) SA 822 (A) 827. 
9Alfred McAlpine and Son (Ply) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administrator 1974 (3) SA 506 (A)at 531 
0-531 E. 
IOVan dcr Merwe et al Contract: General PrinCiples 1993 page 196. 
"Alfred McAlpine and Son (PIy)Ltd Transvaal Provincial Administrator 1974 (3) SA 506 (A)at 532 G. 
12At 531 F. 
6 
However, such a term is not implied ifit is in conflict with the express provisions of the contract. 13 
Implied terms may be derived from the common law, trade usage or custom, or from statute. 
Where mercantile agreements are subject to the usages or customs of a particular trade or 
profession, in that they are implied, the usage must be: 
(a) notorious; 
(b) certain, ie of general application within the trade or profession; 
(c) reasonable; 
(d) not contrary to the positive law. 
If these four requirements are met, then the term will be implied to form part of the contract, 
unless the agreement expressly excludes the term. This would occur even though the party being 
sought to be bound had no knowledge of the trade usage. 14 Once a term is implied, that term is 
held to be inherent to the nature of that specific type of contract, and the law will imply it in 
every case, provided the parties have not expressly excluded its operation. IS 
Smith comments that the courts are achieving what they consider "industrial justice" by the use 
of implied terms. 16 There is a need for implied terms in many contracts of service, if only to fill 
in the gaps revealed in areas of contract law. Although the result may be far removed from any 
real subjective intention.J7 These terms are used by the courts as a means of regulating the 
employment relationship and imposing conditions which the court considers desirable, in line with 
the demands of boni mores and public policy. 
"In a sense 'implied term' is, in this context, a misnomer in that in content it simply 
represents a legal duty (giving rise to a correlative right) imposed by law, unless excluded 
by the parties, in the case of certain classes of contracts. It is the naturalium of the 
BAt 531 E. 
14See Coutts v Jacobs 1927 EDL 120 and Golden Cape Fruits (Pty) Ltd v Fotoplate (Pt}~ LId 1973 
(2)SA 642(C). No distinction is dra\\n between a trade usage and a trade custom, see Tropic Plastic Packaging 
Industry v Standard Bank Ltd of South Africa 1969 (4)SA 108 (0) at 119 and Catering EqUipment Centre v 
Friesland Hotel 1967 (4)SA 336 (0) at 338-339. 
15<Thc parties may exclude the operation of implied terms by express agreement to thaI effect, subject 
to two provisos: exclusion is not permitted where it would be contra bonos mores ... while exclusion of a ternl 
which is essential to the existence of a contract of employment w:i1l ehange the nature of the contract." 
Thompson and Benjamin South African Labour Law (vol 1), amended service 36 of 1997, page EI -1 0, per 
B Jordaan. 
16Smith Is Employment Properly Analysed in Terms of Contract 1975 page 354. 
171bid page 355-356. 
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contract in question. ,,18 
Christie19comments that Pothier classifies the terms of a contract into essentialia, naturalia and 
accidentialia. 20 Pothier describes essentialia as: 
"Things which are of the essence of a contract are those without which such contract 
cannot subsist, and for want of which there is either no contract, or a contract of a 
different kind.'>21 
Essentialia SC1Ve to identifY a contract as belonging to a particular class or category of contract. 
Such identification is essential because the class of contract determines the naturalia of a 
particular contract. 22 Thus, if the essentialia of a particular contract are present certain 
consequences follow, these being the naturalia. 
"Things which are only of the nature of the contract are those which, without being the 
essence, form part of it, though not expressly mentioned~ it being of the nature of the 
contract that they shall be included and understood .. .they differ from those which are of 
the essence of the contract, inasmuch as the contract may subsist without them, and they 
may be excluded by the express agreement of the parties.,,23 
Naturalia are terms implied by law. These terms aid to determine the rights and duties of the 
contracting parties and the effects and consequences of their contract. 24 Naturalia, are based 
largely on notions which originated in Roman Law but they are not fixed Recognised naluralia 
may be extended or curtailed and new naluralia may develop through adaptation by the courts 
in response to changed circumstances, legislation, custom or trade usage. 25 
Pothier's third class, the accidentalia, are included in the contract expressly. For instance, the 
aHowance of a certain time for paying a sum of money due; or the liberty of paying it by 
instalment s, etc. 26 
1KAlfred McAlpine and Son (Pty)Ltd Tran.waal Provincial Administrator 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 531 
G·531 H. 
19Christie The Law a/Contract 1991 page 183 to 184. 
2°1ncidentalia and Accidentialia refer to the same class of tenns. 
21Christie The Law a/Contract 1991 page 183 citing Pothier ss 6·8. 
22Yan der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 200. 
23Christie The Law a/Contract 1991 page 183·184. 
24Yan dcr Mcrwc et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 200. 
2~lbid page 20 I. 
l6Christie The Law a/Contract 1991 page ]84. 
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In summary, essentialia form the bones of the special contract. When further detail is needed, 
due to the type of contract, naturalia are added. After that, if more flesh is needed, the parties 
incorporate the accidentalia. 
"The most convenient method of ascertaining the full terms of a contract is therefore first 
to identify the express terms and, in the light of those express terms, to consider whether 
any additional terms are to be implied either by law or from trade usage or from the 
express terms and the surrounding circumstances. ,,27 
It is not doubted that while the sources of the contract of employment are rich and varied, the 
contract itself remains the foundation of the employment relationship. 
"It not only acts as a conduit for rights and duties derived from other sources, eg statute 
and collective bargaining, but it is also itself an important source of rights and duties. 
Apart from the terms expressly or tacitly agreed to by the parties, a number of terms 
dealing with their basic rights and duties are also implied into the contract as a matter of 
law. In addition, judge-made law and the provisions of legislation and collective 
agreements combine with the express, tacit and implied terms of the contract to mould the 
relationship between employer and employee. ,,28 
1.2.3 Contract in relation to the employment relationship. 
In the common law, the contract of employment is an agreement between the parties that their 
relationship will be bound and restricted by certain mutually agreed rights and duties, provided 
the parties intended to be legally bound and these rights and duties are physically possible and 
'legal. In other words, both parties bargain at arms length and are deemed to be the best judge of 
their own interests.29 But the inequality of the positions of the parties to the employment contract 
has a tendency to go unnoticed or tends to be sacrificed to the contractual ideal of voluntarism. 30 
What is more, voluntarism tends to place the content of the relationship "outside the domain of 
public policy and beyond the reach of the courts". 31 In other words, sanctity of contract is the 
court's binding ethic. Didcott J, quoted Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v 
27Jbid. 
2IVfhompson and Benjamin South A/rican Labour Law (vol 1), amended scf\icc 36 of 1997, page El-9, 
per B Jorrutall. 
29Jne law will not interfere to protect him or her from thc consequenccs of a bad bargain. Sec Jordaan 
The Law o/Contract and the Individual E.mployment Relationship 1990 page 77. 
3O<The \iew that a contract is constituted by agreement, signifies the recognition of individual 
autonomy as a philosophical premise." Van dcr MCIWe ct al Contract: General PrinCiples )993 page 10. 
31Haysom and Thompson Labouring under the law page 222 quoted in Jordaan The Law o/Contract 
and the Individual Employment Relationship 1990 page 77. 
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Sampson32 to this effect: 
"If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that 
their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by courts ofjustice.,,33 
The above is supported by Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estate~4 wherein it was argued that a 
provision in an employment contract should not be enforced because it bore oppressively on the 
employee. The court rejected the argument and restricted itself to the interpretation of the 
contract as it stood. 35 
In reality, the majority of employees have little control over the substance of the relationship with 
their employers. The common law of contract, in short, offers little protection against 
arbitrariness;36 it allows the party with the greater bargaining power to extract any bargain he or 
she wants, however oppressive, perverse or absurd it may be, provided that it is not illegal or 
immora1 37 It is in reaction to this inequality that the South African Parliament, by statutory 
intervention, has favoured two methods in an attempt at levelling the playing fields. The first is to 
impose minimum conditions of employment on employers and employees; the second is to 
promote collective bargaining 38 
In line with this, Grogan3\1 lists the following deficiencies at the common law level of employment 
to which the legislature has already given its attention, namely: 
1. That the common law contract is, by its nature, individualistic, which, as a result, does not give 
regard to the collective relationship; 
2. Inherent inequality in the bargaining power between employer and employee; 40 
3. There being no regard for the enduring nature of the employment relationship; 
4. That freedom of contract encourages the exploitation oflabour; 
32(1875) LR 19 Eq 462 al 465. 
33See Brasscy et 01 The New Labour Law 1987 page 2. 
34 1920 AD 600. 
3sBrasSC)' et 01 The New Labour Law 1987 pagc 3. 
36Consequcnces ofthc right to be arbitrary: ..... tlIC average cmployee has little bargaining power, for 
the simple reason that he needs his wages more than the cmployer needs his services. He is the victim of the 
power to be arbitral)', and the employer is the beneficiary." Brassey et 01 The New Labour Law 1987 page 6. 
J7Jbid page 5. 
38Grogan Riekert 's Basic 1~"l1pl()ymenl Law 1993 page 4. 
J9Grogan Workplace Law 19% page 4. 
4iJMarlin v Murray (1995) 16 JLJ 589 (lC) at 60) C-F, 
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5. The contract does not promote participatory management. 
Though the voluntary contract defines the employment relationship, it is, however, in no way the 
exclusive memorial of the content and duration of the relationship. Statute has to a large ex1ent 
regulated the employment relationship, and as a result the employment relationship is usually 
distinct from and wider than the contractual relationship.41 It has been argued that the employment 
relationship, consequently, exists beyond the borders of the contract of employment. 42 
Furthermore, due to the above shortcomings - that the parties in a contract of employment are not 
on an equal footing to each other in their respective bargaining positions, that the parties may enter 
into oppressive contracts through contractual voluntarism, and the view of labour as a commercial 
transaction - some persons have called for the contract model to be abandoned altogether.43 
10rdaan states that: 
"Dogmatic assumptions about voluntarism and freedom of contract in the employment 
context are unwarranted, particularly today when so much of the context of that 
relationship is governed by statute".44 
Others have opted for a reformist approach, and tend to regard the law of contract as "a necessary 
element in labour law".45 
It must be remembered that the rules of the law of contract "reflect the attempts in the legal system 
to achieve a balance between relevant principles and policies so as to satisfY prevailing perceptions 
of justice and fairness. For this reason, the law of contract has a dynamic and changing nature.,,46 
It seems that this dynamic and changing nature ofthe law of contract is overlooked. Surely the 
law of contract has sufficient means available for balancing the principles of policy with the laws 
of contract. 
41Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 33. 
42Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 33, see also, Grogan A Secret Weapon Defined 199415 ILJ 720. 
43Jordaan The Law of Contract and the Individual Employment Relationship 1990 page 73. 
-«Ibid page 78. 
4$frecdland The Contract of Employment 1976 page 3. 
46Van dcr Mcrwc et al Contract: General Principles 1993 page 10. 
11 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the correct view would be to see the contract as the source of the employment 
relationship, and that the relationship between the parties is created thereby.47 In other words, 
without a contract between the parties there would be no employment relationship.48 
If the relationship of employment is created by contract it is the contract that is the sole guide as 
to the true intentions of the parties. It is the role of the implied term and legislation, as in all other 
contracts of a commercial nature, to define the ambit of the relationship in accordance with public 
policy and boni mores. Then the nature of the relationship is to be determined by analysing the 
terms of the contract.49 Therefore the legal relationship between the parties must be gathered from 
a true construction of the contract that exists. so If the agreement rests on a verbal agreement then 
the court will rely on the surrounding circumstances to locate the true intention of the parties. sl 
In short, the nature of the employment relationship is a conclusion of law dependent on the rights 
conferred and the duties imposed by the contract52- which is the source of the relationship. 
1.3. The Contract of Service. 
1.3.1 Roman Law 
Jordaan argues that in Roman law there was no systematic development of a distinct contract of 
employment, because slave labour satisfied the market demands and the letting of services for 
a wage was treated with disdain in Roman custom. 53 The rendering of services for remuneration 
47Grogan Workplace Law 1996 pagc 3 and 33, sec also, Grogan A secret Weapon Defined (1994) 15 
ILl 720. Borg Warner SA (Ply) Ltd v National Automobile and Allied workers Union (1991) 12 ILl 549 (LAC) 
at 557 G-J; the Appellate dccision, ofthc same case, reported (1994) 15 ILl 509, does not changc the above 
statement but adds that the employment relationship could endure beyond its la\\-ful termination. 
48J'he most acceptable view seems to be that the relationship of employment is basically of a 
contractual nature, see LA WSA volume 13 (1995) at page 37-38, who in tum relies on Brassey South African 
Journal of Human Rights 1993, and Olivier Tydskrifvir die SUid-Afrikaanse Reg 1993. 
49'fhose faets which do not go to prove the existence of the contract are irrelevant in detcnnining the 
nature of the relationship. Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap A VBOB 1976 (4) SA 
446 (A) at 455 A-C. 
YJSmil v fForkmen 's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (l)SA 51 (A) at 64 A - B, sec a]so 
Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap A VBOB 1976 (4) SA 446 (A) at 457 B. 
511n the words of Rabie lA (with whom RumpfTCJ, Wessels JA, Corbett JA and Miller AlA 
concurred): "Dit sprcek vanself dat die kontrdk nic nct in skrif hoef te wecs nie, en dat ook na 'feite', of 
'omliggende feitc', soos die kommissaris dit stel, gekyk kan word, maar die bcdoeling moet steeds wees om vas 
te stel wat die kontrak tussen die partye is." Ongevallelwmmissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap 
AVBOB 1976 (4) SA 446 (A) at 455 A. 
S2Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions 1968 1 All ER 433 at 439 per MacKenna J. Thus it 
is irrelevant that the parties had declared the relationship to be something else. 
53Jordaan The Law a/Contract and the Individual Employment Relationship 1990 page 74. 
12 
was dealt with as two species oflease or hire under the consensual contract of locatio conductio;54 
viz locatio conductio operarum and locatio conductio operis. 
Locatio conductio operarum, being the letting and hiring of personal services, was a consensual 
contract where the worker, as employee, undertook to place his or her personal services, for a 
certain time, at the disposal of an employer. The employer in return undertook to pay him or her 
the amount agreed upon in consideration of his or her services. 5s Usually the subject matter of the 
contract consisted of unskilled services which could be valued in money. 56 The intellectual 
services of certain classes of professional men57 were not considered estimable in terms of money 
and could not be the subject matter of the contract. 58 
Locatio conductio operis is defined as the letting and hiring of a particular work to be done, as 
a whole, in consideration of a fixed money payment. \\!hat was contemplated was not the supply 
of services or a certain amount oflabour but the execution or performance of a specified work as 
a whole. The subject matter of the contract was not the supply of services or labour as such but 
the product or result of labour. 59 
1.3.2 Roman Dutch Law 
Under Roman Dutch law, the rendering of personal services was an instance of locatio conductio. 
The above general principles underlying locatio conductio operis were adopted and further 
developed in Roman Dutch law.60 Locatio conductio operarum was known as "dic1lS contract" 
or "hulir ell verhuur van diensten", and covered all contracts of letting and hiring of personal 
services in respect of domestic servants, workmen, labourers, apprentices, sailors and other types 
of employees.61 In general '"the employment relationship received scant attention from institutional 
writers, probably because its content was to a large extent determined by local placaats and 
'>ISmit v Workmen Compensation Commissioner 1979 (l)SA 51 (A) at 56 D to 57 C. 
~5At 56 E to F. 
56At 56 H. 
~7Such as land surveyors, doctors, advocates, these being listed in .",mil v W'orkmen Compensation 
Commissioner 1979 (l)SA 51 (A) at 56 H. 
5BAt 56 H. 
~At 57 E. 
60At 58 G to H. 
61At 58 H to 59 A. 
13 
ordinances. ,,62 "In short the position at common law was that the employee as lessor leased his 
services to his employer who was regarded as the lessee of such services, and the compensation 
of the employer was regarded as rent. ,,63 
In Europe, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, a distinct contractual model for the 
employment relationship started developing. According to Jordaan, the new development was 
aimed at giving effect to the differences in the underlying economic relations serviced by 
agreement for the lease of things (locatio conductio rei), personal services (locatio conductio 
operarum), and the services of independent contractors (locatio conductio operis).64 
1.3.3 South Afiica 
South African courts have consistently classified the employment relationship as a species of 
locatio conductio.65 The employment relationship is locatio conductio operamm, the leasing of 
personal services, while the contract between a principal and a contractor is locatio conductio 
operis, the letting and hiring of some definite piece ofwork.66 The difference between these two, 
expressed in the judgment of De Villiers CJ,67 is to ascertain whether the worker renders the 
service in the course of an independent occupation representing the will of his or her employer 
only as to the result of the work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. In the 
relationship of independent contractor the principal can control the end product, in other words 
what he or she wants, but not how the task is to be achieved. 
In the employment relationship the employer may demand both the end result and the means to 
be used to achieve that result. At this stage it is necessary to state that the employer's "control" 
in the employment relationship is not decisive, but merely important in the classification of the 
contract of employment. The courts have tended to opt for a classification of the contract based 
on a dominant impression of the circumstances, in other words, an impression of which form of 
62At 58 H sec also Spencer v Gostelow ]920 AD 617 at 628 to 629,638 and B Jordaan The Law of 
Contract and the Individual Employment Relationship 1990 page 75. 
63LA WSA volume 13 (1995) page 8. 
64 Jordaan The Law o/Contract and the Individual J<..'mp/oyment Relationship 1990 page 75. 
65Jordaan, ibid, relies on: 
- Spencer v Gostelow 1920 AD 6]7 
- Smil v Workmen Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 
- Potchestroom Municipali~v v Bouwer NO 1958 (4) SA at 382 (T). 
66Colonial Mutual Life Assurance SOCiety Ltd v MacDonald] 931 AD 412 at 433, 
67At 432-3, 
contract is dominant in the circumstances, or more probable. 68 
1.4. Definitions of the contract of employment. 
Authors have offered the following definitions of the contract of employment: 
Coetzee·69 , 
14 
" ... a contract of employment is a mutual agreement in terms of which one person (the 
employee) for remuneration, makes his personal services available to another person 
(employer), in such an manner that the former occupies a subordinate position towards the 
latter". 
Du Plessis et al; 70 
"A contract of employment may be defined as an agreement in terms of which one party 
(the employee) agrees to make his personal services available to the other party (the 
employer) under the latter's supervision and authority in return for remuneration." 
Fourie;71 
"The service contract is an agreement in which one party (the employee) undertakes to 
provide services to the other party (the employer) for remuneration in such a manner that 
the employer exercises authority and supervision over the employee." 
Grogan;72 
"A contract of employment is an agreement between two legal personae (parties) in terms 
of which one of the parties (the employee) undertakes to place his or her personal services 
at the disposal of the other party (the employer) for an indefinite or determined period in 
return for a fixed or ascertainable wage, and which entitles the employer to define the 
employee's duties and (usually) to control the manner in which the employee discharges 
them." 
Mureinik 73 , 
"A service contract is simply ... an agreement in which one party (the servant) agrees to 
68See in this regard chapter 2 where the three tests, traditionally used in locating and distinguishing 
the employment contract from other contrdCts; namely control, organisation and dominant impression are 
discussed and analysed. 
69Coctzee Die Toepassingsterrein van Ongevallewetgewing in die SUid-AJrikaanse Reg cited in 
LA WSA (volume 13) 1995 page 38. 
7OJ)u Plessis et al A Practical Guide to Labour Law page 8, cited in LAWSA (volume 13) 1995 
page 39. 
71Fourie Law of Master and &rvant in South AJrica page 2, cited in LAWSA (volume 13) 1995 
page 39. 
72Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 20. Grogan offers the definition "if only for the purposes of 
identifying its essentials." 
73Mureinik The contract of service- an ea.\y test for hard cases ) 980 page 263. 
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work for another (the master) in which the servant occupies a subservient position." 
Editors W A Joubert and T J Scott;74 
"A contract of employment is a mutual agreement in terms of which an employee makes 
available his services for a determined period and remuneration under authority of the 
employer. " 
All the above definitions seem to highlight the following as playing a role in the nature of the 
employment relationship: 
1. An agreement. 
2. Between two persons. 
3. For a period of time. 
4. The offering of personal services. 
5. For remuneration. 
6. Some sort of subordinate status of the employee. A subservient position (Mureinik), a 
subordinate position (Coetzee), where the employer has supervision and authority (Du Plessis and 
Fourie), authority (Joubert and Scott), and to define the employee's duties and usually to control 
the manner in which the employee discharges them (Grogan). 
This is not to say that these above elements are the "essentials" of the contract of employment, 
but rather they highlight those elements which are important, from the perspective of the writers 
listed. Remembering that a court will determine the nature of the relationship on an impression 
of the circumstances of the case, it follows that the above elements may only be strong indicators 
for the impression that the contract is one of employment. The existence of some kind of authority 
by an employer over the employee is an important indication of a contract of employment. 75 
Joubert JA comments that it is clear that "one of the important legal characteristics of locatio 
conductio operarom ... in Roman-Dutch law is the duty of the employee ... irrespective of whether 
he happens to be a domestic servant or any other type of employee, to obey the lawful commands, 
orders or instructions of his employer ... in regard to the performance of his services".76 For "the 
74Editors W A Joubert and T J Scott, LAWSA (volume 13) 1995 page 39. 
7~LAWSA (volume 13) 1995 page 43, sec also Kerr The Law of Agency 1991 page 38. 
76!::'-'mit v Workmen Compensation Commissioner 1979 (I) SA 5J (A) at 60 G-H. 
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relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typicaUy a relation between 
a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an act of submission, 
in its operation it is a condition of subordination ... ". 77 
1.5. Conclusion. 
Contract is the SQurce of the relationship between an employee and employer. Essentialia form 
the bones of the special contract. Due to the type of special contract, naturalia occur. If more 
flesh is needed then terms incidental to the nature of the contract will be expressed, these being 
the accidelltalia. The contract of employment is the source of the parties' rights and duties,78 
which include the employer's power of supervision and controJ/9and remedies. so Finally, the 
contract of employment operates as a conceptual framework for statutory regulation of the 
employment relationship .In 
The legal re1ationship between the parties is to be gathered from a true construction of the 
contract that existed between the parties. 82 This conclusion, of the nature of the relationship, is 
a conclusion of law dependent on the rights conferred and the duties imposed by the contract. 83 
In employment some sort of subordinate position or status is held by the employee in the 
relationship The employer has the "traditional right" to control the means to achieve the end 
result for which the employee has been employed. It is this authority over the employee or 
subordinate status of the employee, or the exercising of control by the employer, and the breach 
of this position by the employee that is the focus of this thesis. The role of "subordination" in the 
employment relationship is the topic of discussion in the following chapter. 
TIBcing the words of Sir Otto Kahn-Freund: P Davies and M Friedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the 
Law 1983 page 18, cited in Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 31 footnote 35. 
78f'or example, employee's duty of good faith and. for the employer, the duty of safe working 
conditions. B Jordaan The Law of Contract and the Individual Employment Relationship 1990 page 80. 
NB) yirtue of the employee's implied duty of obedience. Sec Jordaan The Law of Contract and the 
Individual r.·mployment Relationship 1990 page 80. 
aJlbid 
B'Ibid. 
828mit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (I) SA 51 (A) at 64 A to B, sec also 
Ongevollekommis,mris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap A VBO/J 1976 (4) SA 446 (A) at 457 B. 
B:lReady Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions 1968 I All ER 433 at 439 per Mackenna 1. 
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Chapter 2 
SUBORDINA TION IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
2.1 Introduction. 
This Chapter will discuss the three common law tests of Control, Organisation and Dominant 
impression which are, or have been, used in locating and distinguishing the contract of 
employment from other contractual relationships. Each test will be discussed and problems 
associated therewith will be presented. The underlying theme is to highlight the importance of the 
employer's control over the employee within the employment relationship, as well as discussing 
the place and extent of "control" in that relationship. The nature of the relationship of 
employment will then be discussed in order to isolate the employee's duty to be subordinate. 
2.2 The Common Law Tests for locating the Contract of Employment: 
"Control", "Organisation", and "Dominant Impression". 
2.2.1 The Control Test. 
It is clear that "one of the important legal characteristics of locatio conductio operarom ... in 
Roman-Dutch law is the duty of the employee ... irrespective of whether he happens to be a 
domestic servant or any other type of employee, to obey the lawful commands, orders or 
instructions ofms employer ... in regard to the performance of his services.") The employer thus, 
under locatio conductio operarom, has a concomitant right to supervise and control the manner 
in which the employee is to perform hislher services. 2 
Decisions as early as 18943 have stressed the right of the employer to control4 both the result and 
the means of the employee's workS as an essential fact which establishes the relationship between 
ISmif v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) per Joubert JA at 60 G-H. 
2Ibid 60 H. 
3Eas/ London Municipality v Murray 1894 (9) EDC 55. 
41n Townsend v Hankey Municipality 1920 EDL 226 at 228 the clement of control was the proper 
criterion by which to determine whether the relation of master and servant exists, and is found in the right of 
the master to control and order the other(thc employee) in the performance of the work. 
st.·asf London Municipality v Murray] 894 (9) EDC 55 at 61, sec also: t.~vssen v Calder and Co 1903 
(20) SC 435. 
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the employer and employee.6 Therefore where there is no right of control there is no employment 
relati onshi p. 
In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 7 the Appellate Division adopted 
the English8 test of supeJVision and controf for distinguishing the relationship of employment from 
other relationships. De Villiers CJ agreed with the statement of Me Car die J in Peiforming Right 
Society, Ltd v Mitchell and Booker (palais de Dallse) LidO where McCardie J observed that it was 
notoriously difficult to place one's hand upon anyone test which is conclusive in distinguishing 
the employment relationship from other relationships. I 1 Nevertheless, De Villiers CJ observed 
that while it may be a delicate matter to decide whether the control reserved to the employer under 
the contract was of such a nature as to constitute the employer the master of the workman, it was 
beyond dispute that the relation of employer and employee could not exist where there was a total 
absence of the right of supervising and controlling. 12 
Therefore, in line with the thinking found in Colonial MUlual Life Assurance Society Ltd v 
MacDonald, the crucial difference in the relationship of employment and that of the independent 
contractor is that in the former the employer engages an employee to work and is entitled, under 
the contract, to supeJVise and control the work of the employee13- both as to the end result to be 
achieved and the means to be used. On the other hand, the independent contractor is bound to 
contract and the PlincipaJ may only control the end to be achieved and not the means - unless this 
is expressly contracted for The essential difference then lies in controlling the "means". The test 
for the existence of the employment relationship is therefore dependent on the existence of a right 
6EaSi London Afunicipalily v Jlurray 1894 (9) EDC 55 at 62. III Union Government (Afinister oj 
Agriculture) v Lombard 1926 CPD 150 at 154, Cardiner J refers to the ~ of control to conclude if the 
relationship is one of master and servant or of an independent contractor. 
71931 AD412. Which was relied on inR v Caplin 1931 OPD 172 at 173. 
8Joubcrt. JA in Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (l)SA 51 (A) at 62 C. 
9Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (I )SA 51 (A) at 61 H. 
101924 1 K.B at 766. 
I I Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 434. 
l2"One thing appears to me beyond dispute and that is that the relation of master and servant cannot 
exist where there is a total absence of the right of supervision and controlling the workman under the contract; 
in other words unless the master not only has the right to prescribe to the workman what work has to be done, 
but also the manner in which that work has to be done." Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v 
MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 435. 
13Per De Villicrs CJ in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd \' MacDonald 1931 AD 412 
at 433. 
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of control held by the employer over the employee, to control both the end to be achieved and the 
means used14 in achieving that end. 
The test has been stated as follows: 
"A servant is an agent who works under the supervision and the direction of his employer; 
an independent contractor is one who is his own master. A servant is a person engaged 
to obey his employer's orders from time to time; an independent contractor is a person 
engaged to do certain work, but to exercise his own discretion as to the mode and time of 
doing it - he is bound by his contract, but not by the employer's orders."15 
The basis of the test is "control",16 control as a "legal right" allows the employer to command what 
work is to be done and the manner in which that work has to be done. 17 Specifically the right of 
control includes the right of the employer to decide what work is to be done by the employee and 
the manner in which it is to be performed, the means used in doing it, the time when and the place 
li'here the work is to be done. 18 As such this right of control, "makes possible the deployment of 
the productive capacity for which the employer contra('1s, and so is the essence of what has come 
to be termed 'managerial prerogative"'.19 
Though control is the test for the existence of the relationship of employment, it does not follow 
that the independent contractor may not be subject to the employer's control. The right to 
supervise may be reserved as one of the terms of the contract. For the independent contractor, 
the source of the relationship is contract and the contract will expressly state the end result which 
should be achieved The independence of the contractor is at the heart of this relationship -
independence being the lack of control the other party may claim over the manner in which the 
contract should be achieved. Control as to means is not inferred from the circumstances of the 
14See Townsend v Hankey Municipality 1920 EDL 226 at 228. 
15Salmond Law of Torts 6th edition page 96 cited by De Villiers CJ in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 435. 
IlYJ"he hallmark of the employment relationship. Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 13. 
I7C%nial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 436, sec also R v AMCA 
Services Ltd and another 1959 (4)SA 209 (A) at 212. 
18S'mit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (l)SA 51(A) at 60H (thc italics is minc). 
"Supervision implies the right ofthc employer to inspect and direct the work being done by the employee." at 
6OH. 
" 'Control' and 'supervision' arc related .... When refcrcnce is made to an employer's right to 
prescribe 'the manner in which the work has been done', what is meant can also be conveyed by saying that the 
employer has the right not only to say what has to be done, when it has to be done, and where it has to be done, 
but also how it is to be donc." (Italics being mine) Kerr The Law of Agency 1991 page 39. 
I~rasscy The Nature ofHmploymen/1990 page 908. 
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individual relationship and if control is exercised in the way the work is to be done then it is to be 
stated so expressly. The contract of the independent contractor is the source of the conclusion 
that the other party lacks control over the means to achieve the contracted for result. 20 In the 
independent contractor's contract control as to means is absent because independence is secured. 
On the other hand, the converse would occur in a relationship that was dominated by control, such 
as in the employment relationship. Here any limitation of the employer's control over the 
employee must be expressly mentioned in the contract. 
In both relationships, the employment relationship and the relationship of the independent 
contractor, the element of control gives each their specific identity. Their nature is dependent on 
the presence or lack of "control" as to the means of achieving the contracted for result. If this 
essence of the relationship is to be restricted or limited it must be done consciously and expressly. 
Thus there would be no relationship of employment where the employer lacks, as to means and 
ends, control over the employee. The presence of control is essential,21 but does control have to 
be absolute? 
In the decision of Colonial Mutual Ltfe Assurance SOciety the court highlighted that "the relation 
of master and servant cannot exist where there is a total absence of the right of supervision and 
controlling the workman".22 If there was a total absence of the right to control then there would 
be no relationship of employer and employee. If there was complete control in detailed 
supervision and control then there would be a relationship of employer and employee. In later 
decisions it was held that Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society was authority for the right to 
control, as to both the means and end, being vital for the existence of the relationship of 
employment. 23 But whether a relationship of employer and employee existed depended mainly, 
2°Note here the circulant)' of the control test, which will be discussed more fully hereunder in dealing 
with the "difficulties "ith the control test". 
21Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society LId v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 435 per De Villiers Cl 
22Colonial Mulual Life Assurance SOCiety Ltd v MacDonald 193] AD 4] 2 at 435. 
2JR v Feun 1954 (l)SA 58 (TPD) 58 at 600 -F per Roper J. 
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ifnot entirely, upon the degret?4 of control exercised by the employer over the manner in which 
the work was performed. 25 In the words of Roper J, as he then was: 
"Complete control in every respect is in my view not essential to the master and servant 
relationship, and some degree of freedom from control is not incompatible with the 
relationship". 26 
Whether the control exercised is enough to lead to the conclusion that the engaged person is a 
servant is therefore a question of degree. 27 
"It seems, however, reasonably clear that the final test, and certainly the test to be 
generally applied, lies in the nature and degree of detailed control over the person alleged 
to be a servant. ,,28 
The control the employer can exercise must be detailed, but it need not be total. 29 How detailed 
should this control be? 
"Proponents of the test do not say how detailed the control must be. If they did, they 
would probably have to say, it is control sufficient to make the worker an employee -
there seems no other way of putting it. Circular reasoning of this sort may not be foreign 
to the law, but the control test certainly seems to encourage it".30 
2.2.1.1 Difficulties with the Control Test 
It must, at the beginning of this section, be noted that the majority of the cases that use the control 
test involve the attachment ofliability to the employer for the delicts of his or her employees. The 
result is that these decisions may be unsatisfactory guides in determining the nature of 
employment, in reality they tum more on the power of control than the fact of employment 31 
Kahn-Freund32 focusses on the social origins of the control test, and in comparing these origins 
to the differing social realities in a post-industrial world and assuming that control must be 
24See Union Government (Minister of Agriculture) v Lombard 1926 CPD 150 at 154, where Gardiner J 
relies on Performing Right SOCiety. Ltd v Mitchell and Booker (palais De Danse) Ltd 1924 1 KB 762 and 
Addis v Schiller Lighting and Plumbing Co } 906 TIl 218 to make the comment that the test of whether one was 
a servant or independent contractor depended on the degree of control exercised by him. 
2SSee Union Government (A·finister of Agriculture) v Lombard 1926 CPD 150 Lomhard at 154. 
26R v Feun 1954 (l)SA 58 (TPD) at 60 H - 61 A. 
27Roper J relying on and quoting Curlewis J from De Beer v Thompson 1918 TPD 70 at 76. 
2JJPerforming Right Socie~v Ltd v Milchell and Booker (Pa/ais De Danse) Ltd 1924 I KB 762 at 767. 
29Brassc), The Nature of Employment 1990 page 911. 
JOIbid at page 911 . 
31Ibid at page 936. 
32Kahn-Freund Servants and Independent Contractors 1951 (J 4) Modem Law Review 504, referred to 
and relied upon in Bmsscy The Nature of Employment 1990 page 908. 
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complete, he forms his criticism of the control test. Because some employees in the post -industrial 
era work at a distance from their employers and possess skills and knowledge that their employers 
lack it is obvious that these employees need more freedom to perform their employment duties. 
Therefore these "post-industrial employees" could not be subject to detailed supervision and thus 
could not be under the employer's control in relation to the manner in which they performed their 
work. Strictly speaking these servants could not be said to be under the employer's power of 
control. Brassey states that whether the control test was so bound up with the conditions of the 
age is debatable, but what is more debatable is the construction that Kahn-Freund places on the 
control test. 33 
Brassey argues that Kahn-Freund regards the control test as being concerned with whether the 
employer practically controls or can practically control the employee, when in reality the control 
test is concerned with whether the employer has the contractual right to do so. 
"The fact that control cannot de facto be exercised may justiry the inference that it was not 
de iure contracted for~ but the opposite conclusion is not impossible, and it would be one 
to which the courts would be driven if the contract contained express terms to that 
effect. ,,34 
If control cannot practically be exercised then this may justiry the conclusion that it was not 
contracted for; but if the control is not exercised then the conclusion that it was contracted for is 
not impossible. Furthermore, it may be argued that employees work at a distance or without 
supervision only with the leave of the employer - this being a waiver or self-restriction of the 
contractual right of control being made in the best interests of the employer. The employer, 
however, still retains the contractual right to transfer the employees back to head office and the 
like35 
In assessing the completeness of control which Freund-Kahn assumes, Brassey comments that 
proponents of the control test "see the test as operating only in a residual area, the area remaining 
after allowance has been made for the duties imposed by statute and other imperative rules.,,36 
Thus the test is seen as operating in that part of the relationship the parties can regulate for 
33Brasscy The Nature of Employment 1990 page 909. 
34Ibid at page 909-10. 
35Ibid at page 9JO. 
36lbid. 
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themselves. 37 In the words of Roper 1: "Complete control in every respect is '" not essential to the 
master and servant relationship, and some degree of freedom from control is not incompatible with 
the relationship". 38 
\Vith such difficulties in the application of the control test in mind, courts shifted from requiring 
de facto control to requiring merely a right of control. 39 Grogan argues that the court is speaking 
of a right to control in principie.iW The fact that the employer does not choose to exercise the 
right of control will not render the contract something other than one of employment, 41 provided 
the employer has the ability to exercise the right of control. Mureinik points out that what this 
contention overlooks is that the content of the right of control is the right of detailed supervision, 
that is, detailed supervision as to the manner in which the work is done. 42 He argues that this is 
the problem, because the employer cannot supervise all work in detail. 43 He continues by asking 
the apt question: "Is it not artificial to distil from a right which is not only never exercised, but 
which is inherently incapable of exercise, the acid test for the existence of an employment 
contract?'* In the words of Schreiner JA, "the presence of a right of control, as opposed to the 
actual practice of control, will often prove so difficult of verification as to make it most unsuitable 
as a test for the purposes of such regulations as these". 45 To do so places a premium, Mureinik 
continues, on the existence of a right so theoretical as to be almost fictitious, with the result that 
it divorces the legal criterion from social reality. 46 
Mureinik then asks another important question: "[I]s it necessarily true that the right exists even 
in theory?"47 He argues as follows: The application of the control test for the existence of a service 
contract implies that control is one of the essentialia of the contract. 48 As an essentialia the right 
of control is to be stated expressly. But usually this right of control is not stated expressly, 
37Ibid. 
lSR, V Feun 1954 (I )SA 58 (TPD) at 60H - 61 A. 
39Rodrigues v Alves 1978 (4)SA 834 (A) at 842 A. 
4OGrogan Workplace Law 1996 page 13. 
41 Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 1993 page 10. 
42Murcinik The Contract ofSen'ice-An Easy TestfiJr liard Cases 19RO page 249. 
43Ibid. 
+llbid. 
4~R v AMCA Sevices Ltd and Another 1959 (4) SA 207 (A) at 213 D. 
46Mureinik The Contract ofSen'ice-An Easy TestfiJr liard Cases 1980 page 249. 
47Ibid 
48Mureinik The Contract of Sen' ice-A n Fa.'ry Test fiJr liard Cases 1980 page 249. 
24 
especially when the employee is more skilled than the employer. If this is so, then from what may 
this right of control be inferred? Mureinik continues that in these cases the right of control could 
not be said to exist in theory unless it is implied ex lege, that is, it is one of the llaturalia of the 
contract. 
"This it could not be if it was the test for the existence of the contract. It would be 
circular to infer the contract from the right of control and the right of control from the 
contract. And even if it were assumed that the test is not control, where the employee 
contracts to work remote from supervision or where he possesses more skill than his 
employer... the right of control must surely be taken to have been excluded by necessary 
implication. ,,49 
Brassey attacks the control test for its impracticality. 50 Taken literally, it identifies people as 
employees who are not, for example National Service men who peel potatoes in the mess. 51 And 
what of "the problem created by the independent contractor who, willing to trust the good sense 
of the employer, agrees to work in accordance with instructioils,,?52 Furthennore, Brassey sees 
the test failing because it insists that the employer should be the repository of the right of control. 53 
This, according to Brassey, has nothing to do with the fact that control in a large undertaking is 
normally exercised by supervisory staff and not by the employer personally. 54 Rather, it deals with 
the case where the employer expressly agrees not to interfere in the way the job is done, and 
someone else - an employee or independent third party - is appointed to supervise the worker. 
Proponents of the control test would have to say that there is no employment relationship between 
this worker and the employer, but this conclusion seems unrealistic. 55 
4~Mureinik The Contract ofSen'ice-An EQ.\y Test for Hard Cases 1980 page 250. 
'KlBrasscy The ;Vature of f~'mpl(Jyment 1990 page 912. 
51lbid. 
5:Jbid Brasscy suggests that a solution perhaps is found in Ready Mixed Concrete(South l~'ast) v 
Minister of Pensions and National Insurance 1968 2 QB 497 where MaeKenna J recognised that "the right of 
control can neycr be a sufficicnt condition for thc existence of an employmcnt rclationship(at 516G-517 A). At 
best it is a necessary one." (Brassey The Nature of Employment] 990 pagc 9] 2 ) Brassey continucs 
highlighting that evcn in this rolc it fails, this is so because thc test "prefers form above substance, looking at 
the source ofthc control rathcr that its naturc. By postulating that the employer must have a residual right, 
however attenuated. to givc the worker instructions, it excludcs from employmcnt those cases in whieh the way 
the job must be done is exhaustively prescribed by the contract. "(Brassey The J\'ature of J:.;l1Iployment 1990 
page 913). 
531bid page 913. 
54-'ITJhe supervisoT) staff obviously excrcise thc right of control as thc employer's agents, lin thc loose 
sense, sec footnote ]44 page 913 of Brassey The Nature ofEmployment1990J and thc employer invariably 
rctains thc ultimate right of control ovcr each employee in thc firm. "Brassey The Nature of f'-mployment 1990 
page 913. 
551bid page 913-4. 
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"Accepting that a third party can have exclusive right of control over employees would 
probably destroy the control test; for, once this proposition is conceded, it becomes 
impossible to see why the employee should not, as it were, be that third party; why, in 
other words, it is incompatible with employment that the worker should have the 
discretion to decide how the job is to be done. If, for example, a person hired to manage 
a hotel under the supervision of the owner is an employee, one cannot understand why he 
should cease to be so when the owner decides to retire and puts his accountant, or the 
manager himself, in ultimate control of the business."56 
From the above difficulties it comes as no surprise that the control test did not survive. It was 
only the endorsement by the Appellate Division in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance SOCiety Ltd 
v MacDonald kept it alive for so long. Before Colonial Mutual Life Assurance SOCiety Ltd v 
MacDonald, courts started describing the right of control not as decisive but merely as 
important. 57 The result was that the control test became no absolute test at all, but no one really 
said as much until Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 58 
2.2.2 The Or2anisation Test. 
Dissatisfaction with the control test led to the organisation test being adopted by the Appellate 
Division in R v AMCA Services (Ply) Ltd"9 which will be discussed here under. 
The organisation test was first concisely articulated by Kahn-Freund who argued that the key 
question was whether the alleged employee formed part of the employer's organisation6{) An 
employee was one who agreed to work for another and who found himself or herself in a 
subordinate position to the employer through having submitted contractually to the employer's 
power of organisation61 In other words, the test depends on whether the person is "part and 
"'Ibid page 914. 
~7Brassey relics on the following authorities: De Beer v Thomson and Son 1918 TPD 70 at 76, Dennis 
Edwards and Co \' Lloyd 1919 TPD 291 at 295, Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap 
AVBOB 1976 (4)SA 446 A at 456H, Lichaba v Shield I'ersekeringsmaatskappy 1977 (4)SA 623(0) at 635F-H, 
Sasverbijl Beleggings en Verdiskonterings Maatskappy v Van Rhynsdorp Town Council 1979 (2) SA 77 I (W). 
~1979 (1) SA 51 (A). Sec Brasscy The Nature aJEmployment 1990 page 915. It should be noted that 
in the law of Delict, the control test in the determination of a master and servant relationship is still being 
applied for the purposes of fixing the master with liability for the servant's Aquilian wrongs. Mureinik The 
Contract oj sen'ice-An emy lest ji.lr hard cases 1980 page 248, sec also Rodgrigues v Alves) 978 (4) SA 834 
(A). 
¥II? v AMCA Services Ltd and another 1959 (4) SA 207 (A). 
6OKahn-Frcund Servants and Independent Contractors 1951 ) 4 Modem um Review 504 at 507 cited 
in Mureinik The Contract oJService-An Easy Test ji.Jr Hard Cases 1980 page 251. 
61Mureinik The Contract oj service-An Ea!>y Test Jor Hard Cases 1980 page 251. 
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parcel of the organization. ,,62 
The essence of this test, "which would seem to have been prompted mainly by considerations of 
social and economic policies, turns on the integration of the employee into the employer's 
business."63 Or, in the words of Lord Denning: 
"under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business, and his work is 
done as an integral part of the business; whereas under a contract of services, his work, 
although done for the business is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it.,,64 
In R v AMCA Services Ltd and another. 65 Schreiner lA,66 who delivered the judgement, saw the 
question to be decided as whether premium collectors were "employed or working for any other 
person" within the definition in the cost of living regulations contained in War Measure 43 of 
1942, as amended. SChrCi:1Cl JA commented that though each statutory definition of employee 
stands primarily by itself,67 he noticed that the statutory language attempted to make the cost of 
living allowances net wide, and was so wide that it obviously had to be cut down to exclude 
certain cases 68 As a result, he continued, one seeks a test to judge whether a person who in the 
widest sense works for another falls within the scope of the RebTUlations 
The first test that was considered by the court was whether the employer had the right to control, 
not only the end to be achieved by the other's labour and the general lines to be followed, but the 
detailed manner in which the work was to be performed69 Seeing that the right of detailed control 
62Denning LJ in Bank voor Handel en Sheepvaart NI' v SlatjiJrd and Another 1952 2 All ER 956 
(CA). at 295 citcd in Mureinik The Contract of Service-An Easy Testfor Hard Cases 1980 page 252. 
63Smit v Workmen's Compellsation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 63 E. per Joubert AJ. 
MStCl'enSOI1, Jordan & [lai'rison Ud v Mac/)o!1old & E'vans (1925) 1 TLR 10 1 at Ill. Cited in ,s'outh 
African Labour Law Thompson and Benjamin, part E by B Jordaan page 5. 
651959 (4 )SA 207 (A). 
66Malan JA, and A B Beyers JA, concurred. 
67R vAMCA Sen'ices 1959 (4) SA 207 (A) at 211 H. 
68At 212 E. 
69-"(T]he principal reason for distinguishing between the servant and tile independent agent is to fix the 
employer's liability for the other's deliets. To explain the reasons for the master's spccialliability for the 
delicts of his seryant when he has not authori~d thcm, and even when he has expressly prohibited them, has 
proyed no easy task. The main reason may be historical. that. as Holmes put it in The Common Law, service is 
'the decaying reIIlnant of an obsolete institution'. slavery. But at any rate if the employer can control, or at 
least has the right to control, the detailed manner of the other's work, it is not ob\lously unreasonable to hold 
the employer liable. But if the right of detailed control is crucial in deciding whether a person is a common law 
scn'ant for the purposes of the law of delict there seems to be no reason, in conunon sense, why it should be 
erucial in dcciding whether a person is or is not an employee as defined in the present rcgulations."Schreincr 
27 
was crucial in resting liability on the employer for the employee's delict it did not follow that the 
right of control was instructive in deciding if the person was or was not an employee. Rather, for 
Schreiner JA, the true test was one that incorporated the aim of the Regulations at requiring the 
payment of a cost of living allowance for the lower paid members of an organisation but not for 
payment to persons outside of the organisation. 
"Inside the organization you may have persons whose work is subject to close control, or 
to slight control or to no control at all, as may seem most convenient. Some of the 
workers in the organisation may be paid by time and may be required to work during fixed 
hours at specified places. Others may be paid by results and may not be restricted in 
regard to hours of work or where it is to be done. Some may have transport or other 
equipment provided, others may have to provide their own. Some may have no latitude 
to work for other concerns, competing or non-competing, others may have some such 
latitude. Some may work under the supervision or subject to inspection, others not. Some 
may be subject to regular leave agn:~ements, others not. Though none of these 
considerations will by itselfbe decisive they will all to a greater or lesser extent throw light 
on the problem wrll.:thc;· the persons in question are inside or outside the business 
organisation or not. ,,7,) 
It was, however, held that the work done by the collectors was work done inside the company's 
organisation. The collectors were performing the company's work and not their own, they were 
members of its organisation and were therefore employees within the scope of the "definition".71 
"It seems to me that the general picture of the work done by the collectors is that of work 
done inside the company's organisation. In the nature of things a fair amount oflatitude 
was left to them, but they had their rounds to do and what they were doing was primarily 
the company's work not merely their own They were members of its organization and 
therefore employees within the definition."n 
In the above decision it would seem that control or the lack thereof would merely function as an 
indicator as to whether or not a person forms part of an organisation - or is integrated into the 
organization. This still, however, begs the question of what forms the criteria of being part of or 
being integrated into an organization. 
In the later judgement of 5·; v AMCA Services (Pt))Ud'3 the only question to be decided was 
whether the "collectors" were employees within the scope of the definition in the RehlUlations. 
JA dismissing the control test at 212 H to 213 B. 
7°At 214 - 214 C. 
71At 214 G-l-I 
72At 214 G-H 
73 1962 (4)SA 537 (A) 
----------~--~-- _._--_. __ ._---------
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Before 1957, in the decision of R v AMCA Ltd and another the collectors were held to be 
employees but since then the tenns had been ahered; it was contended that the alterations no 
longer made the collectors employees. 74 
Botha JA75 held it was clear that the omanisation test was not used bv Schreiner JA for the 
~, ~ 
purpose of deciding whether a person is employed by or works for another, rather the organisation 
test was utilised for the purpose of excluding from the ",ide scope of the regulations persons who, 
though they may in a sense be said to be working for another, were not "employed by or working 
for" such other person within the meaning of the regulations. It followed, therefore, that the 
organisation test could not be used to bring within the Regulations persons who did not work for 
another. 76 
Therefore, the need to apply the organisation test may arise if the response to the fonowing 
qL:estions are in the afiirm3ti .. c, can the collectors be said to be employed by or working for the 
company in the ordinary broad sense, and can they be entitled to be paid in respect of such 
employment or workr~77 In short, it is important, firstly, to decide if the collectors are employees 
by using the "traditional test". If held to be employees and they fall outside the company's 
organis2tion then those employees may be excluded from the oreration of the regulations The 
result was that the organisation test as a test for distinguishing the contract of employment fTOm 
other relationships wa'} rejected in S v AA!CA SOTiccs (P')~ Ud. n 
In ,S'mi! v Workmcll's Compcnsafion Commis.\iOlU:f',79 Joubcr1 JA held 
"The essence of this test, (the organisation Ilest) which would seem to have been prompted 
mainly by considerations of social and economic policies, turns on the integration of the 
employee into the employer's business But it fails to shed any light on the legal nature of 
integration. In my view the organization test is juristically speaking of such a vague and 
nebulous nature that more often than not no useful assistance can be derived from it in 
distinguishing between an employee (Ioca/of opcrarum) and an independent contractor 
(conductor operis) in our common law "811 
:4S II A.HCA Services (Ply) Ud 1%2 (4)Si\ 537 (A) al 540 F. 
7~With whom Sle)n CJ, Beyers JA, RUInpfT JA. Vblliams JA concurred. 
76 AI 541 E-F. 
77AI 541 G. 
78 1962 (4)SA 537 (A) 
'N1979 (I) SA 51 (A). 
IiOAI63 D-F, 
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Furthermore, in Ready Mixed Concrete (.\'ollth East) v Mmister ~r Pensions and National 
Insurance, MacKenna ] commented that the organisation test: 
"raises more questions than I know how to answer. What is meant by being 'part and 
parcel of an organization'? Are all persons who answer this description servants? If only 
some are servants, whi!t distinguish~s them from the others ifit is not their submission to 
orders?,,81 
Riekert states the reason for the organisa!ion tesl' s failure is that it begs two questions: "how 
much organization must there be before one is integrated in it; and what degree of integration is 
necessary'J,,82 What actually is meant by the use of the phrase "in the organisation" is no doubt 
the test's greatest downfall 83 
Due to the test's vague and nebulous nature as well as its ability to raise more questions than it 
settles, the organisation test has been rejected and has not been relied upon since R v AA1CA 
Sen'iccs ltd ami anorliLT 
2.2.3 The Dominant Impression Te~t 
The main feature of this test is that the court, in deciding if an employment relationship exists, will 
view the relationship as a whole and from this formulate its decision. 84 Where a relationship has 
the elements of both an empluyment rela1jonship and another the court will sort from the facts 
what the "dominant impression" of the contract is R< In line with this, it is easier to locate what 
the contract of employment is not, rather thali \\hat it is&(' 
In Ongevallekommissaric\ l' Ondcrlillge t 'ersekeringsgc/ux)!skap A I 'BOB ~7 the court did not spell 
out exactly what may be included in the "general picture", but some guidance is to be found from 
the English case of Ready A fixed ('ollcre/c (.)'ulIlh !~asl) Itd v A/finis/a (~f Pensions and NatirJllal 
Insllrullc:e 88 in which !\.1acKenna J sets out three possible components: 
8JRea(~~' .\/rxed ('oncrelc (Sotllh Fast) v ,\!illister of Pensions and /\'ationa! Insurance 19(,S 2 QB 497 
at 524 B-C. 
81Riekcrt Hasie Fmp!oynJ('nl /JIII' 11)87 page I) 
H1Brasscy The Sature o/Fl1Ip/ol'!llclll 1 ')<)0 page 917. 
-t K1SCC Medica! Association 0/ • ..,:1 and others v c\itnisler idHea!th and another [1997] 5 BLLR 562 (LC) 
where the court used this test in finding a relationship of employment 
K~()ngeva!/ek()mmi.\s(m.l' v ()nder!in?c I 'ersckertngsgenootskap A 11J()/J 1976 (4 )SA 44() (A) at 457 A. 
floAt 458 AtoC 
R'I97() (4)SA 4ol() (A) 
Klil%8 2 QB 41J7. 
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"(1) The servant agrees that in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will 
provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. (2) He 
agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to 
the other's control in a sufficient degree to make the other master. (3) The other 
provisions of the contract are consistent with it being a contract of service.,,89 
Under the third heading, which is intentionally wide, the court will be free to approach any 
indication that the contract is or is not representative of the nature of an employment rdationship. 
It must be noted that the parties' O\vn description of their relationship is never conclusive, 
particularly if the court finds that the facts support a conflicting conc1usion.90 
What must a court obtain the dominant impression of to classify the contract as one of 
employment? Mureinik states the court should glean an impression of a contract of master and 
servant'll The jlld~.:e'5 task is to clas::i(y the contract He or she may, in performing this task, take 
into account other matters besides control.92 The presence of the right of control over the servant, 
under this test, is, however, onl' of the most important indicia that a contract of employment in 
all probability was entered int0 93 That is, the mOIre control exercised by the employer, the more 
probable it will be that a contract of employment exists. The existence of such a right is, however, 
not the sole cliteriol1 for the existence of the rcla! ionshir of employment but rather ar. important 
indicia What other indicia arc to be considered 'will depend on the provisions of the contract in 
ques:ion 94 
Mureinik comments that it "seems plain that while the notion of employment may have sufficient 
content to enable an employee to be identified in simple (non-penumbral) cases, the 'dominant 
impression' test offers no guidance in answering the (legal) question whether the facts are of such 
a nature that the propmillls may be held to bi: a servant vvithin the meaning of tile common law 
in difficult (penumbral) cases. Indeed, it is no test at all. ,,95 He continues by pointing out that to 
8~'eitcd in Grogan Workplace '-mr 19l)(, page 14. 
9OJ?eady Mixed Concrete v Mmister u/Pensions 1968 I All ER 433 Q.B at 439 H to 440A, Grogan 
Riekerl 's Basic F.-mploYl1ll'l1t/.ml 199."\ page 12, sec also Impaial Cold ,\tOrtl}!J' \" Yco 1 '-)27 ePD 432, ". v 
I.yons Brooke Bond Tea (pI'/) Uti 1 <}81 (4) SA 445 ZAD 
91Murcinik The Cuntract of StTI'ice-An FG.lY Test for Jlard Cases 1980 page 258. 
92Ready Mixed Concrete I' II1mister of I'ension.\ 1968 I All ER 433 Q.B at 441 A. 
9'5;mi/l' Workmen's COfll[l('nslltllifl Commissioner 1979 (J)SA 51 (A) at 62 D to E. 
94."'!nil I' Workmen 's Compensation Commissioner 197~ (I )SA 51 (A) at 62 F. 
9~Mureinik The Contruet (1·Servlce-An Fmy Test for /lard Case.1 1980 page 25X. 
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sayan employment contract is one which looks like one, sheds no light whatsoever on the ·'legal 
nature" of the relationship between an employer and employee.96 Brassey agrees, and continues 
that the test " .. .is unhelpful; indeed it is no test at all, but merely a shorthand way of saying that 
the decision must not be taken without considering all the relevant factors ,,97 But the test has 
value "for its rejection of the notion that anyone factor can be decisive in determining the nature 
of the relationship."9& 
Therefore it can be appreciated why Brassey would comment that, 
"(t)he truth is that no test exists for detennining who is an employee, ifby that is meant 
some touchstone by which the relationship can quickly and certainly be identified. It 
would be surprising if there were. Employment is a complex and multifaceted social 
relationship; its forms are protean, and its existence must be divided by a process whose 
application goes unremarked in most other branches of the law, the process of assessing 
a 11 the relevant fact s ,,9,) 
2.3 The nature of employment 
As has been highlighted, in discussing the three common law tests, defining the nature of the 
employment relationship is no easy matter. 
"All past attempts to compos':' a concise definition of the telms servant or agent have failed 
so lamentably as to curb even the must impetuous. At the most it seems possible in fairly 
general terms to enumerate the more usual incidents and salient characteristics which by 
their presence or absence in any given instance may serve as an element tending to 
determine the relations of the parties "l\ll) 
In Drake's opinion the employment relationship is indefinable. WJ Atiyah agrees, and comments 
that it is impossible to define the contract of service, especially in stating a number of conditions 
which are both nec-essary to, and sufficient for, the existence of such a contract l02 Brasseyargues 
that conuibuting to the problem for l"wyers in finding the right answer is their failure to pose the 
%lbid 
97Brasscy The ."'a/urc ojFmploYnIcn/ 1990 page 920 
98lbid. 
99lbid 
WilDe Beer J, ill ('focle and C/O(!tc v R J 945 OPD 204 at 205, see a)so Uchaha v ,Shield Insurance 
1977 (4)SA 623 (0) at 635, and 1\1 Brasscy The Aature uj'/:'mployment ]990 page 893. 
IOIDrake WaKe ,..,'Im'l' or l~'ntrepreneur'! 196H Modem Law Review 408 al page 418, cited in Brasscy 
The Na/ure oj' }~mpl()yml:'nl 1990 page H94. 
1O;'Atiyah I'icarious Uahility in the I,aw orTort.~ ]967 al page 38 (art 849 ), ciled in Brasse)' The 
Nature of I~'mpl()yment 1990 page 894. 
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right question_ 103 For Brassey, lawyers have mostly been asking what the employment relationship 
looks like, in other words, they have been looking for the feature or features which make the 
relationship distinct,I04 not the essence of the relationship - what employment "is". Brassey 
continues that there might conceivably be such a touchstone, but its existence seemed unlikely, 
especially in light of the various forms the relationship might take. He points out that the quest 
has been futile, and even harmful, having a stultifYing effect on the law; so that where there might 
have been a coherence of principle there is only confusion. 105 But is there then an essence? 
Notwithstanding the above, if two parties entered into a contractual relationship, then that 
relationship is to be determined and defined within the contract. 106 The search for the true 
relationship is the search for the tme intention of the contracting parties. l07 It is in locating the 
true intention ofthc parties that the various tests. as examined above, have been utilised 
In Colonial A1u/lIaI14'l' Assur(./J}ce Suciely Ltd v A4acDonalJ control exercised over the employee 
was utilised to distiOf,~ish the emplo~'mcnt relationship from others Given the ensuing difficulties 
associated with the control test, courts shifted emphasis and started relying on a dominant 
impression made by the unique factual indicators of each case_ Therefore, when considering the 
true intention of the paliies in a p31iicGlar contract regard must be had to the wording of the 
contract's own provisions as a whole lOX However, one should guard against elevating the 
provisions of a ccnsidered contract in a decided case as a yardstick for the conclusion of a 
similarly worded contract. Each case is to be decided on its own unique facts in determining its 
nature or essence. With that s,,:o, hO\vever, "decided cases are helpful in telling us what factors 
are relevant and why "lit) Although no one factor is decisive, and there seems to be no exhaustive 
list of relevant factors, control is seen as particularly important llU 
"No longer was the right of conlrol seen as dctermina:ive: now it became simply one of 
IQ'M Brassc~ The ;\·aturc oIf.·lIIptoHrlCllt 1990 page 8<)5. 
101Sueh as control, the right of control, the right of control over residual matters, integration into the 
organisation. subordination. 
IO'M Brasscy The Vafurc uIFmp!oyment at page 895. 
I06Scc Brasscy at page 920. 
I07The intention of the parties is eonclusiye See "riggs v C\lS' ,r...'upport Services (P~I') Ltd [19971 ) 
BLLR 62 (IC) at 70 D-L And Opperman \. Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd (1997) 6 BLLR 807 (CCMA) at 810 A. 
I08Smit v U 'orkmcn 's Compensation Commissioner 1979 () )SA 5) (A) at 6R E-F. 
I09Bmsscy The Xalurc of bnp/uyment ] 990 page 923 relying on S11l1t v Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner] 979 (] )SA 51 (A) at 68 E-F. 
'loJbid. 
33 
a number of factors to be considered in deciding on the nature of the relationship - the 
most important one, perhaps, but not the only one. The proper approach, the courts 
started saying, was to decide the issue on an assessment of all the relevant factors."lll 
The above reservations notwithstanding, control is an important indication of the employment 
relationship. As a.ll indicator, control consists of the contractual right the employer holds to order 
what work is to be done, and when, where and how the work is to be done. The control, however, 
does not require the employer to have the personal ability to enable himself or herself to show the 
other party how the work is to be done; it is enough if he or she has the right to exercise control 
over the manner in which the work is to be done. For example, if a manager of a business has no 
knowledge of how to program a computer, he or she, nevertheless, has control over the 
accountant to lay down that a computer shall be used for keeping the firm's accounts. 112 
employment relationship from others. The test is not the relationship, but as tests they endeavour 
to identify the employment relationship and distinguish it from others. As a f(!suIt these 
"indicators" used in the dominant impression are "characteristics" of the relationship of 
employment and serve to reveal the ohject of the contract I 1.1 The indicators are not the object of 
the contract of employment ratba they arc expressions of it in practiceIl4 The question then to 
be asked is; what d~)('s "control" or the other indicators tell us about the essence or nature of the 
employment relationship,) 
According to Brassey, the object of the employment relationship would be conclusive of its 
nature1J5 This, Brassey argues, must be so, for the object of the contract determines the partie's 
rights and obligations, and they in turn determine the characteristics of the relationship 116 
"[T]he object of the contract of service is the rendering of personal services by the 
employee ... to the employer ... The services or the labour as such is the object of the 
contract The object of the contract of work is the performance of a certain specified 
work or the production of a certain specified result. It is the product or the re:suIt of the 
1I11bid at page SfJ7. 
mKerr The /,(f\l" (~I A gl'!1 cy 1 <)t) I page 40. 
I DSee in general Brasscy The Aature of f:'mp/oyn/cnl 1990 page 900-1. 
114Jbid 
'''Brassc~ The .\'(J(urc ofFmp/oymc!1( 1990 page 900. 
""Brassc) The Nature uf Fmp/o."vntcnl 19t)O page 900 footnote 63. 
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labour which is the object of the contract,,117 
The above, according to Brassey, is were Joubert JA isolated the traditional nature of the 
relationship, one that remains unchanged by time, but which the Judge nevertheless failed to apply 
comistemly; instead he chose to rer::ard the contract's ohject as just one of several important 
characteristics of the contract. liS The above isolated object of the employment contract suggests 
to Brassey that an employee is a person who makes over his or her capacity to produce to another; 
while an independent contractor is a person \vho commits to the production of a give:n result by 
his or her labour. 119 "In the one case what is transacted is the capacity to work, in the other it is 
the product ofit."J20 Clearly Brassey prefers the surrender of the capacity to work as the heart of 
the relationship,12l and it is this surrender, of the capacity to work, which pervades the obligations 
the parties owe each other. 
"It explains ... why the mere tendf"'r to \\'o,k is enough to entitle the employee to the 
payment of his wage; implicit ill the tcnder is the requisite surrender of productive 
capacity, and it is this that is the consideration for the wage. It also explains why ... the 
employee has a duty in 1<nv to obe\' the employer's reasonable instructions whereas the 
independent contract docs not; the instructions determine the work the employee must do, 
whereas the contractor's job is fixed by conlract"m 
The result of surrendering one's capacity to work is that the employee must be at the "beck and 
cal\" of the employer in order to render his or her pClsonal services at the behest of the latterI23 
It is thc<;e instructions ol'the employer that deTermine the \\.'ork the employee must do, whereas 
the contractor's job is fIxed by contract IN 
W c\'llli/ \' Worklllen's ('olllfwlIsa/IO/l COIIIIllI.I.\ioflcr I <)7<) (I )SA 51 (A) at 61 A-B. 
118Brasse~ lhc Xalure ufFIIlI'/UYIIICI1/ 199(J page <)(JU. 
1'''Brasse~ ]"I;('\'o/I/I·c (1IIIIj>/OI"II/CIIl ]99() page 8<)'). 
lloIbid 
121Brassey nlc '\·a/uri' (~( i:'lIIp/uYlllcn/ 1l)l)O page ')()2 quotes R HyOUlil Industria/ Relations: A A1arxisl 
inlroduction (1<)75) page 24 to the follo\\ing cflcct whell Hyman describes the employment relationship: 
""no employer can exactly predict his workload or tile labour available at any given point in time. He thus 
requires to be able to make flexible use of his labour force: and the contract of employment permits him to 
impose just such an open-ended commitment on his emplo~ ees. RRther than agreeing to expend a given 
amount of effort. the employee surn:ndcrs his capilcity to work and it is the function of management, through 
its hierarchy of control. to transforlll t1t1~ capacity into actual productive activity". 
I21Ibid 
1238,1111 \' Horkmcn 's CompenSaTion )979 () )SA 51 (A) at 6) B-C, see also S v AMCA Serl'iccs (Pty) 
Ltd 1962 (4) SA 537 (A) at 542 H. Ongcl'a//ckommi.lsaris \' Onderlinge I 'ersckeringsgcnootskap A I 'HOB 1976 
(4)SA 446 (A) at 4(>lH-4(,2D, f)enni.l Fdllardl and Cn \' Uoyd 1<)1 <) TPD 291 at 2%. (foldherg \' I>urhan City 
Councill1J70 (l)SA 325(N) al 330 E- 311 A. 
Il~ Brassc) The ;Valuri' (~r j·.mp/oyf1lcnl 1990 page 902 
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It is submitted, that by stressing that the employee contracts away his or her capacity to produce 
indicates that the employee submits himself or herself to the authority of the employer, the 
employer thus "controls" the employee. 
To borrow the words of Kahn-Freund: 
" ... [T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically 
a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its 
inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, 
however much tht; submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indisputable 
figment of the legal mind known as the 'contract of employment' ."125 
A position of subordilliition is taken up by the employee when he or she contracts away his or her 
capacity to produce in favour of the employer. 
As was indicated abnvt' for 1\brcinik the esscntiafia of the caotract of master and servant is 
control and the rendering of labour, 126 which is also the object of the contract. 127 With this in 
mind, the test,128 strictly spc3.king. is not that of control alone. 
"The test is whether there has been agreement that the alleged servant should work for the 
alleged master and that he should submit to the alleged master's right of detailed 
supervision of the manner in which the work is done. Agreement that the alleged 
employee should work fiJr the alleged employer, however, is implied in agreement on the 
employer's right of control of the manner in which the work should be done: one cannot 
submit to supervision of one's labour without also agreeing to work ,,12Y 
Mureinik begins his analysis and search by asking if any guidance can be salvaged from Smit v 
Workmen's Compcnsatio/l Commissioncr and Ongcvallekommissaris v Onderlillge 
Versekerillsgcnl10tskap AVHOR. These judgements point to a variety of factors that contra-
12'Citcd in Mureinik Con/met (:[.)'ervice: all Fmy Test for Hard Cases 1980 page 257. 
12bMureinik dismisses the paying of wage!> or a salary as all essential elemcnt of the contract. uSome 
other form of remuneration (such as tlle payment of commission) is not necessarily incompatible with the 
existence of a master-servant relationship (Imperia! Cold Storage v Yeo 1927 Cpd 432 at 435; R v Freun 1954 
(I)SA 58 T aI(2), although it is one ofthc indicia Ihat the contract is not one of employment ~4VB()B(supra) 
at 461,463; Smlt(supra) at 6~) Nor is remuneration itself an essenlialia of the contract (RodriRucs v 
All'cs(supra) at 841) .... the duration of the contract is also not an esscntial clement, and, if left open by the 
parl.ics, is govcrncd by the nalura!w (7/opaizl I' Bu!owayo MUnicipality 1923 AD 317 at 325, 326)." Mureinik 
The Contract ojS'ervicc-An Fmy Test for liard Cases 1980 page 249, footnote 16, to page 250. 
12iMurcinik The Contract o./Sen·ice-An Fa.I}' Test jor /lard Ca.\c.I 1980 page 249, footnote 16. 
I28Jbid 
129Ibid. 
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indicate the existence of the employment relationship. The contra-indications are that: 130 
1) "The alleged master has no right to supervise in detail the manner in which the work is done".131 
2) "The alleged servant is in a position of independence in the performance of his duties."132 
3) "The alleged servant is not precluded by the contract from working for another."'133 
4) "The alleged servant is not required to devote a specific amount of time to the service of his 
all eged master." 134 
5) "The alleged servant may take a vacation without the consent of the alleged master."135 
6) "The alleged servant is not obliged to perform his duties personally."J36 
7) "The alleged servant is remunerated by commission ,,137 
8) "The alleged master and the alleged servant jointly supply the facilities to enable the latter to 
work for the former,,,m 
9) "The object of the contract is the result of the alleged servant's activities and not the rendering 
of personal services by him"1.'" 
1 0) "The alleged servant is liable to the alleged master for the loss of the latter's property from 
the former's possession even if the loss is not attributable to the alleged servant's 
defauIt"14o 
] 1) "The alleged SClvant guarantees as cU"principal deblor the credit granted by him on behalf of 
the alleged master"141 
I:\('?vlurcinik 'lhe Contrael ofService-.ln Fmy Tesf jJT I lard Cases 198() page 260. 
131 Murdnik The Contract (~,U.,'en'icc-.1n }','/1IY Tesl for /fard Cases 19XO page 26 L Smit v Workmen's 
Compensation] 979 (] )SA 5] (A) at 68. OlJge\'{/lIek(!mmi.~.mris v Onderlinge !'ersekeringsgenootskap A I BOB 
]976 (4)SA 44() (A) at 45(), 
l32Murcinik the C(jllfrod o{,,,'ervice-A n FQ.\y Test fur ffarel Cases 1 <)80 page 261, Smit v Workmen's 
lOmpl'flSalion ] l)79 (1 )SA 51 (A) JClI: eil 
lJ3Mureinik The Contmel (1Scrvice-.1n Fal'\' Testfor Ifr.rd Cases 1 <)Rf) page 261, Smit v Workmen's 
Compensation 1979 (l )SA 51 (A) at 67, Ongc\'a!leko/llllll.\sari.\ v Onderlinge J 'ersekering.lgenoolskap.1f 730B 
]976 (4)SA 446 (A) at 461-2. 
134Murcinik the lontract of'<'ervice-An Ic'os:v TeSI fiJr Hard Cases 1980 page 261, 
Ogevallekommissaris v Onderlinge I'ersekeringsgenootskap A I'BOH loe cit. 
13'iMureinik the Contract (~f5,ervice-An lea!>)' Tesl for ffard Cases] 980 page 261. 
1J6Smit v Workmen '.I' Compcnsation ]979 (I )SA 51 (A) al 67- 68, Ongevallekommissaris \' Onderlinge 
Versekeringsgenootskap A 113()f3 1976 (4 )SA 44(, (A) at 460. 462. 
11,'Smil v Workmen '.I' Compensation 1979 (1 )SA 51 (A) at 68, Ongeval/ekommissaris v Onderlinge 
Versekeringsgenootskap A 1730/1 1976 (4)SA 446 (A) al 461. 4()1. 
I3S0ngevallekommissaris I' ()nderlingc ~ 'ersekeringsgenoofskap A ~ 'BOB 1976 (4 )SA 446 (A) at 459. 
139~<;"mif v Workmen's Compensation 1979 (I)SA 51 (A) at 67-8, 
14f!()ngeval/ekommissaris v Onderll!1gc Versekeringsgenoolskap A I 'BOll 11)76 (4 )SA 446 (A) at 460-1. 
141()ngevallekommissaris v Ondcrltngc ~ ersekeringsgenootskap A 111()B ] 976 (4)SA 446 (A) at 463. 
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Mureinik believes that the above factors are linked by some "unitying theme", and that this is the 
"same perception which underlies both the control test and the organisation test: that the contract 
of employment represents a relationship in which the employer occupies a dominant position,,142 
Thus irl£/;cia ], 2, :3 point toward a relationship in which the supplier of services enjoys a degree 
of independence. And indicia 4, 5, 6 "tend to show that the alleged servant has retained his 
independence by declining to submit to the alleged master's power of organisation in the 
workplace."J43 Item 7 indicates economic independence. 
In light of the above, Mureinik argues that the principle defect from which the Smit-A VBOB 
approach sutlers "is that it promotes the factors tending to establish the employee's subservience-
and which are thus only evidence of the true cIiterion - into the test itself The same flaw, in an 
aggravated form, mars the control test: it elevates the right of supervision, which is also only 
evidence 0f the employer's dumination - and evidence of one sort only - into the determinate of 
the contract. A similar w·cakness may account for the failure of the organisation test to have 
gained more than marginal support: it emphasizes a single aspect of subservience only -
subordination to the employer's power of organisation"J44 
For Mureinik, a service contract is an agreement in w·hich one party (the employee) agrees to 
work for another(thc employer) in which the employee occupies a subordinate position.1 45 Thus 
there arc two cssc!lfialia ofth;: employment relationship, firstly, the giving over of one's personal 
services, and second!\', b..:ing in a subordinate position to the employer. The subordinate position 
of the employee is the distinguishing feature of the employment relationship. As one of the 
e,\:\"(~l1/ialia of the contract, the employee owes a duty to be subordinate to the employer and the 
employer has the cOlTelat!\(' ri~~hl to demand subordination I41, In the words of Brassey, a position 
of subordination is taken up by the employee when he or she contracts away his or her capacity 
to produce in favour of the employer. Essentially the distinguishing feature - perhaps essence 
would be a better word - of the employment relationship is "subordination". 
142Murcinik 1hc ('onlracl oj"S'crI'icc-An Fa.,y Tes/ for lIard Cases 1980 page 261. 
14}Ibid page 262. 
IMIbid page 2(,1. 
14~lbid. 
146Ibid page 2(IS. 
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Is the subordinate position of the employee an essential term from which the contract of 
employment may be inferred? 
Firstly, Mureinik concedes that subordination is ordinarily thought of as a descriptive quality of 
the contract which is inferred from the terms agreed upon and not as a term itself. But, he 
continues, if it is felt desirable that the quality of subordination be transmuted into a term of the 
contract then authority is not wanting. In Jamieson v Elsworth, 147 where insolence was held by 
Innes C] to be a breach of the contract of service, it was held that the servant's duty to be 
courteous to the employer was inferred ITom the fact that he occupies a subordinate position. 148 
"Stated in this form the decision is a non sequilllr: that the relationship is one of 
subordination affords no ground for entrenching the imbalance by imposing a duty on the 
servant to respect this circumstance. It is a philosophical commonplace that an <ought' 
cannot be derived from an 'is'; the status qllo cannot, without more, give rise to an 
obligation to maintain itself."14'l 
Murcinik appears to be contending that one may not argue that because there is this fact of 
subordination in the relationship of employment that the employee then ought to owe the employer 
the duty of subordination. He is to owe the duty. If there is this state of subordination, because 
the servant is in a subordinate position, then there is a duty to be subordinate. Mureinik then 
concludes tha~ the learned Judge's reasoning only I11Gkes sense if the fact of "subordination is 
accompanied by - and buttressed by - an obligation to be subordinate "150 Thus the servant's duty 
to be civil, should be inferred no! frolll the 11h::l of suhl'fdination but from the duty of 
subordination. "The fact ofsuhordination. is ex IZiJ>othesi always present in a contract of master 
and servant; an obligation that invariably accompanies it must therefore be an essential teml of the 
agreement."151 In short, the contract contains the obligation to be subordinate The fact of 
subordination is ahvays present, but it is only the legal right and duty that make subordination 
factually present The factual situation f10\VS hom the right to dcmand.lbordination and the duty 
to be subordinate. 
It is from the essential terms of the contract that the other indicators flow, they are evidence of 
147 1915 AD 115. 
lo\!(At 118. 
149Mureinik The ('ontract ojSerl'icc-.1n Fm}' 7('.\//()r flard Cases 1980 page 2M. 
I'>(Jjbid 
1~IIbid page 2M to 2()). 
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the "lIllil)!illg thellle", Thercl(lrC the "jmlicatuls" (Ire expressions of thc unifying theme, and, 
fiutherlllore, are not all exhaustive list of all thc possible manilcstatiolls of tile "unifying theme", 
The cOl1trol and orgallisation tests cadi IlJCllSScd 011 a specillc characteristic of the employment 
relationship, namely detailed supervision and power of organisation, All the tests' failed because 
they foclissed 011 a specific pal t of the true test, that is subordination and work done within the 
organisation. If this is st), thell tlw essential ingredient that makcs the cmployer and employec 
relationship diflcrellt from other contracts is this subordinatioll. This is the conclusion to which 
the dominant impression test poillts, 
The above mentioncd tests all highlight certain unique characteristics or illdicators orthe contract 
or cmploymellt which are physical ll1ani/Cstatiolls of thc ohject, nature or the essence thereof. 
Thcrefnre all tile tcsts, when studied toget her, should reveal a "unifying theme" - thc essence of 
the relationship. 11\ agreelllent with Murcinik, the unifyillg theme is that the cmployee occupies 
a de faCIO subordinate position ill relation to the cmploycr and it is the de jure duty of the 
eillployee to occupy this position. Thc employer has tlte corresponding legal contractual right to 
oblige the employee to aSSUlllC the duty to occupy the suuordinate position, which makes 
subordination of the cmployee defacto present. 
As (I result the employee owes the employer a duty or obligation to be subordinate with the 
employer having a concomitant legal contractual right to demand obedience to this duty, This 
term or subordination forms an essential term of the contract of employment. 152 Therefore 
insubordinatioll, strictly speaking, is any conduct that bleaches this tefm. Seeing that the 
"indicators" as discussed under the DOll1inant Impression test are characteristics - or 
mallifestatiolls - orillis ullifying theille then il stallds to leasollihat allY breach oflhese "illdicators" 
I "'Thus" hen a 11l:rsoJ\ \\ ho is an eiliployce clai illS 10 he a pariller, \\ hell he or she is 1101 thcII his or 
her dislllissal isjuslilicd I'his is so because ill making sHch a claim the employee is refusing 10 perform llny of 
I he dill i0S or all elllploye0. I h0 employee is breachi ng Ihe l.xlsis or Ihe elllplo~ II1cnl rclalionship, being his or her 
suborliina1C standing and slIbjeclioll 10 Ihe control of the cmployer. 
"Now if the plaintilTclaillled to be a partnCl' whcll he \\as noL IllIillk his dismissal was justified. The 
(lnly direct :tulh(llity oilihis poillt is the case to "hiell Mr Ward cailed JIIy altcntion, All/or I' Fearon 
OX t{eY, Rep, ')X~ sec atso md~\I'lI\' \·/I/1/1P.('r!im/\II1f'kct ('!l1l Re\. Rep 152), \\hich, so hIT:ls I am 
,marc, has lIeyCf beell douhted, This argllmelll ill this case llial the plailltilrs adion was !wl1o/ide ill 
llIakillg the clailll to bc a parlner \las raised inlhat and diSlllissed- ill my opinion, rightly. By 
c1<1illling 10 bc a parlncr Ihe plailllilh\:l~ Icfilsing to perii.1l/n his dulies any IOllger itS:l servant, :lI1d 
the defcndant was thcrellponjustilkd in dismissing hilll, In 111\ opinion, thcreforc, the claim for 
daIllages for \HOllgfid dismissal faits. "lIllI" \' I'ick/e.\ 190') TS-11 I 2,l4 per Smith J al 252. 
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is, surely, insubordination. Clearly then, if the employee acts contrary to the employer's right of 
control and supervision153- an "indicator" of subordination - he or she is breaching the essential 
tern1 and is insubordinate - he or she conunits the misconduct insubordination. The same would 
occur when the employee refuses to submit to the employer's power of organisation. 154 Similarly, 
when the employee is disrespectful towards the employer he or she commits the misconduct of 
insubordination, because his or her duty to assume a subordinate position in the employment 
relationship v-louJd oblige the employee to be civil towards the employer. 
2,4 ConclusiOI1. 
In every employment relationship there must be a certain amount of control, exercised by the 
employer, over the means of producing the desired result. It is this control that gives the 
employment relationship its distinctive nature The employment relationship is a relationship 
v.here the employer has c0ntrC>! over the employee 1),'; factllal position of subordination is 
typical of the relationship. It is this factual subordinate pcsition which is the source for the 
employer's contractual right to control what, when, where and how an employee's labour is to 
be used. This includes the employee's duty to respect the employer. 
]t is this subordinate position that is the essential term of the contract of employment, because it 
gives the relationship its distinctive nature. Any frus!ration of the above rights of the employer 
by the employee would be a fundamental breach of the contract, because it strikes at the root of 
the relationship 
Insubordination, therefore, is when the employee acts contrary to his or her obligation to be 
subordinate Insubordination, thcrcfOl e, can be any mi~(;onduct which is directed towards the 
employer's rights which flo .. v from the essential "unifying theme" of subordination. Thus, if the 
employee docs not obey an instruction from the employer on what, when, where and how to 
perform an instructed tash. then he or she is breaching the employer's right of control which in 
tum is a breach of the employer's right to demand that the employee be subordinate. Furthermore, 
1~3Any conduct which frustrates the employer's right in deciding how the employee's productive 
capacity is to be used, and WltCII. whcrc and what is to be achic\cd therewith will be insubordination. 
I~Rclatcd to this is that the: employee is not permitted 10 act independently of the employer nor work 
for another, and should perfoffil his or her sclyiccs pcrsonall~ 
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the employce hy acting in a subordinate position 1I111S1 show the cmployer a certain amount of 
respcct, which if not Jonc, ill light or t he above, amounts as well to the misconduct 
insubordinatioll. In line with Ihe abovc thinking, insubordination is the material breach of the 
obligations that flow !l"om the employecs essential obligation to remain in a subordinate position. 
Thc disobedicllce or disrespect of tile cmployer would constitute sllch a misconduct, but the above 
mcntioned may nOl1lcccssarily be the only forms of misconduct which constitute insubordination, 
a bl each of the ellJpluycr' s contractual right. 
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Chapter 3 
INSUBORDINATION UNDER THE COMMON LAW CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYME~T 
3.1 Introduction. 
As shown in Chapter 2 "subordination" is an essential term of the contract of employment. When 
the employee breaches this term by being insubordinate he or she is in law breaching the essence 
of the contractual relationship. The obligation to be subordinate in the employment relationship 
is evidenced by certain characteristics, which are manifestations of the obligation or duty. The 
employer's right to control the means and ends of the employee's work is such a "manifestation". 
Notwithstanding what has been discussed in the preceding chapter the employer has the right to 
instruct how the personal services of the employee's productive capacity are to be used, what is 
to be achieved, and \\he~1 ane v../hCl~ t~le empio) to;.' is to work If any of these physical 
manifestations of the employer's right of control are frustrated or refused then the employee 
breaches the employer's right of control and thus acts contrary to his or her duty to be 
subordinate, which constitutes insubordination The same would occur when the employee was 
disrespectful towards the employee If the employee occupies the position of subordination, he 
or she is bound to act towards and address the employer \\;th a certain amount of respect. 
Therefore, when the employee is being disrespectful, he or she breaches his or her duty to be 
subordinate and is being insubordinate 
What this chapter will endeavour to locate and discuss is how the Court's have in practice dealt 
with insubordination in the workplace. Traditionally insubordination was equated with the 
employee's disobedience to a lawful instnlction of the employer, but, as was highlighted in chapter 
two, insubordination includes disrespect l Both forms of the misconduct entail the same breach 
of the employment contract, that being the employee's duty, or obligation, to be subordinate. 
"Subordination of the employee to the power of the employer has been said to be the 
hallmark of the employment relationship That subordination is encapsulated in the 
employee's implied duty to obey the employer's lavvful commands. ... The duty is 
generally said to involve two elements: the employee is obiiged to obey the employer's 
J"DisrcsJXct or insubordination on the part of the servan1 ma) make the intimate relationship of 
master and SCryant untenable and justify dismissal if such disresJXct is of a serious character." Norman-Scobie 
I,aw of Master and Servant in South Africa 195(, page 14X. 
43 
lawful commands and to behave m a respectful manner towards the employer and 
superiors. "2 
The distinction between disrespect and disobedience was formally made only recently in 
CCAWllSA l' WOO/1m Ltd I d ~Foo/worths (Hal1dburg),3 in which insubordination was defined as 
a refusal by an employee "to obey a lawful and reasonable command or request", which refusal 
was "wilful and serious (wilful disobedience)," or which "poses a deliberate (wilful) and serious 
c:hallenge to the employer's authority."4 Insolence was distinguished from insubordinationS and 
equated with "disrespect" or "rudeness". The effect of the Woo/1m decision on the nature of 
insubordination will be discussed fully in the next chapter. 
In line with the argument in chapter two, this chapter will set out dismissal for disrespect, briefly, 
and, more fuily, for disobedience under the common law. The aim is to understand both forms 
of misconduct, tlklt is disrespect and disobedience, as b(;ing part of and falling under the 
misconduct of challenging the employer's authority, or breaching the employee's duty to be 
subordinate, that is acting insubordinately. This is done to highlight the common laws 
understanding of the above mentioned forms of misconduct in the employment relationship 
32 Dismissal for 111isconduct in the contract of employm~nt 
Linder the COll1.nlOn la'.'.', the contract of employment is treated l~s~cntjally as any other contract. 
As such it could be cancelled in one of three ways:6 firstly, in terms of the contract, by giving the 
agreed period of notice or by expiration; secondly, by cancellation due to breach;? thirdly, by 
mutual consent. 
"Under the common law, an employee may be dismissed summarily only on the grounds 
of some misconduct justifying such summary dismissaL and it is only misconduct of such 
nature that it constitutes a breach of the contract of employment as material that it goes 
2Thompson and Benjilmin .~'outh Aji-ican Lahour Law (vol 1) amended seryice 36 of 1997 page El-]8. 
3(1989) 10 III 311 (lC) at 315 1. 
4Cited in Lc Roux and van Nickcrk The South Aji-ican raw of Unfair Dismissal 1994 page 139. 
~Jbid 
6Coakcr and lcffert Wille and .Hll/m 's Mercantile I,mI' o[ .... 'OUl/J A/hen (I8tll edition) ] 984 page 359. 
7"Contracts of ser\'icc do lIot differ essentially from contract~ of any other kind In eve/)' case where 
one part)' refuses to calT)' out his part of a contract the other pilrt) is justified in putting an end to it. The 
refusal need not be an express refusal; it may be implied from conduct And I think that the rule. that the 
breach by one party of an essential term of a contract justifies the other party in putting an end to it, depends 
upon the considerdtion that the breach of an essential term is equivalent to a refusal to carry oul the contract," 
Brown II Sessell 1908 TS 1137 at 1142. 
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to the root of the contract which amounts to such misconduct.. .. "8 
The common law test for summary termination in the contract of employment generally followed 
the rules of contract. The question to be determined was whether the plaintiff's failure to perfonn 
part of his 0:- he: obligations unde;- the contract were sufficient to entitle the defendant to rescind. 
Although the courts have stated that "there is some difficulty in phrasing a test which can be 
applied in all cases in which it is necessary to determine whether a failure to perfonn part of a 
contract justifies rescission." 9 It may, nevertheless, be commented that cancellation would be 
justified if a party has breached a material term, that is a vital term - express or implied - which 
breaches the "root" of the contractual agreement 10 This is so because the breach indicates an 
unequivocal intention not to be bound to the contract ll 
What constitutes misconduct justi(vin,[! di~:~issaJ is a matter "for the courts to decide in the 
circumstances of that casc, the degree of misconduct justif)ing dismissal varying with the nature 
of employment. The qlJesti'on always is v,hether the Servant has failed substantially in the 
performance of the contract...".12 Insubordination, including disrespect, has been held to constitute 
a material breach of the contract of service, because the breach makes the continuation of the 
8\F,0I1f!,OI1l0 \. ;\flfllsler of Fd:l(orilli1 tf ('ulillrl' ,{ ot/}ers (J 9(2) J:\ IL.1 329 (D) at 335 A. per 
M?gid AJ. 
9Goes to the root of the contr:lCt· "the phrase is not one which. without further elaboration, com'eys a 
vcry clear meaning As far as J can judge a breach going to the root of the contract is the same thing as a 
breach of a ,-ita] terrn. TillS \lew is supported by the judgement of Dc Villiers. JP, in Transvaal Cold Storage 
Co v ,">:1 Meal b:porl Co (1917 TPD 411) In discussing this test and explaining its meaning. Sir Frederick 
Pollock (9tt' cd. p.2X2) says: Tan it be said that the promisee gets what he bargained for, with some 
shortcomings for which damages will compensate him. or is the point of failure so vital that his expectation is 
in substance defeated'), And the author proceed" to qllote the follo\\inb passage from the judgement of 
Blackburn. J in Uctrilll v (ZV(' (I. OBD 1 X1): . We arc 10 loot to the whole contract and see whether the 
stipulation goes to the root of the matter, so that a failure to perform it would render the perfonnance of the rest 
of the contract by the plaintiff a thing different in substance from what the defendant had stipulated for; or 
whether it merel~ partiall~ affeLis it and may be compensated for in damages.' In applying that test to the case 
then before the Court, Blackburn, J, used the following language: 'and if tlle engagement had been only for a 
few performances, or for a shorl time. it would afTord a strong argument that attendance for the purpose of 
rehearsals during the six days before the commencement of thc engagement was a yital part of the agreement.' 
] think the test to appl~ in the prescnt case is whether the plaintiff failed to pcrfoml a vital part of his 
agreement. It seems to me to make no dilTer\!ncc whether the term be express or implied." 5;trachan I' Prins/oo 
1925 TPD 709 at 117. 
JOSfrachan v Prinslo() 1925 TPD 709 at 717-71 X. 
IlSee Coaker and Zcffert Wille and MtlIm 's Mercantile Lall' o[South Africa (18th edition) 1984 page 
359. 
J2Coaker and Schutz Wtlle and AMlin's Mercantile /,011 o[Soulh Afnca (17"' edition) 1975 page 278; 
relying on Kaplan v l'enkm 1<)33 CPD 221. 
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employment relationship impossible,13 and justifies cancellation. 
3.3 Dismissal for Disrespect. 
In the employment relationship, under the common law, the employee has contracted to be under 
the control of the employer. It is in this subordinate position that the conmlOn law has upheld the 
duty of the employee to be respectful to the employer in performing his or her duties. 14 
Disrespect, or insubordination, may make the employment relationship untenable and justifY 
dismissal provided the disrespect is serious. 15 However, if the disrespect occurs on one occasion 
it must be of an aggravated character to justifY dismissal. I6 What constitutes disrespect will 
depend on the facts of the case and the nature of the position the employee holds,17 as well as 
public polici 8 . 
34 Dismissal for Disobedience. 
Subordination is essential for the relationship of employment. The employee is under the authority 
of the employer, who in tum controls the employee's productive capacity for the employer's own 
benefit The emplnyer therefore has the contractual right to command \'vhat the employee is to 
accomplish and how, when, and where a task is to be performed. \\'hen the employee disobeys 
the instructions of the employer he or she challen!;es the employer's authority and acts in breach 
of his or her obligation to be subordinate Consequently, the misconduct strikes at the root of the 
13Ibid page 35], rely ing on Jamieson I' F/slI'l!r/h IlJ 15 AD 115 and Oaten \' Ben/witch and Lichtenstein 
1 ')0] TH 11 X. 
1~"The nOlions of cOlllmand and S\lbordlllalioll inherent in the employment relationship give rise to 
bOlh the duty to obey and the dIllY to sho\\ respect. Disrespect or illsubordination has to be of a serious and 
aggravated character to justify summary dismissal." 
Coaker and ZcfTeJ1 Wille and Millin's .Hercantill' I~all' of South Africa (18th edition) 198.t page 361. See as 
illustrations. the judgements of: Oaten v Bentll'ich and Litchenstein 190] TH 118. Jamieson II ElsH'orth, 1915 
AD I IS. Miles I' Jagger and Co, 21 SC 513, (jog/\' Wilson and Collins 1927 NLR 21. and Nonnan-Scoblc 
Lmr of MasTer and ,"'avant in South Afnca IlJS() page I.tX, 
I~Norman-Scoblc I~a\l' (~r }dasTer and ,..,'en'ant in SOUTh Afnca 195() page 148, sec also Leonard v Scott 
189.t ]] SC 35X at 3W. 
lnOwhc \'lIaumann ]910 OFS 59 who at page 62 relics on ('olio \' Urouncker 4C and P 5]8, EdH'ard~' 
v I,evy, 2F and F9.t. Sec also Norman-ScobIe Law afMasTer and ServanT in South Africa 1956 page ]48 and 
in general Thompson and Benjamin South African j,abour Lmr vol I amended service 36 of 1997 Per B 
Jordaan page EI-19, as well as Coaker and ZefTert Wille and Afilll/1 's Mercantile I~tm· of South Africa 18th 
edition] 984 page 361, who further cites Jamieson \' FI.W'orth It) 15 AD 115. 
I"Scc (/ogi v If ilsun and COI/II1S 1927 NLR 11 
lXlbid. 
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employment contract, and because the misconduct may constitute a major breach of the 
contractual relationship, it may justify dismissal. 19 
3 A.l A valid la~ful instruction. 
In the employment relationship when an lawful and reasonable instruction is given the employee 
is obliged to obey it or face dismissal?O The requirements for a valid lawful instruction will be 
discu~sed hereunder in three broad headings; namely: that the instruction should not contradict the 
"law", that the instruction must be given in good faith, bonafide, as well as that the instruction 
should fall within the scope and parameters of the contractual relationship between the parties. 
3.4.1.1 The instruction must accord with the law. 
It is the contract of employment that brings about the subordinate position of the empJoyee,21 and 
sets out, with other implied tem1S, tk pc.ramctc:·s of the employment relationship. It is essential 
that the contract of employment exists and is valid, that is, capable of being enforced?2 In short, 
the contract must be valid and enforceable if there is to be an employer and employee, with 
corresponding legal rights and duties 23 
The law demand:-- that all agreements seriously entered into and intended to be legally binding 
should be enforced. Notwithsta'1ding the above, public policy ncvel1heless requires that the 
fi·eedom of contract should not be unfettered, therefore any ab'Tc"Cment entered into which is aimed 
at harming the State or the public will not be enforced 24 
Contracts held to be contrary to the common la\>,,250r public policy or public morals are unlawful 
l"Norman-Scoblc Lall of,\iasler and S'ervanl in South Africa 1956 pagc 145, who refcrs to Leask v 
French 1949 (4) SA 887 (C). 
20See Afcl"ean v Risch ]<)14 CPO 731. 
21K V Koertman 1904 18 EOC ]60. though dealing with the breach ora statutc it is still, nevcrtheless, 
instructivc. 
2]1\ v lIIatiwayo 1948 (4) SA 100 (TPO). 
DSee Grogan Workplace i,em· 1996 page 31. 
24Coakcr and Schutz Wille and Alii/in's Mercantile Law afSouth Africa 1975 page 29. 
2\'·ln the sourees wc find two general ideas of the comlTlon Im\ in\'olving proh.ibitions affecting the 
validity of contracts. to wit good morals (boni mores) and public policy." Joubert General Principles oflhe Law 
of Contract 1987 page ))2. 
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and accordingly unenforceable. 26 27 
"In general it can be stated that an apparently lawful promise if knowingly made for an 
illegal purpose will not be enforced, a promise illegal in itselfwitl not be enforced, and a 
promise made in return for an unlawful consideration will not be enforced".28 
If the contract is declared unenforceable - that is invalid - no obligation arises from the agreement 
and no action on the contract can be maintained.29 The difference between public policy and good 
morals is difficult to explain.30 Jt has been suggested, however, that the concept of "public interest" 
is the "test" for the invalidity of the contract. 31 The important question then is whether the courts 
may determine what is, or is not, of public interest and whether public policy demands that a 
contract offending against the public interest be unenforceable32 Courts have assumed that they 
may declare that there has be~~n an alteration in public policy with the result that contracts that 
were formerly valid may be decbrcd invalid 33 
Couns have the task of adn;i:1i5tcring the la\\, thus "[a]!l that the courts can do is to find as a 
matter offact that a particular contract does or does not offend against the public interest and that 
there is or is not a customary mle pemitting the contract or prohibiting the contract,,34 The boni 
mores, public interest and public policy arc onl) relevant because they provide the basis upon 
which a decision of illegality is made in law JS This power to declare contracts contrary to public 
policy has to be "exercised spar'ingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the 
26 All three cxpressions arc intcrchangcable: Christic The raw 0.( Contract in South Africa 1991 page 
417. relying on S'mjin (Ptyj Ltd I' Heukes 19})<) 1 SA (A) 8 E-G. Sc:c: also Coaker and Schutz Wille and Millin 's 
Mercantile rail' ofS'outh Aji-lca 1975 page 28 
27"NO\\ this Court has the power to treat as void and to refuc,e in any wa~ to recognise contracts and 
transaction~ which arc against public policy or contrary to good morals. 11 is a powcr not to be hastily or r.lshly 
exercised: but once it is clear that any arrangement is against public policy, the court would be wanting in its 
duty if it hesitated to declare such an arrangcment void What we rune to look at is thc tendency of the 
proposcd transaction, not its actual!) proved result" Inncs CJ in FaslWood v Shel'stone 1902 TS 294 a1302 
cited in Christic The Law ofContrac{ in South Aji-Ica 1991 page 417. 
2JlAenne(~}' v 5,'tecnkamp 19J() CPD, cited in Coakcr and Schul,,,: Wille and Alil/in's Mercantile Law of 
South Africa 1975 page 2X. 
29 Joubert General Principlc, of the l.aH' o(Conlracl 1987 pagc 151. 
30Ibid page 132. 
31lbid page 112-1. 
32Ibid pagc 133. 
33Jbid page 133, rclics on Fastwood \' ,<..;hcpstone 1902 TS 294 at 302, lIur ..... itz v Taylor 1926 TPD 81, 
Couzyn v rajiJrce 1955 (2) SA 2X() (T). 
34Jbid. 
J\Van der Memc: el 01 Contract (;enerall'rinciplc.l 1994 page 119. 
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validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power. One must be 
careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or 
some of them) oftend one's individual sense of propriety and faimess,,36 Furthermore, in such an 
investigation it must be kept in mind: 
"(a) that, while public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, it 
nevertheless properly takes into account the necessity for doing simple justice between 
man and man; and (b) that a court's power to declare contracts contrary to public policy 
should be exercised sparingly and only in cases in which the impropriety of the transaction 
and the element of public harm are manifest "37 
Courts should therefore only declare contracts contrary to public policy in the clearest of cases, 
but Courts "should not regard themselves as bound by the existing heads of public policy because 
human devilment and foolishness know no limits and the courts cannot set themselves limits which 
disable them from combatting such things,,,38 
From the above, it is clear that an unlawful element contained in a contract would cause the 
contract to be null and void, If the employment contract is void the employee would not be 
obliged to obey any instruction from the employer for the simple reason that the person is not an 
employeeJ9 The next issue tha1 ne,eds to be dealt v...ith concerns an illegal instruction given within 
a legal and binding contractual relationship 
If an unlawful instruction is given by the employer then the instruction itself will not necessarily 
cause the relationship as a whole to be null and void, only the instruction itselfwill be unlawful 
and unenforceable An employee is not obliged to obey an unlavvful instruction, Whether an 
instruction will be unlawful will depend on the circumstances of each case,40 An instruction may 
be declared unlawful as to t\\O general categOlies; firstly, in that the instruction offends legislation; 
and secondly, in that the instruction oftends the common law directly or indirectly, indirectly 
because the instruction is unreasonable to the extent that it is unlav.ful. The above will be 
elaborated more fully hereunder. 
36:.,'asjin (1'(\1) Ltd v Beuke.\ 1980 (l) SA 1 (A) at ') B, see Christie The raw ofContraet in South Africa 
1991 page 41710 8. 
JeHocxter JA in lJotha (now Griesse/) v Fmanscredil (Ply) /,td 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) at 7821-783C, 
cited in Christie The Lmf of Coni rae/ in South Africa 1991 page 418. 
3&Christie The /,(J"" afContract in South Africa 1991 page 418, 
'¥if< v Dube and another 1928 OPD 181, 
4ONorman-Scoblc I.a"" of Master and Savant in South .,1fnca 195() page 147. 
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In Coetzee v Argus Printing mul Puhlishinx C 0 41 the plaintiff entered the service of the defendant 
company upon the signing of a contract stipulating that the only holidays to which he would be 
entitled were Christmas and New Year's Day. On Union Day, which was declared a public 
holiday by Act 3 of 1910, the piaintiif absented himself from work although he had been expressly 
ordered to attend and was thereupon dismissed. The plaintiff argued that he was not guilty of 
unlawful conduct in absenting himself from work because the day which he failed to attend was 
a public holiday and that he had the right to absent himself from work on that day under the law.42 
The court was of the opinion that unless "there is special legislation declaring that certain work 
cannot be legally performed on a public holiday, there is nothing illegal in requiring such work to 
he done. I come to the conclusion that there is no provision in our law making the defendant's 
action in requiring the plaintiff to do his ordinary work on Union Day unlawfuL,,43 In other words, 
the instruction was lawful because it was in line with the common law and relevant legislation. 
Clearly "legislation" and the "'common law" were the only categories the court was concerned 
with, not equity or fairness or reasonableness in a \vide sense. But, as was indicated above, an 
instruction may be unlawful in that it offends the common law indirectly, that is the instruction is 
unreasonable to the extent that it offends public policy and is deemed to be unlawful -
unreasonableness narrowly construed in this case 11 is submitted th?t the relationship between 
the common law and public morals is such that to demand thc instruction to be reasonable is 
merely another way of stating th<!t the instruction should n0t offend the common Jaw, indirectly, 
by offending against public policy and the like. In other words, an unreasonable order which 
offends public policy is, in law, unlawful Thus reasonableness, it is submitted, is merely an avenue 
of inferring public policy into the employment relationship, the intention being to stop "serious 
abuse and gross injustice".44 This submission is further supported by the court's reluctance to 
iIlterfcrc in commercial agreements on grounds of equity alone. 45 
"[W]hcre docs the process end') Some ofthc dicta seem to suggest that we have here the 
t.hin end of a wedge whose c:xact shape and full dimensions remain undefined. A few more 
taps, maybe, and the granite concept of sanctity of contract will be shattered,,46 
41 191.1 CPD 749. 
42('oetzee v Argus Printing and J)uhlishmg Co 191.+ CPD 749 at 750-1, per Maasdorp JP. 
4'At 751. 
M,\' v Colfell 197X (3) SA Rhodesia AD 206 at 211 B 
4~SCC Techni-Pak Sales (Pry) Uti \' lIalll96X 0) SA 211 WLD at 238 G-H Although Colman J was 
concerned with the English doctrine "frustration of contracts" it is submitted that the comment on equity or 
"fairness" would apply in the above matter of reasonable orders 
""Techni-Pak :-;ale., (Ply) /,tel v lIall I %H (1) SA 231 WLD at 23K G-H 
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The above submission is supported by the decision of R v Qumba47 where the accused was 
convicted of contravening a Regulation 48 The defendant was accused of unlawfully and 
wrongfully refusing to obey a lawful order given to him by the assistant superintendent. At the 
time of the instruction the accused was occupying a lean-to at the back of a store, the 
superintendent considered that this was not a place that should be occupied. The occupation was 
not lav.fully authorised, and the superintendent gave the accused an order to remove himself from 
that lean-to and to move to another hut. The Judge assumed that the regulations were intra vires 
and that ReblUiation 7 gave the superintendent the right to transfer any resident in the location to 
some other hut or building should he at any time find it necessary. The Judge, however, also 
stressed that the power under that regulation had to be reasonably exercised. The superintendent 
would not have the authority under the regulation to do anything which was dangerous to the 
health of people It was this defence that was taken up by the accused, that the other hut was not 
fit for human habitation 4 \! The court agreed that the accommodation was not fit for human 
habitation 50 As a result the order of the superintendent was an unreasonable order, and for that 
reason it could not be regarded as lawful 
"} do not say that it was unlav,fJl to order this man to remove from the lean-to - that may 
also be unfit for human habitation - but the order we have to consider is an order not 
merely to leave the leall-to but also to go to another hut specified, and that order I think, 
whatcver may be his position with regard to his removing fl-om the lean-to, he was justified 
in refusing to obey "51 
The employee was permittcd to disobey the order because the instruction was unlawful as to its 
unreasonableness - in that the instruction went against public policy Though the instruction was 
in accord with the legislation it violated the common law indirectly by its unreasonableness -
unreasonableness narrowly construed 
Therefore whether an instruction is unlawful wili depend on the circumstances of each case,S2 but 
generally an instruction may be declared unlawful as to two categories; firstly, in that the 
instruction offends legislation; and secondly, in that the instruction offends the common law either 
~~1930 CPD 3% By Gardi.ner JP with whom Van Zyl J concurred 
4I!Framed under Act 21 of 1923. 
49At 397. 
">OAt 39X. 
~'Ibid. 
~2Norlllan-&oble j,aw (~r Masler and Servant in South Africa J '.156 page J 47. 
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directly or indirectly, indirectly where the instruction is unlawful due to its unreasonableness. 
When should the lawfulness of an order be challenged? 
In Schierhout v Union (Jovemment'3 a civil servant refused to assume duty on transfer to another 
post. He took up the position that his refusal to proceed to Pietermaritzburg to take up the post 
of professional assistant to the Attorney-General was not due to any spirit of insubordination or 
contumacy to lawful authority, but to a bonafide belief on his part that he was not legally obliged 
to obey the order. He argued that there was no justification for the initiation of disciplinary 
proceedings against him, but rather that the question whether the order was a legal one or not 
should be determined by proceedings in the nature of a declaration of rights. The court, however, 
disagreed. 
"There is no ground, however, on which this contention can be supported. To suggest 
th&[, H1 every case where a public Ser\a:lt disobeys an order of a person having authority 
to give the same, he is entitled to take up the attitude that the order was not a legal one, 
and that he was then~fore under no obligation to obey it until the legality had been 
determined by a coun of lay'.!, would be totally subversive of discipline in the public 
service. The disobedience of the order justifies the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, 
and it is in the course of these that the legality of the order should be tested,'54 
In line with the above, unlawfulness of an instI"l'ction should be challenged in disciplinary 
proceedings, to enable the smooth running of businesses, but if the employee is convinced as to 
the unJaw1i:lncss of'the instruction there is nothing stoppillg him or her, ifhe or she has exhausted 
all intemal means available, to approach the court to decide on the lawfulness of the instruction. 
If the employee disobeys an unlawful instruction then he or she is not in breach of his or her 
contractual duty to be subordinate and obey the employer. 
Accordingly it is \vi1hin the following categories that an instruction wili be deemed lawful and 
which the employee should obey. The instruction should be reasonable, to the extent that it does 
not offend against public policy, and should be in line with legislation and the common law. 
~)1926 AD 2<)5. 
~At 301. 
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3.4.1.2. The instruction must be given in good faith to be lawful. 
Vv'hat is under discussion in this section is the requirement that the instructions should be given in 
good faith. An order given in bad faith, for example in attempting to procure an employee's 
resignation or to engineer the employee's disobedience, to facilitate grounds for his or her 
dismissal, need not be obeyed. 
Denny v ,s'outh African Loan, Afor/gage, and Mercalllile Agency Co Ltd 55 dealt with motive 
behind an order. 56 The material facts may be summarised as follows: the plaintiff had agreed 
before being employed by the Agency that he was to be the sale manager, and he was engaged in 
that position as the sole manager. In this position, the plaintiff received the power of attorney 
authorising him to manage all the affairs of the company at Port Elizabeth. In October, 1881, the 
defendants wanted all their employees to be on the same footing, being subject to three month's 
notice, to which thl'>' proposed tha~ the plaint/irs contract should expire and after that date 
continue his service subject to three month's notice. 
The plaintiff, afterwards, being dissatisfied with his position gave notice that he would leave the 
defendant's service Nothing that could be objected to was done by the plaintiff. Beattie, the 
secretary of the company, acting on instructions given to him by the managing director and the 
general manager and anncd \\lth a general power of attorney - recalling and cancelling the power 
held by the plaintiff - arrived at Port Elizabeth and gave a letter (this letter contained the order and 
is set out in footnote 5() to the plaintifl: signed by the general manager. Plaintiff considered the 
matter and after consulting a solicitor stated that the contents of the letter, besides the inspecting 
of all business matters, was unjust and unreasonable and thus he declined to act on them 57 Beattie 
then continued that if the plaintifrpersisted in his attitude towards the company he would be under 
the necessity of sllspending :1im pending further instructions. He further advised the plaintiff to 
51 188] CPO 47. 
'iOThe letter, which contained the instruction. reads as follows: 
"This \\ill be handed to you by Mr Beattie. the Secretary of the Company. to whom you will be SO good to 
afford CYCI) facility for an inspection of your books and business. Mr Bcattie's stay in Port Elizabcth may be 
somewhat protracted, and during the time he is there you will submit to him all and C\'CI)' business offered to 
you, and take his direction as if given by me. He will be present at cvcry interview with applicants, and will 
occupy such place in the omces a5. he rna.' desire. All cheques. bills, bonds, and documents signed on behalf of 
the Company you will please get counter signed by Mr Beattie, from and after receipt hereof, and you will give 
the nccc5S3I)' notification to the banks. handing them a specimen of Mr Beattie's signature" Denny \' South 
African roan, Mortgage, and ,Herconllfe Agency ('0 Ud 1 KS] CPO 47 at 51. 
~7 At 51. 
------------------
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take until the following day to consider his position, and placed the plaintiff on his honour to do 
no further act on behalf of the company. The plaintiff did not change his mind. Beattie said that 
he would be obliged to take action and left the office and went to the banks, with whom the 
company had accounts, and exhibited and filed his power of attorney revoking the plaintiff's 
power. Further he instructed the banks not to honour any cheque unless countersigned by him. 
On his return the plaintiff was instructed not to issue any cheque or document on the company's 
behalfVvithout Beattie's signature 58 The plaintiff, however, did issue a cheque. The next day the 
company advertised that the plaintiff was no longer the manager and that Beattie had been 
appointed The court was asked if the order given had been lawful. 
With regard to motive Skippard J commented that if 
"those orders were not entirely bona fide; if they were given with the object and in the 
expectation of goadin,:; the pbi ntiff inLl ~(\rnc act or expression which might be construed 
as proof of insubordination, and be subsequently made usc of to repel just such a claim as 
the plaintiff has preferred in this action, then a jury would be cert.ainly justified in finding 
as a fact the order to resign the whole functions of manager to the London secretary was 
not ajust and reasonable order; and consequently, that the plaintiff's alleged disobedience 
was not such wilful disobedience of a lawful order as would alone justify dismissal. ,,59 
In the same case Barry jp considered, in his judgment, the motive behind the order, and 
commented that: 
"Without distrusting the plaintitT in reality, distrust both of plaintiff's integrity and 
judgment was alleged with the view of inducing plaintiff to throw up his office in disgust; 
or to retire from it upon terms more favourable to the defendants than those given by the 
contract of service. I confess that I am unable to discover in the circumstances any other 
motive for the letter than an attempt to procure the retirement of pJaintiff by unmerited 
indignity. No manager with any self-respect could for a moment submit to the insult 
intended to be conveyed by that letter; and I think the case of Smith v Allen (3, F. and F., 
157) is some authority tor the contention that a master cannot, under the mask of what in 
some circumstances may not be an improper direction, give the same direction in such a 
manner and at such a time as to convert it into an insult instead of a lawful command."60 
Although the court commented that it was a painful duty to give a verdict on the motive of an 
employer in giving an instruction,61 it may ncvcJ1hcIcss be appreciated that if an instruction is given 
5I<At 52. 
~9 At 65 
60At 57, per Barf) Jr. 
61 At 6(), per Shipard 1. 
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In bad faith to engineer the disobedience of the employee for whatever purpose then that 
instruction would be unlawful as to its motive.o2 
3.4.1.3. The instruction must fall within the ambit of the contract of employment to be lawful. 
In the contract of employment the employee agrees to occupy a subordinate position. This duty 
is however restricted by law, public policy, and the contract itself It has been noted that the 
employment contract brings into being the employment relationship, and it is the contract that 
identifies and defines the role of each party in that relationship vis a vis the other. It is the contract 
between the parties which sets out the parameters of the relationship which is to be enforced 
between the parties, and as such it defines the extent of the parties' duties and rights therein 
The terms of the contract may set out how the duty of the employee to be subordinate is to be 
fulfilled, or what specifically the employee is to achieve. Obviously, if the contract disregards the 
essential teml or tCiTn~; of the employment COll~nlct then the relationship is not that of employment. 
Accordingly, any instruction to be valid and to demand obedience must fall squarely within the 
nature of the parties' roles as set out in the contract defining the relationship. 
The employee is bound to perfoml a lawful instruction which falls squarely within the contract of 
employment. Four ·cases which deal with dismissal for disobeying orders expressed within the 
contract of employment \vi11 be discussed he'eunder. 
Firstly, in ReliC l' Alexander6l the appellant entered into the service of the respondent under a 
V>Tittcn agreement, by which he bound himsc1fto rcnder the services of a chef de cuisine at a hotel. 
He undertook to do all that was necessary and required of a person in that capacity at a first class 
hotel; and to perform his duti!;:s truly, diligently and skilfully, as well as to do all in his power to 
ntrther the interests of the employer Furthermore, the appellant was to be bound by the rules of 
the hotel. The evidence showed: 
"that the appellant had been guilty of several acts of misconduct. He left the hotel one 
afternoon in April without preparing the dinner for that evening, and did not return until 
the next morning at a quarter to nine o'clock. He gave an untruthful explanation to his 
employer of his absence, and was cautioned that upon repetition of such conduct he would 
be instantly dismissed. Then on the night of the 13th May he did not return before the 
usual closing time, in accordance with the rules of the hotel, which he had undertaken to 
62At 65, per Shipard J 
63 )91 () CPD (,OX 
55 
obey, and was brought in later to the hotel in a hopeless state of intoxication. Lastly on 
the 22nd May he again disobeyed an order not to put meat outside in the hotel yard, and 
that same evening, on leaving the hotel, presumably after he had prepared and served the 
dinner, he was told by his employer to be back by the usual time ... "64 
"""'hich he failed to do and was dismissed, The court held that he was guilty of wilful disobedience 
a;}d detlance of his master's la\vful orders, and ofbrea~hing the duties in his contract of service 
which he had bound himself to perform65 He failed to abide by his contractual relationship 
because he failed to obey an instructicm that fell \\'ithin the contractual role he agreed to assume. 
Secondly, in A1iles v Jagger alld ( 'd'r, the employee used insolent and offensive language towards 
the manager of the respondent's forwarding department, the consequence being that the employee 
was given one month's notice to leave his employment. The employee was then transferred from 
the store to the accounting department, where he was asked to do the work of a ledger clerk, 
which he did, Later he refused to till tLs \\ ork, and was then dismissed The court found the 
request made to him to do this work was not unreasonable,67 The request, or the order, was 
lawfullx,o.cause he was asked to do the worl which he was contractually bound to perform. The 
court came to the conclusion that the accused would have been bound to perform this work 
because he had previously done the work which constituted evidence showing that he considered 
himself to be so bound Further the salary of the accused was the same as the ledger clerk's - the 
court was however quick to note that the comparing of salaries was not conclusive but, 
nevertheless, was an imp0l1ant element which needed to be taken into account. 
Thirdly, in Dellny v ,\'outh African /'oan, Iv/ortgage, alld Mercantile Agency Co LIef'S (supra) the 
order was held to be unlawful In addition to having been given with the motive of goading the 
employee,69 it was found to be unlawful because the instruction contradicted the contract that 
MAt 613 t0614, 
6~At 614 per Kotze J, with WhOIlI Gardiner J concurred. 
661904 SC 513, 
67At 515 per De Villiers CL with wholT! Hopley J concurred 
68 1883 CPD 47. 
6Q,'BUt. independent of the questioll of the moti, e. I think the command itself in this case was an 
unlawful one, The defendant on receipt of thi5 letter was willing to allo\\ inspection of the books, but after 
consulting his solicitors said that the othcr directions were unlawful. and to test them without causing an 
interruption in the business of the company drew a chequc for a trifling amount for an existing debt, which 
cheque he dcliYcred to the creditor without obtaining Beattie's signature. The question we have to answer is, 
Was plaintilT bound to obey these directiom'l" f)cnny I' .\'ollth Ajricnn i,oan, Mortgage, and Afercanlile Agency 
Co Ltd I8S) CPD 47 at 57-5S. per Barr:. JP, 
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existed between the parties. The letter70 which contained the order was intended to create Mr 
Beattie as coadjutor. This was held to be the only object of the letter and the defendants had no 
right under their contract to create a dual managership. Thus the moment a coadjutor was added 
tht" agreement between the parties was bre<:ched by the defendant s, 71 '\vhi ch caused the instruction 
to be unlawful. 
Finally, in Oaten v BenM'itch and Uchten.stein 72 wherein the plaintiff was engaged as a "practical 
hatter", the plaintiff was given an instruction to teach an untrained person the duty of trimming 
a hat This duty, it was held, was not considered part of his contractual duty and thus did not fall 
within the scope of his duties. 73 Thus "the plaintiff was accordingly justified, when called upon to 
give this instruction, in refusing to obey the order. It was not an order coming within the scope 
of the duties he had undcr1aken 10 perform, and on this ground the defendants were not justified 
in dismissing the plaintiff. ,,/4 
When entering into a contract of employment the employee-to-be, binds himself or herself to the 
essential terms of that specific relationship. When the person assumes the role of employee he 
or she is obliged to obey any lawful instruction gi\en by the employer This would apply to any 
instruction 'written in the contract or given verbally, provided the instruction was lawful Verbal 
instructions themselves form part of the contract of employment as they flow from the essential 
70Sce footnotc 56. 
71"1 am of opinion even then that in the circumstances of the employment at Port Eli/Abeth. and the 
conduct of thc business there. both before and after Beattie's ad\enl. the withdrawal from tJle plaintiff the 
Jxmcr to sign a cheque except jointly \\ ith Beattie deprived plailitifT of his powers there as sole manager, and 
was intended to do so. and that. thcrcfore. that command \\as an unlawful one. The case of Eatun and others v 
Wesf()fJ (9, Q.B Diy .. 6'1R) justifies the findin!:=.that the whole command, and even the part which related to the 
drawing of a cheque. was, in the circumstilnces. an unreasonable. and therefore an unlawful, command. Taking 
the letter as a whole, or part which relates to the cheque, it carries an unla\\ful command." The written orders 
"were calculated to subject the plaintiff to indignity. to lower him in the eyes of the mercantile community, to 
deprive him of eyery vestige of power as manager. and not merely to associate another with him as joint 
manager, the very arrangement he had repudiated from the first. but to place another absolutely over his head . 
.. .I think the orders in question mllst be taken as a whole, and 1 have come to the conclusion that the order 
conveyed to the plaintiff by Mr. Beattie was not ajust and reasonable command ",ithin thc fair and reasonable 
scope of the plaintiffs employment... and so was not a lawful order; and consequcntly that this was a wrongful 
dismissal, and that the plaintiff is therefore entitled the judgement of the Court.~ Denny v South African Loan, 
Mortgage, and Mercantile Agency Co Ltd 1883 CPD 47 at 66. 
72 1903 TH 1 18 per Solomon J . 
7"'(T)herc wac, no obligation OJ] his (the plaintilTs) part to give instructions in the making of hats, his 
work being to make hats and not to teach others hO\\ the~ should be made." Oaten l' i3entwitch and 
Lichtenstein 19<n TH 118 at 11 t). 
740aten \' lJentwitch and I..icht('nllein I t)01 TH 118 at 119. 
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tenn of the contract that the employee occupies a subordinate position. In Rene v Alexander the 
employee breached his duties in the written contract which he bound himself to obey, as well as 
the essential tenn of the contract by not obeying a lawful instruction given verbally. The 
misconduct is the same in both cases, the disobedience of a written instruction or a verbal 
instruction, as both fonns ofmisconduct entail disobeying the instructions of the employer which 
are evidence of a chalJenge directed at the employer's authority. Clearly the employee is acting 
contrary to his or her obligation to be subordinate in both cases. 
Why instructions which fall outside the parameters of the relationship are not binding, are because 
the instructions themselves have no bearing on the unique relationship which exists between the 
parties,75. 
From the above, an instruction which contradicts the contract between the parties, or which falls 
outside the scope ofthc c,mtractual roles each party have bound themselves to fulfil, is unlawful. 
Notwithstanding the above, tht' refusal to obey must be done in a proper and orderly manner and 
if a employee does not do so then he or she may be validly dismissed for being insolent. 76 
An order may be deemed unlawful on three genC'ral grounds. Firstly; mala fides, for example, an 
insult intended 10 procure an employee's resignation may taint an othcnvise lawful instruction with 
unlawfulness Secondly, an instruction that contradicts the law, or which is in law deemed 
unreasonable, is unlawful Thirdly, if the order relates to a matter that contradicts or falls outside 
the scope of the contract bet ween the parties then the instruction is not a lawful instruction. 
Restated, an order given in good faith within the parameters of the contractual relationship, which 
does not contradict the lavv, must be obeyed by the employee and if refused may constitute a 
breach of the employment contract between the parties justifying dismissal. 
3.4.2. The refusal to obey a valid lawful instruction (the employee's disobedience) 
In common law, summary dismissal is only permitted where the disobedience to an lawful order 
is wilful and not inadvertent or due to neglect. 77 "It is not every act of insubordination or 
7~ sec Uatcn \' Iknt\1'ltch and Uchtenstein 1901 TH 11 g. 
7"lbid at 120. 
77Nonnan-Scoblc /JIH (~f.\JlJ.\tcr and Servant in ,",outh A/nca 19,)() page 145. 
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disobedience ... which will justifY the summary dismissal of a servant. Where the ground relied 
upon is refusal to obey an order it must be a serious and deliberate refusal,,7S or, in the words of 
Searle J, a "deliberate and wilful disobedience of a lawful order justifies dismissal.,,79 
It is submitted that "wilful" and "deliberate" essentially refer to the same state of mind, that being 
an intentional state of mind. Thus a mere neglect to obey an order does not constitute a wilful 
refusal to obey.so 
3.4.2.1. '''hat constitutes a deliberate or wilful refusal? 
Essentially the enquiry into intent would revolve around whether the accused directed his will to 
the attainment of a particular consequence and whether the accused was conscious that the result 
being achieved was achieved in a wrongful or unlawful manner. 
"Intent is a legally n:prehcnsible staie of mind or mental disposition encompassing the 
direction of the will to the attainment of a particular consequence, and consciousness of 
the fact that such result is being achieved in an unlav.ful or wrongful manner"gl 
Intent is a "manifestation of the will rather than a wish or desire. "g2 As such the concept is 
entirely subjective, subjective intent "is present only if the defendant in fact intended to bring about 
a particular result and was ... subjectively av,'arc of the wrongful character of his conduct.,,83 
Intention, as far as it relates to the consequences of the conduct, takes on three forms; dolus 
directus, dollls indirect liS, and dulus even/ualis, 
Do/us dircclus, is when the actor directs his or her will to attain a particular consequence, Do/us 
indirectlls, occurs when the actor "acts wjth the object of attaining a certain object but at the same 
time actually foresees that another consequence must necessarily flow from the conduct", then his 
78J\foonian \' Bo/mural J fold 1925 NPD 215 at 219 per Dme Wilson JP with whom Hathorn J 
concurred. (The emphasis is mine) 
79Coetzec I' Argus Prmting and Puhlishing Co 1914 CPD 749 at 752. 
soScc R v Mots{lhc 1 Y19 OPD Y9. per Fischer R. 
"Uit die getuienis blyk dit dat op 29 Noyember het kIaeT die beskuIdigde bcvccl om die volgcnde oggend die 
skapc na Abrahamskraal oor te bring en cIat h) hullc cas op die 31 SIc daar gebring het. Daar is nie die minste 
aanduiding dat die beskuldigdc geweier het om die bevel te gehoorsaarn nie, Daar is ook verder 'n Iccmte in 
die voldocning aan die be"yslas wat op die Kroon berus en wat genocgsaam is om die veroordeling tot niet te 
maak," at 101. 
HI Midgley LA WSA (\'01 8) 1995 page II (,. 
R2Jbid page 118. 
83Ibid page II (i 
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state of mind in relation to the consequence is indirect intent. 84 Dolus evelltualis, occurs "[ w ]here 
one acts with the intention of attaining a particular object and at the same time subjectively realises 
or appreciates that another consequence may possibly result from ones conduct and one reconciles 
oneself with this possibility, one's intent in relation to the possible consequence takes the form of 
lio/us eVt;'ntuah\. ,,8: The actor must have foreseen the possibility, and if it is found that the actor 
should have foreseen the possibility then at best he or she i~ guilty of being negligent.86 
Wessels J87 in Mcerho/z v Norman88 referred to the concept "wilful" in the contract of 
employment. The facts therein were thar the employee was a barman in the service of the 
defendant, and certain hours for his service had been specified in the contract. At the beginning 
of February the attendance of the plaintiff became irregular, and at each time he made an excuse 
that his watch was not keeping good time or that he had overslept. On 29 February the employee 
again arrived late, the de:'cnd(~llt infornlC·d him tha1 if the lateness continued he intended to dismiss 
him On 5 March the plaintiff was again late and, consequently, the defendant summarily 
dismissed him The question which the court was asked to decide was whether the dismissal was 
justified 
Wessels J commented. " ira servant.. engaged with definite v\'orking hours, wilfully disregards his 
contr act in that respect and \\ il1!.llly C0T1le" lale on mallY o('casions, his employer is entitled to 
dismisc; himc even al:hou.l:)l he ha;:; fiJrgiven him hi:~ past errors "~') The empbyee may be dismissed 
for the breach of the specific terms of the contract, provided his conduct was v.ilful. Wessels J 
did, however, concede that "where an employee is detained by accident, or where he is unable to 
come at the exact hour, by reason of illn('ss, then the ma~ter would not be entitled to dismiss rum 
summarily unless some grcut prljudicc well; proved"'J(\ It f011o"ws that if the absence is wilful then 
84Ibjd 
8'Jbid 
8°Ibid 
87With \\ h0m Gregorowski J and Mason J concurred. 
l!ll191() TPD :r12. 
'lNMeerf1()/z I' Normol1 19) () TPD 332 al 33-l. Looking at the thoughts of Mason J on the same matter: 
"1 think where a master chooses to appoint certain definite hour~ for work and the servant accepts that contract, 
the master is entitled to require those hours to be adhered \0. and it docs no lie on him to show to any court that 
those hours arc necessary for the purpose of his business Where a SCf\an( fails repeatedly to kccp those hours J 
think the master i!> entitled to dislllis~ him" per Mason J at :n5. 
9(}At 314 
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the employer may dismiss, but if the absence is not wilful then the employer has to show prejudice 
to justity dismissaI. 91 Much seems to tum on the meaning of "wilful". Wessels J continued: 
"It may be said that if a man's watch is slow, or if he oversleeps himself, that is not 
wilfulness, but I think, in a legal sense, a man who comes late under the circumstances is 
wilfuHy late. It is not an accident. lfhis wc.lch is slow it is his duty to get one which is not 
slow. If he cannot wake at a particular time he must get an alarm clock or have some 
other means of waking, but he cannot make a contract that he will appear at his work at 
a certain hour and then, as an excuse, set up a watch that docs not go well or a heavy sleep.'>92 
The court found intent, the refusal was wilful, that is, deliberate in a legal sense. The concept of 
"wilfulness" \I\'as also dealt with in Cocl::ec v A rgus Printing alld Publishing CO. 93 "In the case 
now before us we have a clear stipulation that the plaintiff should be liable to work on days 
including Union Day. The plaintiff had been specially ordered to put in an appearance on Union 
Day, and had refused deliberately".94 The result was that the disobedience was wilfuL 
From the above decision (Coet::ee), and in relation to the matter under discussion, an important 
question arises; did the employee not think that his conduct was justified in that the order was 
unlawful, thus affecting his "deliberate" state of mind? 
The court pointed out that there may be circumstances under which a person may be improperly 
absent from work without being guilty of wilful disobedience 95 The court stated: 
"We have been referred to an authority% from which it would appear thCil if a servant, 
being under the impression that he might not be expected to come to work, absents 
himself, the law will not regard that as gross misconduct. It could not be taken advantage 
of by the employer to dismiss the servant, but even there it must appear that there is no 
stipulation contrary to such usage in the contract of the servant. In the case now before 
us we have a clear stipulation that the plaintiff should be liable to work on days including 
Union Day The plaintiff had been spt'cially ordered to put in an appearance on Union 
Day, and had refused deliberately,,97 
Coetzee clearly had agreed to work9S on that public holiday - it was mentioned in the contract -
and yet refused to work on that day, even though he was warned to come. The lawfulness of the 
91Prcjudice will be discussed latcr in section 3.4.3 
9JAt 335. 
9'1914 CPD 749 at 752. 
94Coctzc(' v Argus Printing and Puhlishtng Co 1914 CPD 749 at 752, per Maasdorp IP. 
9~ibid. 
'!VOle authorit: is not cited 
9"At 752 per Maasdorp JP. 
9HPer Searle J in ('octz!'£' I Argus Prtnting ami I'uh/tshing ('0 19)4 CPD 749 at 752. 
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order is not doubted, but it is tempting to argue that Coetzee v Argus Printing and Publishing 
Co is authority for the view that if one seriously believed that the order was unlawful then, as an 
employee, one would be lacking the Vv1lful intention to disobey a lawful order, and consequently 
the employee was "vilfully disobeying what he or she believed to be an unlawful order. The truth 
is that the judgment, being short, does not deal in any sufficient degree with the factual 
circumstances of the case to warrant this conclusion, furthermore it must be remembered that 
Coetzee's defence was not that he lacked "wilful intention" but rather that the command was 
unlawful. 
Nevertheless, it would be fair to comment that if a command was given and the employee knew 
that the conunand was unlawful and refused, wilfully, not to obey that command then his intention 
is wilful in refusing to obey the unlawful order. The next question is: what of a person who 
seriously hdit:ves that an order was unlawful and as a consequC"1ce refused to obey. Surely, then, 
the same applies with regard to the employee's wilfulness, as in the above illustration? If the order 
is proved to be laVvlul then that alone does not affect the employee's state of mind in refusing 
wilfully to obey what in his or her mind was an unlawful order. He or she is, at the time of the 
order, not disoueying a lav.rfLiI order wilfully 
Perhaps the best way to resolve the above problem would be that if the commands are obviously 
illegal an employee would be justified in questioning or even refusing to execute such commands, 
but as long as the instructions of the employer are not obviously and decidedly in opposition to 
the law then they must be met v,ith complete and unhesitating obedience 99 Thus the court would 
look at the ot~ective circumstances sun"ounding the instruction and decide on the "obviousness" 
of the unl;nvfulness of the instruction before attributing intentional defiance. 
'»fhe case relied on for this position was dealing with what constitutes a lawful ordef to a policeman. 
Sutton J highlights thaI what is lawful for a police command is ba!.icaJly that the command must not contradict 
the law and be in line with the relationship between the parties, based on custom. Sutton then relies on 
Solomon JP in Rex v Smith 17 SC page 5()7 where he qllotes with approval the statement contained in the 
Manual of military law, that if the commands afe obviously illegal an inferior would be justified in questioning 
or even refusing to execute such colTlmand~. but as long as the orders of the superior are not obviously and 
decidedly in opposition of the law of the land, or the well known established customs of the anny then they 
must meet with complete and unhesitating obedience. Frol1l Ariel v Commissioner of Police 1929 CPD 373 at 
377 per Sutton J. 
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3.4.2.2 Reactions in the heat of the moment. 
In Moonian v Baimorai Hotel, 100 a new manager of a hotel attempted to put the Indian staff of the 
Hotel on twenty four hours' notice, in place of a month's notice. The Indian staff declined the 
offer. On the day of the dismis53.1, the same proposal was put to the Indian waiters, the proposal 
was made to the plaintifl~ who was the head waiter, and it appeared that he convened the other 
waiters who all refused to accept it. These men were at once given notice. Within the hour the 
dismissal of the plaintiff occurred. 
The manager claimed he went to the plaintiff and told him to get on with the preparation of 
sandwiches for 100 people who were expected a1 a reception, which was to take place that night. 
The plaintiff responded: "what about overtime"; the manager replied "I don't know about that 
yet." In reaction the plaintiff said, "well, if there is to be no overtime there will be no sandwiches." 
The evidence for the plaintiff was that it had been customary in the hotel always to pay for 
overtime, and there seemed v.ith the arrival of the new manager that the custom being 
discontinued was raised, and that the Indi.an employees were uneasy about it. The court 
higl-Jighted that though it was wrong or impertinent for the employee to have said, "if there is no 
overtime there will be no sandwiches", the question was whether under the circumstances such 
a mere remark must be takf.,;n as a deliberate refusal to obey a lawful order. 101 
It was held thElt the statement wa" nl?dc in a moment of excitement, and that no time was allowed 
fur any explanation, or to asccliain whether it was really meant, or what it meant. The statement 
addressed to the maJ13gcr \vas, for the court, consistent with a mere intimation that if the overtime 
had to be done and was not paid for, then the cutting of sandwiches by the workers need not be 
expected in the future 1(J~ 
The court seems to be indicating that the response of the accused was not a refusal to cut 
sandwiches as such but merely an indication that if there was no overtime then there would not 
be any work after hours, which was an indication of a conditional refusal, which would mean that 
the sandwiches would not be cut. 
The court, however, also found that the dismissal was not justified on another ground: 
"But even if it be taken as a refusal to cut sandwiches that afternoon, it was a statement 
IOOA/oonian \' f3almoralllo[el 1925 NPD 215_ 
10J At 219 per Dove Wilson jP. 
1001bid 
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made in the heat of the moment.. .. But the manager seized the opportunity, and without 
any further parley or delay at once reported to the proprietress, and forthwith dismissed 
the plaintiff No time was allowed to find out whether this servant often year's standing 
seriously meant what he said, or whether what he said amounted to a refusal to cut 
sandwiches on that day, as to all of which it seems to me the evidence leaves reasonable 
room for doubt; and so long as there is room for doubt the onus on the defendant of 
proving justification has not been discharged."J(!) 
The court focussed on the circumstances surrounding the alleged refusal to obey in an attempt to 
infer the state of the worker' s mind behind the "conditional" refusal and the dismissal of the 
employee. The Judge found that the "heat of the moment" refusal and retaliatory dismissal was 
a sufficient excuse for justifying the employee's disobedience and for making the unreasonable 
opportunistic dismissal by the manager invalid. 
Clearly the refusal of an order must be ""iIeu1 and not made in the "heat of the moment". 
Furthemlore, a dismissal should not be based on a heated exchange, particularly ifboth parties 
are not thinking clearly while labouring in the '"heat of tlie moment". 
3.4.2.3 Disobedience in order to further the employer's interests 
What is the position of an employee who refuses to obey a lawful order in attempting to further 
the employer's interests') Though the Court in KOjJlun \' Pellkil1lO~ briefly dealt with this matter, 
the ( ourt was nevertheless quick to point out that a de~jre to forward the employer's interests 
does not afford a good reason for di~obeying orders, or that it will always serve as a bar to 
summary dismissal. The Court, however, did comment that the motive of the employee, if only 
in the circumstances of Kaplan l' PClII-.in should be taken into consideration when one has to 
decide whether the conduct warranted dismissal J(I~ Though not decisive, the employee's motive, 
ncvcI1heJcss, may be taken into consideration. 
IO'At 220. 
IO'Waplan I' Pen kin 1913 CPD 221. 
IO'Kaplnn Ii Penktn )911 CPD 221 at 22X per Gardincr JP with whom Joncs J concurred. 
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3.4.3 The role of prejudice to the employer to iustifY dismissal 
In Schneirer alld London Ltd l' Bennet,106 De Waal lP had opportunity to deal with the role of 
prejudice in the employment relationship before the dismissal of the employee would be valid. The 
first case analysed was Brown l' Scssell.107 De WaaJ lP found that the learned judge in that 
judgement did not say that prejudice to the employer was an essential element in determining 
whether or not the employer had the right to dismiss; but rather that prejudice was an important 
element to be taken into consideration. lOS The next case to be considered was: Meerho/z v 
NnrmanlO<J wherein Wessels 1 commented: "It appears to me that if a servant, engaged with 
definite working hours, wilfully disregards his contract in that respect and wilfully comes late on 
many occasions, his employer is entitled to dismiss him, even although he has forgiven him his past 
errors." De Waal JP then turned to llO Coetzee v Argus Printing and Publishing CompallylIl and 
. 
quoted Maasdorp JP to the following effect: "In the case before us we have a clear stipulation that 
the plaintiff should be Iiahle to W\xk on days including Union Day. The plaintiff had been specially 
ordered to put in an appearance on Union Day, and had refused deliberately. Under such 
circumstances I come to the conclusion that this was such a wilful disobedience as justified the 
defendants in dismissing the plaintiff" Based on the above reasoning of the various courts De 
Waal JP concluded 
"These authorities secm to me to sho~ that where an employee, not a menial servant, 
absent~, himsclftrom his master's cmph)y on an isolated occasion, and the master suffers 
no prejudice thcreby, the rnaSlCI cannot dismiss him; but that where that employee has 
Ir,,) ')27 TPD .l4(). The grollnd~ on \, hich the dismissal was justified are firstl) , absence from duty in 
breach of instmetions and. secondl:-. being under the influence of alcohol. 
The following \\ as corn mOil caU5e. on 26 October the plaintifJ left the business premises of the defendant 
between') and ') . .10 am to go to the commercial exchange. there he was employed on the business of his 
employer, \, here he \\ ould remain ill the ordinan course of business up to about II or II :30 in the moming 
On that da: the pbintiff adlllilted thai he wa<, illfod1Jcd al the lillie h(; left that he should not be Cl\ray long. he 
slayed a\\ay for the resl of the daj. The plaintiff phoned the office and infonned the person who came to the 
phone that he would not be in the office and that it was doubtful" hether he would be back until Thursday 
The reason he gave ",as tli;lt a frieIld of hi~ \\ as arriving from England whom he was meeting and was to help 
ill looking for accomll1odatiOll ill Johannesburg. The friend did not arrivc and the plaintifTknew that he would 
not have arrived at the station until 4:30 in the aftcmoon According to thc evidcnce of Mr Schneirer it seemed 
thaI he had Oil previolls occasions reprimanded the plaintiff for his continual absenccs from his office. Further 
that on the morning asked the plaintifT first ho\\ long he was going to be, and thcn, being told about half an 
hour, informed the plaintiff that he should not be aWl!.\ long. but should return a5 soon as he could. When 
plaintiffrcturned the following day he "as sent for and summarily dismissed. 
w I 90H TS 1137. 
1000Schneirer and hmdon Ud \. Nennd 1927 TPD 3-t(, at 350. 
10')1,)1() TPD JJ2 
ilo • ...,·chnelrcr and j,ondon !'Id \' nellfl£'1 ) ')27 TPD 3-t(, at 351. 
111)')14 CPD 74() 
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been expressly ordered or notified by his employer not to absent himself from his duty at 
a specified time or on a specified occasion, and the servant wilfully disregards or disobeys 
his master's order, he renders himselfliable to dismissal. If that be so then, on the facts 
in this case, I am satisfied that the appellant was justified, in the circumstances, in 
dismi~sing the respondent."112 
Prejudice thus may have a bearing on the validity of the dismissal of the employee in disobeying 
the orders of an employer although this depends on the nature of the relationship - whether menial 
or otherwise - but where a direct order is given or is stipulated in the contract and the employee 
wilfully refuses the order then he or she may be dismissed. 
3.5. Conclusion. 
From the evidence in this chapter there is no doubt that the court under the common law applied 
and understood insubordination mainly as wilful disobedience of a lawful order. 
This chapter has shovm that under the common law the employer, in the employment relationship, 
can expect the employe~ to obey his or her commands; given in good faith, which fall within the 
confines of the contract bet\\'een the parties and which do not contradict the laws of the land 
\Vhat constituted instruc~jons given by the employer we~e either those expressed in the contract 
itself or those which were uttered verbally by the employer. The refusal of such an lawful order 
willjustif) dismissal if the employee was wilfully disobedient and was not a reaction in the "heat 
of the moment". Such disobedience goes to the root of the employment relationship because the 
employee will not perform his obligation to be subordinate, which justifies dismissal. 
It is clear why the disobedience of these instructions would constitute a material breach of the 
contract, and thus be insubordination, especially if one sees that the employer has control over the 
productive capacity of the employee. This con:rol is a manifestation of the de jure duty the 
employee has to be subordinate, which is highlighted by the de faCIO position the employee 
occupIes 
It is clear that the employer was restricted in ensuring that his or her position of authority in the 
employment relationship was not challenged by the employee's disobedience. The employer was 
only pennitted to dismiss the employee if the employer's instructions were lawful and reasonable. 
112."'·chnl'lrcr (Jnd/,()f1dU/I rId \'/knnd ) n7 TPD 14() at 15)-2 
These instructions had to be la\vlill to the extellt that they did 1I0t contradict legislation or the 
common law, given in good faith, and lell within tlte contractual relationship of the palties, and 
reasonable 10 the extent that the instruction was in line with COl1\I1Ion law principles and public 
policy. Dismissal was, however, only pelmitted where the insubordination was intentional and did 
not occur ill the heat or the moment. It is important to note, notwithstallding the above, that the 
courts dealt with the misconduct squarely as a breach of the contractual relationship and did not 
interfere in the relationship, or the misconduct, 011 grounds of fairness or equity. 
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Chapter 4 
INSUBORDINATION UNDER THE UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE JURISDICTION 
4.1 Introduction. 
In the previous chapter dismissal for insubordination was analysed on the basis of common law 
principles. The subject of discussion in this chapter is the same form of misconduct but understood 
under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. To achieve the above, the chapter is divided into two 
main sections, the first highlights what is understood by the concept "unfair labour practice", and 
the second discusses insubordination under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. The latter topic 
will be discussed in relation to two related categories: the giving of a lawful and reasonable order 
and the serious wilful refusal of an order. The aim of these sections is to highlight, by focussing 
on decided cases, what would justifY dismissal for the misconduct and what would not. 
4.2 Unfair Labour Practice 
4.2.1 Introduction 
According to Bennet, the first glimmeting of the principle of "unfair dismissal" in South Africa 
emerged in the decision of South African Association (!f Afllllicil'all'.,'mp/oyees v A1inisler (~f 
hlhulIr.l The court held that the question before it was not whether the employer was entitled 
to terminate the employee's services under the contract but was whether, notwithstanding the 
employer's legal right to do so, the employer should have done so in view of the circumstances 
of the case. "The court made the distinction between what was lav"ful and what was right or fair ... 
The Cape Provincial Division held that the question which had to be resolved by a Conciliation 
Board was not whether the employer had acted within its legal rights but whether it had acted 
'inequitably or unreasonably'''] 
In 1979 the Industrial COUJ1 was given jurisdictioll to dctennine disputes concerning "unfair labour 
practices" by the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979.3 The unfair labour practice 
was defined as "any practice which in the opinion of the industrial court constitutes an unfair 
')94" (I) SA 52" (A). 
2Bcnnct A Guide to the /,011' (!fl'-nfoir lJismis.lof In South .1Jma 19n page 3-4. 
~Lc Roux and van Nickerk The Suu/II African f,mr (l Infwr lJl.lmis.mf 19~4 page 18. 
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labour practice". 4 This definition was replaced by section 1 ( c) of the Industrial Conciliation 
Amendment Act 95 of 1980 and was later again amended by the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act 51 of 1982. It was fiom these amendments that the definition of an unfair labour practice 
culminated which was in force during the period \vhen the Industrial Court formulated the basic 
principles regulating unfair dismissals. 5 
The definition read as follows: 
" 'unfair labour practice' means-
(a) any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other than a strike or a lock 
out which has or may have the effect that-
(1) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his 
or their employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, moral or 
social welfare is or may be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby; 
(2) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly 
affected or disrupted thereby; 
n) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
(4) the relationship between employer and employee i& or may be detrimentally 
affected thereby; or 
(h) any other labour practice or any otl1i?! change in any labour practice which has or may 
have an effect which is similar or related to any effect mentioned in paragraph 
() "6 a .. 
By applying the above definition the Industrial Court brought about fundamental changes in the 
law governing the employment rclatioIl'.hip The amended definition, although more restrictive 
than the former, was, nevertheless, still open-ended and the Industrial Court essentially had the 
freedom to decide what was unfair or fair 7 The result was that the court essentially created a new 
labour law "in which common law contractual principles playa lesser role and where emphasis is 
placed on fairness in the employment and industrial relations context."8 
III 1988 the Labour Relations Amendment Act 83 was brought into effect. The definition of the 
unfair labour practice "now spanned some three p3ges in the Act and for the first time attempted 
4Ibid page I ~-19. 
~lbid page 19. 
6Citcd in Lc Roux and Van Nickcrk 7//(' .South A/m:an hIW 0/ Un/air Dismissal 1994 page 19. 
7Bcnnet A (;uirif' to the Law of Un/mr /)lsmissal in 5,'outh A/rica 1992 page 6, Bennet also cites the 
following: " .. .it would appear that the Icgisbturc b~ defining the concept in such "'ide terms could have 
intended that this court should lay down guidelines as to "hat are to be considered unfair labour practices". 
{JAAf.l Wlf and Others \' hJdens (1 !)!(l) 4 ILJ 212 pel Ehlers DP. 
8Lc ROll:» and Van Niekerk The South A/rIcan Iml o/lin/mr Dismis,w/1994 page 19. 
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specifically to regulate unfair dismissal". 9 The definition was repealed in 1991,10 and the 
replacement definition was similar to the pre-1982 definition,11 and read that an unfair labour 
practice: 
" ... means any act or omission, other than a strike or lockout, which has or may have the 
effect that-
1) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their 
employment opportunities or work security is or may be prejudiced or jeopardised thereby; 
2) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or 
disrupted thereby; 
3) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
4) the labour relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally 
affected thereby". 12 
In interpreting and applying the above unfair labour practice definition the Industrial and Labour 
Appeal Courts developed various tests, "but the tl1Jth is that whether a dismissal is fair will depend 
on the specific facts of each case and, in many instances, will invoh'e a value judgement made by 
the manager concemed and, if necessary, the courts, or an arbitrator."n This will be discussed 
more fully hereunder. 
4.2.2 Substantive fairness 
The Industrial Court in fonnulating its decision as to the presence of substantive faimess 
established the facts surrounding the dismissal, and upcm them decided whether those facts 
justified the dismissaL Substantive faimess requires that the circumstances surrounding the labour 
practice, being the reason for dismissal, constitute both a "valid" and "fair" reason for dismissal 14 
The distinction between the abovementioned may be stated as follows "[Validity] goes to proof 
and to the applicability to the particular employee of the reason for the dismissal; faimess ls goes 
to the weight or sufficiency of the rea50n.'*' 
9Bennet A Guide to the I,mr 0/ en/air DIsmissal in Soulh A/rica 1992 page 7. 
lO'fhc Labour ReI,H ions Amendment Act I) of 199) . 
IILe Roux and Van Niekerk lhi' S·()ufh A/rican Lall' o/Un/air Dismissal 1994 page 26. 
12Citcd in Bennet A (iuide 10 Ihe {,all" (~rl/nji:Iir Dismissal JrJ 5,'outh A/rica 1992 page 7. 
I3Lc Roux and Vall NieL·rl-. The South ,.1/rican /,at! (~r (Irifai,- lJismissal 199·~ page 7. 
1~'1malgamal('d ('lotJiing and 7 exli!!' /I·orker.1 Union oj S1 and others \' J\f .Jacohsohn (Pty) Ltd( J 990) 
11 ILJ 107 (lC) per DA Basson. A M at II) J - 112 A. 
l~Faimcss. for the samc authors. "means that the dismissal must be justified according to the 
requirements of equity when all the rele,ant features of the case are considered.'· Cameron et 01 The New 
Lahour Relation.1 Act.· the Jaw aft('/" the} Y8H amendments 19X') page 111. 
IOlbid page Ill. 
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"[ A] reason will be valid if the facts indicate the employee actually did the things he is 
being accused of .... A reason will be faiT if the misconduct was sufficiently serious to 
warrant dismissal and the employer, having regard to the substantial merits of the case, 
acted fairly (Rycroft & Jordaan at 152-3). Several principles and factors are taken into 
account when the sufficiency of the reason for dismissal is considered, for example 
common-law principles like the nature of tht~ conduct, the possible prejudice to the 
employer and the employee's state of mind; the employer's disciplinary code; the 
consistency of the employer's actions; prior warnings received by the employee; and the 
fact that the employee knev.' he could be dismissed for his misconduct. The circumstances 
of the employer also play an important role when considering the fairness of the reason to 
dismiss. Certain instances of misconduct that may under normal circumstances not be 
regarded as sufficiently serious to justify dismissal may be rendered sufficiently serious in 
view of the employer's particular circumstances.,,17 
A valid reason for dismissing is a justified dismissal from the perspective of the employer based 
upon the circumstances of the case, whereas fairness is the yardstick that is placed on the valid 
conduct of the employer, froni ttl(' perspective of the Court. In short, "[vJalidity goes to proof, 
fairness to gravity."18 
The Industrial Court initially relied heavily upon the test of the "reasonable employer" for locating 
substantive fairness in the labour practice The "reasonable employer" test,19 borrowed from 
English law, was cited in LcI" alld others l' Western Areas Gold Iv/illin}: Co LtJ2° wherein the 
English decision of FeroJo Ud I' H Ranll's [1976] IRLR 302 was quoted, where Kilner Brown 
J stated at 303. 
"It seems to this Tribunal, therefore, that the law is quite plain and that what the Industrial 
Tribunal ought to do is, not to ask itself the question which this Tribunal did - "Are we 
satisfied that the offence was committed?" - but to ask itself the question, "Are we 
satisfied that the employers had, at the time of the dismissal, reasonable grounds for 
believing that the ofTence put against the applicant was in fact committed?" .... "21 
Landman AM, being aware that the above dictum could not be divorced from the context of the 
English Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974, nevertheless continued that the passage 
seemed to express the approach the court should follow when deciding similar issues.22 As a 
I7JefJeriesv President Steyn M/I1(' (1994) 151LJ 1425 (lC) at 1431 H-1432 C. 
JHCameron el al 7I1C .'\'eH' /'n/>(lI'(f Relations Ar/' tli .. law a(ier Ihe jY!-i8 amenrimen/,\ 19R9 page 144. 
19"The proper test is apparcnt1~ nol the polic) of the employer on disciplinary matters, but the reaction 
of a reasonable employer who takes into account releyanl circumstances." National Union oj Alineworkers and 
another v r,'ast Rand Proprietarv Mines Ud (I9!n) 8 ILJ 315 (lC) at 322 D per Bulbulia. M. 
w(J985) fllLJ 307 (Ie) 
2JCitcd at 3 J 4 C-E. 
22At 314 E-F. 
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result, when deciding if an employee was guilty of committing an offence the question to be asked 
was whether the employer had relied on reasonable grounds in finding the accused guilty. 
According to Bulbulia M "[a]n employer need not be satisfied 'beyond reasonable doubt' that an 
employee has committed an alleged offence. The test to be applied is whether the employer has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the employee has committed the offence.,,23 Similarly, in 
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union v Pretoria Castings (Pty) Ltd, 24 Fabricius AM 
held that" '('.JOod grounds', 'valid reason' or 'good cause' in relation to a determination whether 
a summary dismissal was justifIed, seems to me to require an evaluation of the facts under all the 
circumstances and the enquiry as to whether a reasonable employer having regard thereto and to 
equity, would or should have acted in the particular manner."Z5 
When the Court was faced with di;::ciding \\-hether an employer should have, in the circumstances 
of the case, summarily dismissed the employee - i.e. was the dismissal fair besides being merely 
valid - the proper approach to be followed was indicated in National Union (l Mincworkers and 
others v East Rand Gold alld (iralliun1 Co Ltd wherein the author Anderman was quoted to the 
following effect: 
"Industrial tribunals have been sharply reminded that in deciding this issue too they must 
not ask themselves what they would ha\e done had they been management, rather they 
must look at what lhe employer has decidt.~d and ask whether the employer's decision in 
the circumstances was reasonable Moreover, they must judge the reasonableness of the 
employer's decision remembering that in these cases "there is a band of reasonableness 
within which one employer might reasonably take one view; another quite reasonably, take 
a different view"; and as long as it was quite reasonable to dismiss him then the dismissal 
must be upheld as fair even though some other employers may not have dismissed him."26 
2'Xational Unio/1 ojAfil1('workcrs and others v East Rand Gold and ('ranium Co Ltd (1986) 7 lLJ 739 
(IC) at 7--l2 I. 
24(1985) 6 ILJ 369 (Ie). 
2~At 375 E. Fabricius AM. relics on MachI v [;nion Governmenf 1924 AD 77 at 80-81. 
2"Being a quote from Andcnllall J,aw of enfair Dismissal second edition at page 149, National Union 
of Mineworkers and others v Fast Rand (,old and Uranium Co /,td (198() 7 IU 739 (lC) at 746 F-H. The 
correct test was stClted thus in National en/on 0/ Wlnl', Spirit and A /lied Workers and others I' Distillers 
Corporation (J'ty) Ltd: "Was it rCClsonahk for the employers to dismiss him? If no reawnablc employer would 
have dismissed him then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might reasonably have 
dismissed. then the dismissal was fair' (Lord Denning in British Leyland (UK) Ltd v Swift [198)] IRLR 91 at 
9:1.)" at 788 H-J. According to De Kock AM. "the tribunal must not ask itself whal it would have done had it 
been managemenL rather it lllllst loot al what the employer has decided and ask whether the employer's 
decision in the circlll1lstClncc~ was rcasoHClblc .. at 78X J. 
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The standard was that urthe reasonable employer, with the question needing to be answered: did 
thc cmployer act ill an unreasonable lll<lII11C( in relation to the behaviour of a "reasonable 
employer" in the same circumstanccs? II' the employer did deviate lI'om the standard of the 
reasonable employer then his or her action was unreasonable and consequently unfair. If, 
however, the employer's action matches up to the standard of the reasonable employer then his 
or hcr action is rcasonable and cOllsequel1t1y fair. 
With thc passagc oftilllC, Fabricius AM started expressing doubts as to whcther the "reasonable 
elllployer" tcst \Vas thc COllect tcst to bc applied in the law or labour relatiolls27 and in National 
(flliun r!/Alillell'orkcrs and olhers I' Vaal Reef" Lrp/oJ'OlioJl alld Ivlil/illK ('() Ud 28asked whether 
there was any point ill enquiring whether an employer had acted reasolllfh~v ill deciding to dismiss, 
as opposed to./(lil'/), or eqUitably? He thought not. 
"As I~lr as an employer's reason to disllIiss is concerned the sule question should be 
whether he had good grounds 1(11' doing so, From the strict jurisplUdential point orview 
there is or cnulse a dil1crence bl'lweeil reasollableness and fairness, although the hon; 
mores alld policy considerations l(lIln parlor each concept. A good reason (in tbe 
employer-cmployee relationship) may emanate from commoIl-law principles or from 
standards cullectively agreed to between Ihc parties, Ultimately, and stripped of all 
selllantics, it is conduct, or repeated conduct, which cleally indicates that the continuance 
orthe cmployer-employce relationship has been made intolerable, What such conduct or 
course or conduct may be will ultilllately depend 011 the Jacts and it would be unwise to 
lay down specific considerations in this I egald, .. , I'v1y view is therefore that the question 
whether the 'reasonable employer' test should be applied in our law or not is misplaced, 
alld as G'1r as substantive fairness is concerned need ill ally evcnt not be decided in the sense 
or its being either right or wrong The qucstion should in lact not be an issue at all as [ 
have attempted to indicate. The heritage of Ollr colllmon law seen in the light of prevailing 
circumstances and social conditions, plus thc good judgement of the marketplace (the hOlli 
mores) will provide the answ('r ill most conceivable instances,"z'! 
There was no Illeanillgli.t1 distinction to be madc bet ween "reasonable" and" lair" behaviour. As 
1~lr as all e1llployer's reaSOil to dismiss was concerned the solt~ question should be whether he Of 
she had good grounds for doing so, Though there is a differencc between reasonableness and 
f~lirness, ultimately it is collduct, or repeated conduct, which indicates that the continuance of the 
employer-employee relationship has been made intolerable. This will depcnd on the facts of the 
2tn nl~I1,/1 \.' .lUi(' ,"'tore (I <JX7) X tLJ 71,.J. (tC) al 717G, 
"H(l9X7) R ILJ 77() (lC), 
I') Yutionol Unio/J (~f',Hlncll,(),.k('rs (/l1d Illlwl'S I.' 1'1/(// /?eej\' /exploration ilnd Mining Co Ud (1987) 8 
ILl 77() (Ie) al 779 C-J, 
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case, and each case should be judged as unique, ralher than using the reasonable employer test. 
Fabricius A1\1's view, in the above dictulll, is that substantive fairness will be located when one 
had regard h) the COllllllon law, in pat ticll\ar the heritage thereof: seen in light of the prevailing 
circulllstances alld social conditions, and the good judgement uf t he marketplace (the bOl1i mores), 
As a result that which was reasonable belJaviour, on par with the behaviour of the reasonable 
employer, may be rair behaviour ibut this was not always the casc30 In short, umcasonableness, 
more oneil than 110t, would indicate unfairness ll but reasonableness was not the enquiry itself; 
rather thc cnquiry was into the i11cls orthe case as evaluated against the elll~ct those racts would 
havc un the employment relationship Where certain conduct, 011 the part of the employee, was 
such as to cause the employment relationship to becoll1e intolerable then the employer's action in 
dismissing the employee would, more oneil than Ilut, be filiI' FssentiaIly, at the end of the enquiry, 
the court is attempting to investigate if the employee's misconduct haclthe cOcci or destroying, 
or or seriously damaging, the employment relationship between the parties,U Therefore it is the 
eflcct urthe misconduct on the employment relationship which is paramollnt in thc evaluation of 
fairness, 
"All employer's response to a breach orduty by all employee ought properly to be dictated 
by the extent to which the breach has ill1paired the cmployment relationship, and nothing 
I]lOre, The fact that an employee rcmaills defiant is relevant only ill that context. In my 
view the proper enquiry in each case is whether the employer can fairly be expected to 
continue the cmployment relationship, Thc attitude adopted by the employee is but one 
oCthe factors which is relevanl to that enquiry," .U 
'°111 ('/J(,mical WorkCI'S industrial ('lIioll \'!?ccf,i!I alld ( '011111111 ,\,'1 (I'll) Uri (I ,}90) II ILJ 1319 (Ie) al 
LUX D-G the court indicaled that there was fmce in the submission orthe applicant's counsel "that the 
apPIll:lch to be adopled is diclated by tile opelling \\Ords orthc ddillilion or 'IInfair labour practice' in sl orthe 
Labollr Rclalions Acl. \\hkh read -'an,1 :lcl 01 OIl1ission \\hich in an IInl:lir manner infringes or impairs the 
labour rdalions between :1Il employer and elllplO\cc" '. and that this lays down a raetnal. objective test which 
does lIot depend on Ihe slate of milld or knowledge 0[' I he clllployer. Usually what is reasonable will also be fair 
bllt Ihal is not always the casC,., 
"Indeed a labour practice which is Illlleasonabic "may givc rise 10 what is regnrdcd as oppressive 
cOllduct" (Va/iollal (ilium 01'1\ ftne II 'orkers and (/I/OIIIl'I' I' Fast Halld l'f'IIprif'larl' A lilles Ud (1987) 8 I LJ 315 
(1(') al ,121 I) per Bulbulia, M) and oppressi\c cOllcluel is "lIf~jllst or h:lrsh. bllrdellsolllc and wrongrul. or which 
illvolves al Icasl all element or lack or probity or (:lir de:lling or a visible deparillre rlOm the standards or fair 
dealillg ami a \iolatioll or Ihe conditiollS or !;til' pla,v", l\o/i(}lIal (illioll ol'AflflclI'lIl'kcrs alld another I' !~'ast Rand 
!'ropril'/lIIy ,\ lilies /,td al .\2 I E, citing ,J.\pck I'il'<' ( '0 },Ir! ([IIIIII/wther I' A 10u('rli(,I')I,('r und others 1,}68 (1) SA 
517 (C) at 526 and 527, 
"Sec I/ol'chst (I'll) !,Id \' ( '/fj(r al/d (ll/olher (1993) 14 I LJ 1449 (LAC) at I 'l51) cited in Jefferies I' 
I'rcsidenl ,"'Inll Ml/IC (I 99..J.) 15 ILl 1425 (Ie) at 1432 D, 
";\/Ol/(/i I'apcl' ('II Uti v }'0l'£''' I'rilllill)!, /l'ood ,t', • Wier! Workers Ullio/l & anolher (11)1)4) 15 ILJ 778 
(LAC) at ]X 1 A-I3 per Nugellt J, 
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But what is the role of the common law? 
A dismissal in contravention of the provisions ofa statute or of provisions made or issued in terms 
of the statute are void, irrespective of whether justifiable cause for the dismissal exists.34 If the 
dismissal is void then its fairness need not be enquired into. But what would occur when the 
dismissal was justified by the COITUnon law or the contract? The dismissal would only be permitted 
once it was found to be fair, which is when all the factors relating to fairness are considered. 35 
"[T]he court has categorically stated and applied the principle that irrespective of the 
lawfulness of the dismissal, i.e. where the dismissal is completely in accordance with the 
common-law principles, or with the provisions of a contract of service ... it remains to be 
decided whether the dismissal can be regarded as fair in the light of all the circumstances. 
This flows from the fact that the court is in these circumstances entitled to adopt a broader 
approach than a mere common-law or legalistic approach. However, the lawfulness of a 
dismissal is usually taken into account as a preliminary step when the fairness of the 
dismissal is considered,,36 
As early as 1983 in A1awli v Bar/ows kkl.llujacturillg Co Ltd7 the court rejected the argument that 
a dismissal that was la\vful could not be unfair. 
"To confine the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of this court in respect of dismissals to 
those that were wrongful only would effectively render the legislative intent behind the 
provisions of such a jurisdiction nugatory for the employee would then be given no further 
rights than those hI..' has all along enjoyed at common law ,,-'8 
The enquiry is into fairness, and lawful conduct is not necessarily conclusive of fairness. 
"Unlawful actions and practices arc dealt with in the ordinary courts.... A practice wlllch 
is quite lawful may, however, be unt~l.ir as contemplated by the definition of 'unfair labour 
practice' in s 1 of the Act I therefore find that it is unnecessary for this court first to 
obtain ajudicial pronouncement on the lawfulness of the clause complained of Tills court 
can make a detemlination without reference to the said legal point"39 
In conclusion, the position of lawfulness in relation to fairness may be summarised as foHows: an 
unlawful act would be an unfair labour practice due to its unlawfulness. This does not mean, 
however, that a lawful act is a fair labour practice It is the act which must be fair and to be fair 
34Brasscy et al The A'ew /,ahour Lall' 19X7 page 3('0. 
3'lbid. 
JOlbid page 3()o. 
37(1983) 41LJ 283 (lC). 
JljAt 294 A. 
Cited in Lc Raux and Van Nickcrk 1hc South A/man /..(1\1' I!f Unfair /)I.wnissai 1994 page 24 
39('OUllcil (~r,Hlf1mg ('I1IOIIS \. ('halllhcr of Almes (1.<..,:1 (19X5) (, ILJ 293 (Ie). per Hiemstra AM. at 
295 B-D. 
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it must initially be lawful, but "although a dismissal might be lawrul it can still be unnlir."10 
So, a ncr I he above, vvhat constitutes {~lilt1css'1 J\ concise, succinct statement is that: 
"Fairness ... is ora sul~icctive nature ill regard to which reason is not necessarily applicable. 
Fairness must take account of human l~lllihility and or the I~lct that reason is seldom the 
sole guide or hUl11an behaviour. ;\ sensitive response to deeply felt needs of his work-
f()rce, even ifobjectivcly those needs arc Jlot reasonable in all respects, should be expected 
of any manager. "41 
ThOllgh "reasonable behaviour" may not be a 11ecessary indicator of fairness, it may, nevertheless 
be sullicicnL. What is fair will be concluded tiorn ami I()lllldcd upon the surrounding circumstances 
of the labour practice More accurately, the judgement of 1:1imess essentially is a value judgement 
which takes all the evidence into account·12 In light of the above, the following arc otTered as 
sullicicnt indicators ortililllCSS, or the lack thereoC lawfulness, reasonableness - which should be 
distinguished frolll the reasonable employer test - equity and especially the damaging effect of the 
practice on the employment relationship. 
4.3 Understanding insubordination under the lInnlir labolUJ2ractice jurisdiction. 
4.3. I ControLill.Jhc. ernpJoyment rclatiillI sltilL::._MaHi1gQJ ial prerogative 
One of the consequellces of the employee's obligation to be subordinate is the employer's 
contractual right to control the employee's pmductivc capacity. This right "is at the velY heart 
or mosl employment relationships. It makes possible the deployment of the productive capacity 
for which the employer contracts, atld so is the essence of what has come to be termed 'managerial 
prerogat i ve'. ",11 Under the unnli r labour practice jurisdiction, it was said, that the power of 
cnnllnand, "is one or t he 1l10st jealously gUaI ded territories of managers everywhere. In its modern 
guise as the 'managerial premgative' or managemellt's 'right 10 manage' it underlies many 
contemporary disputes between managelllent and organised labour. ,,41 The Industrial Court 
1n/'l ·mls I' ( 'f rr ,\ 1IIIIIIIi/c/uring (1'1.1') /,/(/ ( I,),))) 11 II J I :'IX) (1(') bcllm: Vall Zyl M al 1590 F. who in 
I urll reI ies 011 Jl/elalllnd .II/iet! Workers [ fllioll (/Ild o/h('rs I· liar/Oil's ,\ /111 11IIiu-/urillg ('0 lAd ( 1(81) 4 1 LJ 283 
(Ie) at 21n F-Ci: A:nvilli (/nd olhers, Kofasc lind olhe!s I' ,"'truml Hox (l'lv) Uti (1985) 6 ILJ 453 (IC), Na/iunal 
{imon o/A IlI1cll'Orkers I' ,\ /arif:I'a/e ('ol1so/it/ated ,\ lilies /,tel (198(l) 7 1 L.J 123 (Je). 
()·l9 I-J. 
11,'-': I ('hell/icof Workers Union 11l1d IItile}"s l' C,,:' industrial (f'ly) /,Id /.'<7 l'al1l'ct (1%8) <) ILJ 63') (Ie) at 
~7( 'oullcil/ilr ,r..,'ciF:nlijic and induslriall?('sL'o}"("h I' "'/en 1996 (2) S/\ I (/\) at lIB. 
I1Brasscy eI al 'l17e Nalure (~/ lilllp/uylllcnl I<)<.J() pagc 1)08 . 
. 11Rickert nasic 1'.Il1ploylllcnl [,II11' J YR7 p:lgc ()2. 
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indicated that it had the authority and power to scmtinize the so called "managerial prerogative". 45 
As to what exactly makes up managerial prerogative, the court in Clarl«: v Ninian and Lester (Ply) 
LtJwas in agreement with Brassey e( art; and cited the follO\ving: 
"The law gives the employer the right to manage the enterprise. He can tell the employees 
what they must and must not do, and he can say what will happen to them if they disobey. 
He must, of course, keep within the contract, the collective agreement and the legal rules 
that govern him. He must, now, also make sure his instructions do not fall foul of the 
unfair labour practice jurisdiction: in other words, if what has been said above is right, that 
they have a proper commercial rationale: to them But, even given these constraints, he 
still has a wide manageriaJ discretion He can decide which production line the employees 
should work on; whether they should take their tea break at ten or ten fifteen; when they 
may go on leave; and countless other matters beside. He can also decide what will happen 
to the employees jfthey do not work properly, if they go to tea early and so on. In short, 
it is he who, within the limits referred to, lays dov,'11 the norms and standards of the 
enterprise. Thi') - at least as far as the law is concerned - is ,,·hat 'managerial prerogative' 
entails, no more and no le~s "47 
Cameron in Checkers SA Ud (South lfi!ls H'arehc)l/se) and _\~4. Commercial Catering and Allied 
Jforkcf:\" Uniol14Ji. dealt with managerial prerogatilve and cited the above passage by Brassey el al 
adding that the existence of the prerogative of management had a number of implications. In the 
firs! place, management has the prerogative to manage the business. 49 Thus management has a 
decisive say over the conduct orthe enterprise and other busincss related decisions 50 The second 
ambit of the employer's prerogative is to impose reasonable and fair disciplinary regulations on 
its employees5J The third area where managcrial prerogative may come into play in defining the 
lawful ambit of an employee's responsibilities was stated as follows 
"Here management's prerogative to act unilaterally is considerably more restricted than 
in the other two areas .... \Vhen an employee is en~aged or promoted or when the terms 
of his or her contract are otherwi~c sealed, it is true that the parties agree not only to a 
specified ambit of responsibility, but also to an inevitable degree of subordination, he or 
she is required to submit to the employer's instructions. These may relate to what exactly 
thl;: employee is required to do or to how he or she is required to do it. But the 
4lCIarke v Ninian Glld/,ester (I't.,) /,td (1 <)XX) () ILJ 651 (Ie) at 655 A. 
""The New I,ahm;, /.ml. (19!-17) at p;.gc 74. 
4~ At 655 B-E. 
48(1990) II ILJ 1357 Atbitrallion, before Cameron, Arbitrator. 
4<ICheckcrs 5,:,1 Uti r. .... 'oulh lllll.1 WarchOl/ole) and S1 Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union 
(1990) ] I ILJ 1:157 ArtJitratioll at DoS 0 
~Ibid 
~I At ) 1(,'i D-E. 
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prerogative has definite limits, and these lie along the boundaries nrllle employee's agreed 
contractual duties Managerial prerogative call1lot be hdd In make the employee 
submissible to instructions or \vhatevcr kind rnanagement might chose to impose. As 
Brassey shows, the employer tIlust 'keep within the contract' and observe 'the legal rules 
that govern' the employment rdationship."52 
It would sccm that an el\1ployer's interest ill maintaining discipline in his workplace is legitimate. 
"As a gencral principle it may be staled that the bl each of rules laid down by an employer 
or the refiJsal to obey an cmployer's lawful and reasonable order is to be viewed in a 
serious light and may in given circumstances even justify summary dismissal."s3 
"The very Hlbric or the empluyment relationship requires all employee to accept and obey the 
reasonable orders or his superiors and 10 leave the taking of managerial decisions to those other 
employees who have chargc of thelll. ,,51 Although the person placed in author ity has this right or 
"prel ogativc" thcle is little doubt that when it is exercised, the person in instructing his or her 
cmployees how, wherc, when and what to do, or not to do, should do so within the f(:.>lIowillg 
parameters. Firstly, the cmployer must 1I0t give all order which falls outside the parameters of the 
employment relationship; namely, the contract of employment and collective agreement. 
Furthermore, the employer should exercise his authority by 1I0t illliing flmI of the unfair labour 
practice jlllisdiction. It is within these "constraints" I hat the employer should exercise his or her 
authority, or managerial prerogative, and it is within these parameters that an instruction will be 
decmed lawful to demand obedience, the refusal of which would be a breach of the contractual 
relationship. But would that disobediencc constitute insubordination? 
4.:).2 ld..QD1i1)iugJhc flat lire or iJl~lbord.inatiQ!UHl(Ler the~fair lab,QJlumlctice jurisdiction. 
As was indicated ill chapter 2, the cmployee occupics a de .lcu.:ln subordinate position in the 
employmcJlt relationship This subOidinate positioll is evidence or the employee's de jure 
obligation to be subordinate in the relationship This obligation, or duty, to be subordinate is 
buttressed with the employer's cOllitractual right 10 dcmand that the employee act according to his 
or her obligation to he subordinate. As understood ill the light or the above, the breaching of this 
duty would be any conduct which causes the employee to act contrary to his or her contractual 
"AI I J(,,'i G- 1.1(,() A. 
"Pcr M Olivcr ill Brasscy el al n/l' NcH' /,a/1I1Iu·/.1l11' 11)l{7 pagc 430. 
c11.andlllall AM ill ,<.,'Iec! /'.ilgIlW!'l'illg ill/r! ;l11il'i/ /llirkers Union o/S·I alld olhers I' (',,/lillall/'ower 
Fil" il 11111'111 , IIll1cpor1cd N II I 1/2/1575 (iF ()1)5 ci led ill il/ail/o/II \. I) '//11(' o/ld 'rei/i/C'r fitl nlOl'I1l'il/e Fnp,ineeril1?, 
(11)1)0) I I ILJ 31),. <1(') all'm 1- .11)1) A. 
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obligation to be subordinate. Insubordination, under the common law, as discussed in chapter 3, 
was more narrowly defined and equated (primarily) with the employee's disobedience rather than 
any conduct contrary to the duty to be subordinate. 
\Vhat "vil1 be dis-cussed hereunder is the misconduct of insubordination as defined under the unfair 
labour practice. This in turn VI-~n indicate to the reader the restriction and limitation placed on the 
contractual right of the employer to demand the employee to act according to his or her obligation 
to be subordinate. 
In Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA and another v Woo/tru Ltd tla 
Woolworth\' {luuldburg/s the court pointed out that an employer may only dismiss an employee 
if he or she breaches (l "fundamental", "material" or "important" term of the contract. 56 
Insubordination constituted sllch a valid rcasor. for dismissal,57 pro\ided the dismissal was 
substantively fair 58 The court held that insubordination took place when: 
"the employee refuses to obey a lawful and reasonable command or request and the refusal 
is wilful and serious (VI-'ilfu!1y disobedient) or when the employee's conduct poses a 
deliberate (wilful) and serious challenge to the employer's authority,,59 
Insubordination was thus equated with a wilful disobedience of a lawful instruction, akin to the 
common law's undct~tanding ofth~~ same misconduct. In the decision, Mqhay; v rail I..eer SA 
(PI;) Lid, (,() the Industtial Court d(:cided a matter where an empl0yee left his workplace in defiance 
of authori ty61 The Industrial Court was satisfied that "the applicant's belief that permission had 
been granted was unfounded and calculated to challenge .... [the employer's] authority."62 Van 
Schalkwyk M therein noted the follO\ving from Lord Evershed Mr in IBH'S v London Chronicle 
(Indica/of' Ne"'1'.~papef'.\) i"td (J 959) 2 All ER 285 at 287F and 288A respectively: 
~5(J9g9) 10 ILJ 311 (Ie) per DA Ba<;son AM, with \\hom Hartdegen Ac\1 concurred. 
x'At 314 B-C. 
57 At 313 E- 314 A The court reI ied on han,\fJilrl and Genera! Workers Union and another v 
interstate Bus Lines (Ply) Ltd (1988) g II.] 877(1(') al 1\80-1. Furthermore the court indicated that the abo\'c 
was in accordance with Alqhavi v I em !.eer ,<"':1 (Ply) Ud (1984) 5 ILJ 179 (lC) at 182. 
5HTo the extent tllat thef<.: \\ <l~, both a \ alid afld h;, rCRSGf] fur the dismissal. Co,..mnerciu! Caferinj.! and 
A /lied Worker., ['nio/l 0/,\·1 and (mOille,. \' i,oulfru Uti t II lIoolll'ortlis (H.andhurg) (19W) 1 0 IL.I 311 (Ie) al 
313E. 
59At314H-1. 
6O(l9X4).'i ILJ 179 (Ie) per Van Schalk\\yk M 
61Mqhayi \' Ian Lecr'\1 (/>1.11 i_lei (J9X-l) 5 ILJ 179 (1(') at I71J G 
62At lin n 
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" 'It is, no doubt, thcrell)[(\ gcncrally true that wilful disobcdience of an order will justify 
summary dismissal, since wilful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order shows a 
disrcgard - a conlplctc disregm d - of a condition essential to the contract of service, 
Jl<Hlldy, the condition that (he servant mllst obey t he proper orders of the master and that, 
unless he does so, the I c1ationship is, so to speak, struck at fundamcntally.' 'I do, 
however, think (following the passages which I have already cited) that one act of 
disobedience or misconduct can justify dismissal only if it is of a nature which goes to 
show (in effcct) that the servant is repudiating the contract, or one of its essential 
conditiol1s~ and for that reason, therefore, I think that one finds in the passages which 1 
have rcad that the disobediiencc Illllst at least have the quality that it is "wilfhl": it does (in 
other words) connote a deliberate flouting of the essential contractual conditions.' ,,63 
From the above it Illay be concluded that the wilful disobedience of a legitimate instruction may 
justify dismissal. because the refusal Indicates a disrcgard of a fiJtldalllental condition of the 
cmployment relationship, that is, the esscl1tial requirement that the employee will obey and act 
according to his or her subordinate position"1 III refusing thc instruction, the employee breaches 
the relationship fi.l11danlentally and repudiates the cOlltract(''i The misconduct was labelled by the 
court as being insubordination and consisted of the ernployec challenging the employer's authority. 
Insubordination was there(ore the wilfi.1! challcnge or the employer's authority, of which 
disobedience was a manifestation of sllch a challenge. Summary dismissal, however, can only be 
justilled if the employee commiHed a deliberate and serious act of disobedictlce. 66 
In /l'allSpol't and GUllural Workers (flliO/1 and allo/her v In/ersta/e Bus Unes (Ply) Ltr.f7 the 
applicant had refused to participate in a disciplinary hearil1g because the chief shop steward was 
not present to represent him. The frame Ilianager, who was conducting the hearing, was not 
prepared to adjourn as another shop steward was present who could represent the applicant. The 
disciplinary hearing continued and at the end of the enquiry the trafTic manager informed the 
"';\t 182 A-C. 
"'This eWIJ applies for employees who h:I\e heen placed in a posit iOIl of authurity over others, 
insubordinalioll relates 10 the breaching of Ihis <llllhorily as well. "A refusal to obcy instruelions from the 
person whom the employer, 10 the knowledge 01" 1 he employee, has placed ill authority over that employce 
a1ll0uIIIs 10 misconduc1. This is so "hethcr the person in authorit .... is a subcofllractor or a normal cmployee or 
thc COIIIP;III)". Such behaviour amounts to nliscollduct for which the employer is cnlitlcd to disciplinc the 
cmployee." .'·;out/lI!/"/1 SIIII I!otel ('orl'orat iOl' (I'ty) Uri 011'/ .\\ ('oll/lIIcrcia! ( 'llterillg and A /lied Workers Union 
(1991) 121Li 140.1 Arbitralioll, pcrBralld, ;\rbilratof, atl4Ll F-II. 
"'nuifdillg ( 'ollstl"llc{ioll and /1 {lied Workers I 'nion and IInother \' fo.' Hogcrs and C Huche! CC and 
allother (1987) 8 ILJ 1 W (lC) at 172 E-J. 
('('A1qhayi I' I ·1117 {,eel' ,):1 (Ptv) Utl (19lH) 5 ILl t 7') (lC) at 182 0 cites Moonial1 v lJolmoral /lotel 
1925 NPD 215 at 219. 
"( 1988) 8 ILl '!I.77 Ie, per Dc Villicrs Sc. M. 
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applicant that he was satisfied that the evidence proved his e,1Uilt. In response to this finding, the 
applicant became annoyed and snatched the notes from the traffic manager's hand and thereby 
tore them, He then shouted at the traffic manager and rushed out of the room, with the shop 
steward, before the discipiinary enquiry was complete, taking the tom notes vlith him68 It was 
this latter behaviour of the employee that resuhed in the applicant having to appear at another 
disciplinary enquiry, the following day, where he was to face the charge of "intolerable behaviour" 
and "insubordination" because he removed confidential documents from the boardroom and 
disregarded his disciplinary enquiry by walking out of the boardroom. 69 De Villiers M pointed out 
that "insubordination, calculated to challenge an employer's authority warrants instant dismissal,,70 
Insubordination therefore occurrled when the employee challenged the employer's authority or 
position of authority, In relating the facts of the case matter with the above nature of 
insubordination the court continued: 
"lfthe applicant in casu was not satisfiEd with the disciplinary proceedings he could have 
mentioned it at his appeal hearing and there was therefore no reason for him to behave the 
way he did, which behaviiovr was inexcusable. The court is therefore satisfied that the 
applicant's behaviour at the disciplinary enquiry the previous day amounts to gross 
insubordination and although the court cannot find that it was calculated to challenge the 
respondent's authority, it nevertheless had the effect of disregarding the respondent's 
authority and of making a mockery of the respondent's disciplinary procedure"71 
The COUlt was satisfied that a "mere disregard" of authority had the same effect as a "challenge" 
of authority Thus a "challenge" directed to or a "mere disregard" of an employt~r's authority was 
evidence of the misconduct insubordination. 
In Humphrie ... and Jewell (PI») Ud \' Federal COUllcil of Retail and Allied Workers Union and 
others the Labour Appeal Court hdd that "a disregard by an employet, of his employer's authority, 
especially in the presence of other employees, amounts to insubordination and it cannot be 
expected that an employer should tolerate such conduct. The relationship of trust, mutual 
confidence and respect which are the very essence of a master-servant relationship cannot, under 
6HAt 8RO A-F. 
6"At 8)0\0 G-H. 
7°Tramport and General Horkers Union and anuther \' Interstate /Jus Unes (P(r) I.td (1988) 8 ILJ 877 
(lC) at 880 I-J The court referred to: Mqhayi v "an I,eer SA (1984) 5 ILJ 179 (Ie) and Rosto/l & 'n ander v 
Leeupoort Mineralc 13ron (Fdm.l) (l3pk) (1987) 8 III ]GG (1(') 
71 Transport and (;eneral Jj(Jrker,~ {;nion alld another v In/cr.ltatc BU.I Unc.\' (Ply) Ltd (1988) SILJ 877 
(IC) at 880J-881 C 
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these circumstances, continue. 
In summary, from the above, the Labour Appeal Court in Humphries and Jewell (Ply) Ltd" 
Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers Unioll and others held that a "disregard" of the 
employer's authority was insubordination, in line with the Interstate decision. Wov/tru and 
Mqhayi both prefer the "challenge of authority" as constituting the misconduct. Woo/tru, 
however, continues that disobedience of a valid instruction would also be insubordination. 
Accordingly, Woo/lI"u confirms the view that insubordination may occur in any of those two forms, 
a challenge of authority or disobedience - in Wvoltru, the employer's authority was referred to as 
"competence to give orders". 73 It is submitted that the unifying theme in these judgements is the 
"challenging of the employer's authority" as the essence of insubordination, of which disobedience 
is evidence of such a challenge, so too is a disregard of the employer's instruction. So, at the heali 
of the enquiry is conduct, on the part of the employee, which will indicate an intention to challenge 
the employer's authority. One of the ways in which this challenge may be manifested is by the 
employee's wilful disobedience of a legitimate instruction, or by the employee disregarding the 
employer's authority. 
But on what grounds can a mere disregard of the employer's authority amount to 
insubordination?74 Disregarding an employer's authority is the same as "pay no attention to" or 
"treat as of no importance,,75 which would, it is submitted, have the same effect as disobeying the 
employer's instructions, in both cases the employee is acting in a manner which is contrary to his 
or her obligation to be subordinate to the employer's authority. 
I t is submitted that it does not matter how slight the disregard or disobedience is, provided the 
conduct indicates a deliberate challenge to the employer's authority. lfthe conduct does indicate 
72!!umphries and Jewell (/'(y) Ud v Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC), berore Spoelstra J, silting with Van Den Hccver, Claassen, assessors, at 1037 F-l. 
73AI317 B. 
7~Sce Humphries and Jewell (PM Ltd v Federal Council oj Retail and Allied Workers Union and 
others (1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC) at 1037 F-l. 
75The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1990 page 338. 
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such an intention then that conduct is insubordination.76 If the conduct is insubordination then it 
is a valid ground for dismissal. But whether it is a fair ground for dismissal is another matter) and 
it is here that the "degree" of disregard or disobedience win playa more important role - the 
seriousness of the breach. 77 7X 
The enquiry into the seriousness of the insubordinate act relates to the fairness of the dismissal as 
the appropriate sanction for the misconduct. The enquiry is whether dismissal was an appropriate 
sanction according to the facts of the case; that is) was the insubordination so serious as to warrant 
dismissal? As such it is that enquiry which usually foHows a finding that the employee in fact was 
insubordinate) i.e. that grounds for dismissal existed.79 
What is serious will depend on the surrounding circumstances of the case) which include the 
personal circumstances of the parties. A good guide as to what constitutes "serious misconduct" 
is whether or not the misconduct entailed behaviour which undermined the relationship of trust 
and harmony between an employer and employee to such an extent that the continued relationship 
would be impossible or intolerable;xo or which caused the relationship between the employer and 
employee to be destroyed or seriously damaged to such an extent that the relationship could not 
761n Interstate the court held that a mere disregard of the employer's authority was sufficient to 
constitute insubordination. While in Wooltru a challenge of authority was insubordination The solution 
offered in Wooltro was that the Interstate decision was not wrongly decided. Rather it was "submitted that the 
'disregarding of the employer's authority' did on the facts of that ease constitute a deliberate and serious 
challenge to or defiance of or resistance to (all of which are stronger than a mere disregard of) the authority of 
the employer (especially because he was making a mockery of the employer's disciplinary procedure)." 
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA and another v Wooltro Ltd t/a Woolworth.\· (Randburg) 
at 314 J. With what has been said above, and if true, the court in Wooltro would Dot have had to find that the 
conduct of the employee was more severe than a mere disregard, as the disregard was insubordination and was 
a valid ground for dismissing. Whether it was a fair ground is another matter, and therein the seriousness of 
the breach would be more important. 
77 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of SA and others v JM Jacobsohn (Pty) Ltd 
(1990) 11 ILJ 107 (Ie) per DA Basson AM, at 112 E who in turn cites Building Construction and Allied 
Workers Union and another v E Rogers and C Buche! CC and another (1987) 8 ILJ 169 (IC). 
78Amalgamated Clothing and Textile U'orkers Union of SA and others v JM Jacobsohn (Pty) Ltd(l990) 
II III 107 (lC) at 112 G, relying on SEA WUSA v Trident Steel (1986) 7 ILJ 418 (lC) and Bissessor v 
Beastores (Ply) LID tla Game Discount World (1986) 7 ILJ 660 (Ie). 
79HLCCAUVSA and another v Wimpy Pleasure Foods fla Wimpy Eastgate 1 1996J9 BLLR 1125 (Ie) at 
1133 H-J. 
IIOIbid. 
'The test to be applied in determining whether and employcc has commited a misconduct of such a nauter was 
set out in Anglo-American Farms tJa Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo )9923 (6) SALLR 1 (LAC) as 
follows: 'Whether the aeeused's misconduct had the effect of rendering continuation of relationship of 
employer and employee untenable' .... " at I 1331 to I 134 A. 
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be continued,81 or, "the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee being 
broken down irretrievably".82 Obviously, the more serious the misconduct the higher the 
probability of its damaging etTect on the employment relationship, and where the misconduct 
causes the continued employment relationship to become intolerable the misconduct is serious 
enough to warrant the sanction of dismissal. 83 
1t is in the assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct that the court will focus on the 
"implications" or "consequences" that the insubordination will have on the employment 
relationship.84 For example, it has been held that dismissal was justified or appropriate where the 
disobedience was serious because the disobedience could have caused a disaster,85 or because of 
the employee's persisting negative and militant attitude towards management,86 or when the 
employee refused an instruction and used abusive language in the presence of customers. 87 
Dismissal for insubordination is justified where the refusal is aggravated or repeated,88 the wilful 
repeated disobedience indicates a complete disregard of the employer's authority and the 
employee's duty to obey.89 Before the decision to dismiss is taken, similar incidents, including 
81Rossouw AM, relying on Scaw Metals Ltd v Vermeulen (1993) 14lLJ 672 (LAC) in Nyemhezi v 
N 1~,/h1 WU 119971 I BLLR 94 (IC) at 103 G-I . 
82Rossouw, AM citing Abrahams v Pick 'n Pay .<"'upermarkets OJ;:,,,' (1993) 14 ILJ 729 (Ie) in Nyemhezi 
v NFIIA IVl! 11997\ 1 BLLR 94 (Ie) at 103 G-I. 
8Jln general see Nyembezi v NEllA WU 11997J 1 BLLR 94 (IC) at 103 -105. 
81"The degree of seriousness must be ilssessed in the light of all the circumstances. And much depends 
on the implications of the refusal." Bennet A (iuide to the Law of Unfair Dismissal in South Africa 1992 pages 
41-4.1. cited in SACCA W(J and another v Shoprite-Checkers 119951 12 BLLR 87 (lC) al 92 J-93A. 
8'Nationul Union of Mine workers on beha({o{Mokgotho v Greenside Colliery(1995) 16lLJ 387 
(LAC) before Nugent J, sitting with Cassim and Euijen, assessors, who concurred. 
'The transgression was a serious derelielion of duly. Underground work is inherently ha:t.ardous, and 
managemcnt can only fulfil its duty to reduce Ihc risks to workers if it can be confidelltthat instructions 
properly given will be carried out. As appears from the evidence. it is essential thaI the person in charge of an 
underground shift is aware at all times of tile location of the workers under his control. Furthermore the task 
which Mokgotho was ilssigned to was the removal of loose lying coal which presents a fire hazard 
underground." at 389 C-F. See also National Union of Alineworkers and others I' iJriejiJntein Consolidated Ltd 
(l984) 5 ILl 101 (lC). 
R('SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union & another v Ninial1 & /,ester (Ply) Ltd (1995) 16 ILJ 1041 
(LAC). Berore Combl'inck J, sitting with Nicholson and Wintcl1on, Assessors, who com . 1Jfred. The shop 
steward incited ilnd encouraged fellow employees to disobey instructions, the dismissal was fair in light of the 
shop steward's persisting attitude of defiance and militancy towards the employer. 
H7/ILCCAWUSA and another v Wimpy Pleasure Foods tla Wimpy Eastgate [1996J9 BLLR 1125 (Ie) at 
1129 F-G. 
KHAtad/ala I' lynne and Tedder tla Thornville Engineering (l990) 11 ILJ 394 (IC) at 395 F, per De 
Kock, M. 
I!')At 365 G. 
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other relevant facts, should be taken into account. 90 That the insubordination occurred in the 
presence of other employees, who eagerly watched on, will weigh heavily with the court. 91 
On the other hand, the disobedience was not serious enough to warrant dismissal when the 
disobedience did not cause prejudice to the emp]oyer,92 or when the employee's failure to carry 
out the instructions was only partial. 93 It is therefore apparent that what constitutes serious 
misconduct is a decision based upon all the facts of the case. Notwithstanding the above, some 
decisions will be discussed hereunder to highlight which "surrounding circumstances" may justify 
the dismissal and which would not. 
In the arbitration of ATC (ply) Ltd and National Union of Metal Workers of SA 94 the dismissed 
employees were guilty of convening a meeting in defiance of management's refusal to permit 
one.95 The arbitrator indicated that the following militated against any conclusion that the penalty 
was appropriate.96 The day was exceptionally unusual, there was turmoil and violence in the 
community, and the workers in their anxiety had appealed to the union for help. Their decision 
to call for a meeting was found to be understandable. It was difficult at least from the side of the 
workers to see why management should refuse them permission to meet. The arbitrator stated: 
"The question is whether they (the grievants) were guilty of misconduct so serious as to 
warrant their dismissal. In making that assessment, one has to bear in mind that they acted 
in a moment of crisis, with little time to reflect and consider, in response to an emergency 
of a kind they had not experienced before. They should accordingly not be condemned 
merely because, with the benefit of hindsight and mature reflection, it is possible to think 
of better ways in which they could have achieved their legitimate ends. They should 
instead be judged in the moment of crisis in which they found themselves and the question 
should be whether, in those circumstances, they were guilty of culpable conduct so serious 
as to warrant their dismissal. It can in my view clearly not be said that, by calling the 
prohibited meeting in the circumstances they did, they were guilty of serious misconduct 
WWhich was enunciated as principle in" Nodlete v Mount Nelson Hotel and another (1984) 5 ILJ 216 
(Ie) and the Rostoll ... case at 370 E - F." Commercial Catering and Allied 1Yorkers Union of SA and another v 
Wooltru Ltd tla Woolworths (Randburg) (1989) 10 ILl 311 (Ie) at 315 I-J. 
9Wumphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd v Federal Council 0/ Retail and Allied Workers Union and others 
(1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC) at 1036 F. 
92SA CCA WU and another v Shoprite-Checkers () 995 J ) 2 BLLR 87 (Ie) at 95 B-D. 
93CJf1U and another v SA Polymer Holdings (Ply) Ltd t/a Megapak (1996] 8 BLLR 978 (LAC) at 
984A. 
94(1992) 13 ILJ 1320 (Arbitration) beforc Trcngovc, Arbitrator. 
95A1l' (P~v) Ltd and National Union o/Metal Workers o/S/I (1992) 13 ILJ 1320 (Arbitration) at 1325 
E-G. 
%At 1325 F - 1326 F. 
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of that kind. ,,97 
Though the organising of a union meeting was in defiance of management's instructions it was not, 
in the light of crisis, so gross as to justify dismissal. The employees should be judged in the 
context of the events that gave rise to their defiance. Similarly in I','valls v CIIT Mallufacturing 
(P1J~ uJ)X the applicant was dismissed for gross insubordination in that he called the general 
manager an "ignorant bastard". The court found that the events which occurred in the months 
preceding the incident; coupled with the abuse the applicant was subjected to and his general 
frustration at the lack of co-operation he was receiving, justified his outburst. Thus a single 
outburst at the end of a strained relationship could not be regarded as serious enough to warrant 
dismissal.')') In a similar vein was the dismissal of an employee who acted insubordinately on the 
spur of the moment in Armitage Shanks SA (Ply) ],(d v Mllisi. IOO The Labour Appeal Court 
observed in that case: 
"(The) employee had approached his charge hand to request their supervisor to allow him 
to leave work carly. It appeared that the charge hand did not advise the employee that the 
supervisor refused to grant him leave. Only when the employee was about to leave did he 
speak to the supervisor and discover that he could not give the requisite permission. After 
a half-hearted attempt to find a more senior manager to obtain permission fi-om him, the 
employee left work. The employee was dismissed. The Industrial Court found his 
dismissal to be unfair and reinstated him retrospectively for a period of six months."lol 
The CourL held that in the circumstances, although the employee did disobey the order, he did so 
on the spur of the moment and without committing insubordination. It is clear from the above that 
the surrounding circumstances exculpated the employee's insubordination. 
1 n each of the above three decisions the actions of the employee were analysed in light of the 
general surrounding circumstances of the dismissal and each time exculpated the employee, which 
caused the dismissal to be unfair. But should the court take into consideration the personal 
circumstances of the employee? 
Q7 At 1326 D-F. 
0
8(1992) 13 ILJ 1585 (Ie) before Van Zyl, M. 
QQHl'ans I' ellT ManufaclurinK (Ply) /,id (1992) 13 ILJ 1585 (Ie) before Van Zyl Mat 1592 G-I 
IOO( 1995) 16 ILJ 61 (LAC), before Goldstein J sitting with Hutton and Motimclc, Assessors, who 
concurred. 
'O',1rmitaKe S'han/o; 5vl (Ply) Ltd v Mnisi(l995) 16 ILJ 61 (LAC) at 61 C-E. 
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in the arbitration of Curobr;ck (Ply) Ltd alld Natiollal (/Ilioll (l iJllilding and Allied Workers l02 
it was found that there could be no doubt that the employee failed to carry out the lawful 
instruction to clean the driers on two occasions.103 The arbitrator found that there were factors 
which persuaded him that immediate dismissal was not the correct penalty, iII these circumstances, 
for the 1l1ilure to carry out the lawful instruction. 104 The company should have taken into account 
the age orthe dismissed employee, and should have considered the employee's perception that he 
was unwell, especially because this may have rendered him psychologically incapable of carrying 
out t he tasks asked of him. lOS The job categoty may have been above the capability of the 
employee. 106 Clearly the arbitrator was of the view that when deciding whether the dismissal was 
an appropriate sanction fbr insubordination the employer should take into account the personal 
circumstances of the worker involved. 107 Jefferies v President Sleyn Mille l08 also illustrates this 
point. 1 [ere the applicant was a 44 year-old hostel manager at the mine and had fbr some time, 
with the approvaJ ofthe respondent, also conducted a transportation business of deceased miners. 
This involved the transportation of the bodies of deceased miners to their place of burial, at the 
request of the family or other hostel managers. When the new personnel manager became aware 
of this he gave the applicant a written instruction to discontinue the body transportation business. 
The applicant ignored this instruction because he believed that it was a private business conducted 
after hours and off the premises of the mine. The applicant was dismissed. 109 
The instruction was found to be reasonable and lawful,1l0 and the refusal was found to be 
unreasonable. I 11 The court, nevertheless, held that although the applicant's misconduct 
IOI(IY92) 13 ILJ 1616 (Arbitration) Be/ore Pitman. 
IOY'orobrik (Ply) Ud and National Union of Building and Allied ~Vorkers (19Y2) 13 lLJ 1616 
(Arbitration) at 1621 C. 
'O~At 1621 D. 
105 At 1621 G-H. 
'MAt 16211. 
'07At 1616 H. 
'OR(1994) 15 ILJ 1425 (Ie) per Verwey, AM. 
I09JejJeries v President Steyn Mine (1994) 15 LLl 1425 (Ie) at 1426 A. 
IIOAt 1437 F-G. 
1I'''The instruction came from the personnel manager, it was 011 this senior mallagemenlleve) that 
clarilicatioll should have been obtained immediately. Applicant had a duty to ascertain the reasonable and 
lawful meani ng, applicability and extent of the instruction given to him, if he was uncertain about it, as he 
clearly \yas. before unilaterally deciding not to adhere thereto. T accordingly conelude that applicant, all 
employee in a managerial position, acted unreasonably in refusing to consider the instruction applicable to 
himself and accordingly refusing to obey it." At 1438 D-F. 
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constituted a valid reason for dismissal it was, nevertheless, due to the personal circumstance of 
the employee not a fair reason.ll2 The following personal facts weighed heavily with the court: that 
the applicant was 44 years of age, that he had 15 years of unblemished service, and that there was 
no evidence that he had abused his position to further his own business. 113 
Clearly the court tended to place emphasis on both the surrounding circumstances of the dismissal, 
as well as the personal circumstances of the employee, in searching for any sign of 
"reasonableness"in the disobedience which would either justify the insubordinate conduct or the 
dismissal. The circumstances that surround the labour practice and those of the parties either 
mitigate or aggravate the employee's wilful state of mind, and in tum highlight the "seriousness" 
of the misconduct. 
According to the common law the refusal should be wilful, that is intentional or deliberate, to 
justifY dismissal. Thus a mere disinclination to perform the instruction, 114 or performance under 
a genera] sense of protest, 115 is not insubordination because the employee is performing what he 
or she has been instructed to perform. Conduct which appears to constitute insubordination may 
not necessarily be so. The arbitration of Tubecon (pty) Ltd and National Unio11 of Metalworkers 
of SA , 116 was concerned with a refusal by some employees to leave a disciplinary hearing on the 
grounds that they had not received a fair hearing. The misconduct had occurred in the course of 
a disciplinary hearing 
"The line between effective and assertive defence in a disciplinary enquiry and 
insubordination is a very blurred one. If a worker oversteps the mark I think this must be 
taken into account because frequently the motive is not to subvert the authority of the 
management but to assert the merits of the defence. In this case both grievants believed 
that they were not getting a fair hearing and the motive behind their conduct was not in 
my opinion to subvert the management's authority as much as to assert their rights. The 
mAt 1438 H-J. 
"Applicant's misconduct tested against the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, was not 
sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal, and respondent, having regard to the merits in casu, acted unfairly and 
too severely by awarding dismissal as sanction." at 1439 A-B. 
mAt 1426 D-F. 
114 "If mere disinclination is an offence, then half the country's population would Jose their jobs" per 
Bulbulia in Metal and Allied Workers Union and others v Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts and Rivets (Pty) LId 
(1988) 9 ILJ 129 (Ie) at 138 1. 
IlsA/etal and Allied Workers Union and (Jlhcrs v Tran.wanl Pres.~ed Nuls, Boll.~ and Rivets (Pty) Lid 
(1988) 9 ILJ 129 (Ie) at 138 H-1. 
116(199) ] 2 ILJ 437 (Arbitmtion), before Bmnd. Arbitrator. 
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fact that they were unduly robust in doing this does not indicate a settled and wilful desire 
to subvert the authority of the company."l11 
From the above, it is important in deciding the fairness of the dismissal for insubordination to 
identify the conduct as being insubordination and not some other intentional conduct. Intention 
is impOTtant because it indicates the employee's blameworthy or wrongful state of mind in 
challenging the employer's authority. Intention is essential, because it gives the misconduct its 
"insubordinate" nature. 
4.3.3 The giving of a lawful and reasonable instruction under the "unfair labour practice". 
Undcr thc common law, dismissal for dh;obeying a lawful and reasonable order was permitted. 
What was lawful, and reasonable, depended on legislation and the common law (See chapter 3). 
How these requirements, lawful and reasonable, were understood and applied by the courts under 
the "unfair labour practice" jurisdiction will now be discussed. 
It was noted above that employers must exercise their "managerial prerogative" within the 
parameters ofthe law and binding contractual agreement, which include individual contracts and 
collective agreements. [n addition, the instruction should be reasonable and fair. Clearly 
reasonable orders under the unfair labour practice was interpreted in light of "fairness" and 
"equity" which was wider than the understanding and interpretation thereof under the common 
law - where reasonableness was restricted to the common law's understanding of bOlli mores. 
There seems little doubt that by the addition offaimess the legislator strengthened the employee's 
position by restricting the employer's contractual right to demand the employee to act according 
to his or her obligation to be subordinate. This will be highlighted more fully hereunder. 
4.3.4 Lawful and reasonable orders. 
4.3.4.1 lnstructions when given must tall within the contractual relationship. 
Employees are employed to perform specified tasks and when an instruction is given which 
unilaterally varies or falls outside of the contractual relationship that instruction is unlawful 
117'l'ubecon (Pty) Ltd and National Union oJMetalworkers (~rSouth AJrrica (199\) 12 ILJ 437 
(Arbitration) at 446 E-H. 
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because it contradicts the relationship of the parties. The instruction, therefore, when given should 
fall within the bounds of the contractual relationship between the parties to be lawful and demand 
obedience. 118 
The decision of Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of SA and others v JM 
Jacobsohn (Pty) Lttfl9 illustrates the above. The employee was employed as a chopper-outer, 
besides this function he also did the "laying-up" of material and carried material from delivery 
points. 120 The employee objected to doing the duties of "laying up" as well as carrying material, 
he argued that these functions did not form part of his occupation. I2l It was common cause that 
"not only did the chopper-outers carry the material but everybody at the company pitched in: the 
managing director(s); the factory manager and the cleaners.,,122 One day when the delivery truck 
arrived the employee refused to carry the material. 123 The employee was then summoned to a 
disciplinary hearing where he was charged with insubordination. 
Did the instruction fall within his job description - his contractual role? The court was not 
convinced that the carrying of material was part of his job description, in the true sense of the 
word, and the employee had accordingly not refused to obey a "lawful" request. 124 Though the 
order might have been reasonable, especially because the other employees helped and the applicant 
himself contributed in carrying material on a number of occasions, the order, nevertheless, fell 
outside the bounds of the contractual relationship, and therefore these duties did not form part of 
the employee's job description. Therefore the instruction was unlawful and the employee was not 
obliged to obey. In a similar vein is the decision National Union of Textile Workers and others 
v Ja~ruar shoes (Ply) Lttf 25 wherein the court was concerned with the refusal by employees to 
work overtime, for which they were dismissed. 126 It appeared that the respondent had a 
118Which is why the order should relate to working hours only. Kahn v Rainbow Chicken Farms Ply 
Ltd (1993) 14 ll...J 1566 (IC). 
361 F. 
119( 1990) II ILJ 107 (IC) per DA Basson AM. 
l20At 110 C. 
mAt 110 F. 
122At 110 I. 
123lbid. 
'24At I J 5 C-G. 
m( J 986) 7 ILJ 359 (lC) per Bulbulia M. 
12°National Union o/Textile Workers and others v Jaguar shoes (Ply) Ltd (J986) 7 ILJ 359 (Ie) at 
90 
longstanding practice, of almost 20 years, of requiring employees to engage in overtime work. 127 
The dismissal of the employee was held to be unfair because the refusal to work the overtime was 
110t a breach of the contract between the parties. The overtime was voluntary, there was no 
express or implied agreement between the paliies to work compulsory overtime, thus the 
employee's refusal was not a breach of their contract. l2S As a consequence, there was no evidence 
that the employees disobeyed a lawful instruction, on the contrary it was the employer that had 
flouted the law. 129 The employees were not bound to perform the instruction as it did not fall 
within the contract between the parties. The above decisions clearly highlight that an instruction 
which does not fall within the ambit of the contractual relationship or which constitutes a unilateral 
variation of the contract - i.e. does not form part of the employee's job description - is unlawful 
and need not be obeyed by the employee. But when does an instruction actually fall outside the 
parameters of the contractual relationship? 
An instructive and illustrative decision is A Mauchle (Ply) Ud t/a Precision Tools v National 
Unioll (d"Metalworkers (gSA & others.130 The facts were that the appellant manufactured car 
parts and received an order for certain parts. The company wanted this opportunity to recover 
some of the losses which it had incurred. Further, they were concerned that if they could not fulfil 
the order then the car manufacturer would order the components from an overseas producer 
which would place the future business relationship at risk. In order to satisfy the order, the 
appellant proposed that machine operators should work overtime when required and that five 
operators should each operate two machines. The company regarded the latter proposal as 
reasonable because the operators had both the time and ability to do the work, in particular the 
operators were being paid for a tull day's work although they were not fully occupied.l3I The 
union was of the opinion that instead of some operators operating two machines, employees 
previously retrenched should be re-employed. After numerous meetings the position still did not 
mAl 361 C. 
12RFurthermore, the refusal to obey was justified because the work was in excess of the maximum 
numuer or overtime hours permitted by law. Thus the order was unlawful ill that it fell outside the parameter~ 
of the contract between the parties and the order itselrwas illegal. National Union o/Textile Workers and 
others" Jaguar shoes (Ply) Ltd (1986) 7 lLJ 359 (Ie) at 366 E-1. 
129See National Union a/Textile fVorkers and others v Jaguar shoes (Pty) Ltd at (1986) 7 ILJ 359 (Ie) 
365 I - 3Mi A. 
11°(1995) 16 lLJ 349 (LAC). Before Myburgh J sitting with Campbell and Tip as Assessors, who 
concurred. 
111 At 353 B-C. 
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change. Thereafter the works manager addressed the union members in the production department 
and explained management's position. The stewards met with their members and reported back 
that they were no longer willing to work overtime unless retrenched employees were reinstated, 
which could be done on a temporary basis. 132 This reply was a reversal of the union's previous 
position, which had been that overtime would be worked but that one operator would not operate 
two machines. 133 
Later some of the machine operators were instructed to operate two machines and they refused. 
A written warning was given to Mr Molokomme that unless he operated two machines by 13 :30 
further disciplinary action would be taken against him. 134 He persisted in his refusal and the union 
gave the company written notice that a dispute was being declared about the disciplinary action 
taken against Mr Molokomme. 
The company then requested the names of five machine operators who were to operate two 
machines, these were not produced and the machine operators were informed that they were 
dismissed for their collective refusal to comply with the company's lawful and reasonable 
instructions in relation to the performance of work 135 
The Industrial Court found for the union on three grounds: 
"(a) the company issued a request, not an instruction, and hence the applicants were not 
obliged to comply with it; 
(b) in making the 'request' the company intended to aIter the terms of the contracts of 
employment ofthe applicants; 
(c) the 'instruction' was not a reasonable one (which the applicants had to obey)."136 
On appeal the Labour Appeal court disagreed and held: 
"(t)he company had a valid reason for dismissing the applicants: 
- an instruction was in fact given; 
- the instruction was lawful; 
- the instruction was reasonable; 
- the refusal to obey the instruction was serious, deliberate and repeated.,,137 
mAt 354 G. 
mAt 354 H. 
134At 355 D. 
l3'At 356 D. 
I3<>At 356 H-J. 
137 At 359 E-G. 
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As to the instruction, and the lawfulness thereof, the Labour Appeal Court reasoned if the 
instruction constituted "a unilateral amendment to the terms of employment of the applicants, the 
inst11lctions would have been unlawful. The narrower inquiry, consequently, is whether the 
instruction did constitute a unilateral amendment to the terms of employment of the applicants." 138 
In relation to the contracts of employment, which were vague as to the contractual obligations of 
the employees, the Labour Appeal Court was convinced that the employees had been employed 
as "operators" and continued: 
"On those facts it was not a tenn of the contracts of employment that the applicants would 
operate only one machine. A description ofthe work to be performed as that of 'operator' 
should not, in my view, 'be construed inflexibly provided that the fundamental nature of 
the work to be performed is not altered' (Wallis IJabvlIr and 1~ll1plvYl11ent Law para 45 at 
7-19). 1 agree with the view expressed by the learned author at 7-23 n 9 that employees 
do not have a vested right to preserve their working obligations completely unchanged as 
from the moment when they first begin to work. It is only if changes are so dramatic as 
to amount to a requirement that the employee undertakes an entirely different job that 
there is a right to refuse to do the job in the required manner. ... The fundamental nature 
of the work orthe applicants was not altered by the instruction to operate two machines. 
The nature of the work was precisely the same as it had been before .... the instruction to 
operate two machines instead of one did not, as construed on behalf of the union, amount 
to an extensive change in the work to be performed by the applicants."139 
Clearly employees should perform what they are contracted to perform. This, however, does not 
mean that their contracts are conclusive memorials of all the functions which they are to perform. 
Employees are to perform all instructions which do not contradict or which are not contrary to 
the "fundamental nature" of their contract. Employees have the contractual right to refuse to obey 
an instruction which would cause them to undertake an entirely different work. By instructing 
the employee to undertake an entirely different work the employer is in law attempting a unilateral 
amendment of the contract of employment, which is unlawful. Though employees do not have "a 
vested right to preserve their working obligations completely unchanged as from the moment when 
they first begin to work,,140 they nevertheless do have a right to act and be instructed according 
to the essential fundamental nature of their contract. It is within these parameters of the core 
nature of the employment contract that the employer may give instructions which, if not a 
DRAt 357 D. 
139 At 357 F-358 D. 
l'IO lbid. 
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unilateral amendment of the essential nature of the contract, must be obeyed. In deciding if an 
instruction amounts to a unilateral variation of the contract the court will have to ask itself two 
related questions: firstly, what is the fundamental nature of the employee's contract, and secondly, 
does the instruction cause the employee to perform work of an entirely different description? 
Clearly the answers to the above related questions will depend on the terms of the contract and 
the ensuing practices of the parties in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
An instruction may be lawful because it falls inside the parameters of any binding legal agreement 
and does not contradict the legislation, and the common law, but it may, nevertheless, still be 
found to be invalid because of its unreasonableness. 141 
4.3.4.2 Reasonable orders. 
A lawful order may be held to be unreasonable. 142 An unreasonable order may cause the instruction 
to be unfair, and such a finding could invalidate any dismissal based on the disobedience of the 
employee, or may justify the wilful disobedience of the employee, which in practical terms amounts 
to the same thing. 
What is "reasonable" depends on the circumstances surrounding each case, and depends, to a 
certain deS'Tee, on the judge who makes the value judgement as to fairness. No strict formula can 
be produced or applied, as the facts of each case differ. Where an instruction was held reasonable 
on one occasion, it does not follow that the same instruction might be reasonable on another 
occasion. The court does not "understand the law to be ... that an instruction, reasonable on the 
face ofit, may not, in the right circumstances, be found to be unreasonable."143 Notwithstanding 
the above it may be stated that an instruction may be held unreasonable due to its content, or that 
the employer acted unreasonably in giving the instruction, or both. For example, in A Mauchle 
(Pty) Ltd tla Precision Tools v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & othersl44 (supra) the 
instruction to operate two machines instead of one at the same time was held to be lawful and 
141Ntsibande v Union Carriage and Wagon Co (Ply) Ltd(1993) 14ILJ 1566 (Ie), per Bulbulia, Deputy 
President. 
142The "lcnn 'reasonablc' cmbodies thc notion of moderation and also implies a limit to excessive 
expectation (sec The Concise Oxford Dictionary)." Ntsibande v Union Carriage and Wagon Co (Pty) Ltd 
(1993) 14ILJ 1566 (Ie), per Bulbulia Deputy President at 1570J - 1571. 
143Hlman v Mos~gas (Pty) Lid (1)(1995) 161LJ 946 (Ie) at 954 I - 955 A. 
l~he facts Ilre discussed above in relation to the lawfulness of the instruction. 
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reasonable. 145 The COUl1 listed the tollowing factors which made the instruction reasonable: only 
five of more than forty machine operators were required to do the additional work; the additional 
work was to be performed for a limited period; the second machine was to be operated when the 
operator was standing waiting; that each operator would have had the time to do the work and 
would physically have been able to do so; and the applicants' fellow colleagues on the night shift 
operators agreed that some of the night shift operators would operate two machines and in fact 
had done so in past months. in contrast in Ntsibande v Union Carriage alld Wagon Co (Pty),146 
the applicant held the position of transport clerk, but also perfomled ad hoc driving duties in the 
PWV area. He was instructed to transport goods to Botswana and refused, for which he was 
dismissed for refusing to carry out a lawful and reasonable instruction. With regard to the 
reasonableness of the instruction the following factors weighed heavy with the Court: the 
employee's main duties were clerical; his ad hoc dliving was in practice restricted to Nigel and the 
PWV region; he had never travelled as far as Botswana; he would be alone in driving and would 
have to drive the two-ton truck with no assistance. 147 The court in light of the above held that the 
instruction was unreasonable, with the employee being entitled to refuse the instruction. 148 
A decision which dealt with the reasonableness of the giving of the instruction was Huilding 
COllstruction and Allied Workers Union and another v J~' Rogers and C Buchel CC and allotherl49 
wherein the court stated: 
"It has also been pointed out that 'it may be unfair to dismiss in circumstances in which it 
was unreasonable for the employer to issue the order in the first place and to insist on 
obedience to the point of dismissal'. ,,150 
The facts dealt with the dismissal of a worker who was busy clearing land with a loader. The 
applicant, who had previously worked as a lorry driver. was driving the loader. The brakes on the 
loader were detective, and a mechanic had given him advice that morning on how best to operate 
the loader to load stones onto another lorry. A Mr S observed that the applicant was having 
11'..1 Mauchle (Ply) Ltd l/a Precision Too/s v National Unio/1 o.fMetaiworkers of SA & others (1995) 
16 ILJ 349 (LAC) at 358. 
l~fi(1993) 14 ILJ 1566 (1C), per Bulbulia. Deputy President. 
117At 1570 E - 1571 B. 
148At 15701. 
IN( 1987) 8 ILl 169 Ie per Bulbulia M. 
l>oIJuilding Construction and Allied Workers Union and anolher v E Rogers and C Buchel CC and 
another (1987) 8 ILJ 169 (IC) al 173 E, citing Nazeer Cassim Unfair dismissal (1984) 5 ILJ 275 at 291; and 
refers to the decision of Matshoba and others v ji~F 's Metals (Ply) Ltd (1983) 4 ILJ 107 (IC). 
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difficulty in manoeuvring the loader, and was unable to load any stones. Mr S then gave the 
applicant instructions which resulted in the employee's dismissal due to his disobedience. Mr S 
agreed that the exchange between him and the second applicant had been heated, and that he had 
used abusive language. He further conceded that the applicant's unwillingness to operate the 
loader in the particular manner suggested by him was not unreasonable in the circumstances if one 
had regard to certain factors, them being: 
a) that the second applicant had scant experience as a loader operator; 
b) that the vehicle had defective brakes; 
c) that the mechanic had earlier told him how best to manoeuver the vehicle to overcome the 
problem of the defective brakes; and 
d) that he honestly believed that it would have been unsafe for him to follow Mr S's instructions. 
In light of the above surrounding circumstances the court held the dismissal to be unfair. 
In contrast, in the decision of Madlala v Vynne and Tedder t/a Thomville Engineerint 51 which 
concerned a dismissed employee who was instructed to collect the workshop tools and lock them 
in the tool cupboard, he failed to obey this instruction for five days, even after receiving a verbal 
warning. The applicant claimed that the order was unreasonable because it would cause him to 
leave the working premises after 17hOO, which was when the working day was completed, causing 
him to miss his bus home. 152 Had this been the only evidence the employee might have succeeded 
in showing that the instruction was unreasonable, but evidence was led that another employee was 
instructed to collect the tools, subsequent to the applicant's dismissal, and this employee had not 
indicated that the collection caused him any difficulty or that it was an additional burden. Further, 
the court found that there was sufficient reason for the company to require one employee to 
collect and place the tools in the cupboard.153 Therefore the instruction was reasonable when 
given, and the instruction itself was reasonable because it did not cause the employee any 
prejudice. 
It is clear that the court will on a summation of the facts surrounding the instruction decide on the 
reasonableness of that instruction. This enquiry, however, will not be divorced from other relevant 
151(1990) II ILJ 394 (Ie) at 395 H per Dc Kock M. 
mAt 396F. 
153At 39() B. 
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factors which have a bearing on the instruction, as was the case in E Rogers and C Buchel CC 
(supra), or the circumstances that are instrumental in the instruction originally being given. It is 
here that the individuals and their "dispositions" may playa role in assisting the court in deciding 
on the reasonableness of the instruction. In particular the employer's "insensitivity" towards his 
or her employees may cause an instruction to become unreasonable. 
SA (~hemical Workers Union and others" CE l11dustrial (Ply) Ltd t/a Palll'et154 may serve as an 
example of the above. The facts were that on 16 April the general manager of the factory called 
the two shop stewards to his office and infonned them that 20 April, being Easter Monday, would 
be a working day. He gave them a memorandum which was addressed to all the factory staff in 
which was set out that 20 April was not a factory holiday, and that employees should ensure that 
they were at work. 155 The workers were asked if they understood and each acknowledged that 
they did. One of the workers asked ifit was possible to work in the Saturday for the Monday but 
the manager responded that there were orders which had to go out on that day. Apparently, once 
the manager left the workers discussed the matter, and seeing that they had made other 
commitments decided not to work the Monday.156 On 20 April the workers stayed away from 
work, and on the following day each was separately summoned to the manager's office. The 
following day they had to find out the decision. 157 The attitude of the workers was that they did 
not wish to go and be intormed individually but wanted to be informed collectively. The upshot 
was their dismissal. 158 The general manager justified the dismissal because they had flouted his 
authority and deliberately refused to obey his instructions, and not for the first time. 159 In the 
court's view, the crux ofthe matter was whether the instruction, which was disobeyed, in relation 
to working on 20 April was a lawful and reasonable instruction. 160 
"That it was lawful in the strictly legal sense there is no doubt, but whether it was 
reasonable and enforceable in the equitable sense is another matter. Not only is there 
15'\1988) 91LJ 639 (Ie) per John AM. 
mAt 642 E-G. 
IS';AI 642 1-1- 643 A. 
157 AI 643 1. 
I~~AI 644 A. 
IW"They had refused to work on 10 October despite an instruction that they should do so, and again on 
25 February they had refused an inslruction to return 10 work \'o'ilhin ten minutes after he declined to telephone 
Beecham. This then was the third occasion on which they had deliberately refused to obey his instructions." At 
646 J-A. 
I60A1646 D. 
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doubt as to whether it was a clearly understood policy of the company that work would 
ordinarily be required on non-factory holidays, including Easter Monday, but there were 
reasonable grounds, in the view of the court, for the workers to assume that they would 
have Easter Monday Off."161 
In the court's opinion any management with sensitivity at all would have taken the initiative in 
ensuring that Easter Monday couJd be given as a holiday, as had been the case in the previous two 
years. l62 The time could have been worked in, and management could have approached the union 
to discuss the possibilities. 163 In the circumstances of the case, the giving of notice on the day 
prior to the long weekend was unfair. l64 Was the employer entitled to dismiss the workers for not 
heeding the instruction? The court held that even if the applicants were aware that Easter Monday 
was not a holiday it was unreasonable of the employer to postpone the notice that it was a working 
day to the last day before the Easter weekend. It was further unreasonable to ignore the 
indications of dismay of the applicants and to insist that they come to work on the Monday.16s The 
manager was unbending in the sense of having given the instruction he required it to be obeyed, 
even if it was unreasonable and unfair, albeit lawful. l66 In light thereof, the court found the 
manner in which work on Easter Monday was handled in the factory had a distinct element of 
unfairness. 167 Thus the dismissal of the workers for failing to work on Easter Monday was an 
unfair labour practice because the instruction given was unreasonable when it was issued and 
remained so until the dismissal. 
"A sensitive response to deeply feIt needs of his work-force, even if objectively those 
needs are not reasonable in all respects, should be expected of any manager. "168 
Though the employer's insensitivity may have a bearing on the reasonableness of the instruction, 
the insensitivity of the employer is not to be taken in isolation, or after the fact. 169 
"In answering this question a court's required to take account of all the relevant facts and 
to avoid falling into the trap of narrowing the enquiry to those which led directly to the 
161 At 647 C-E. 
162At 647 F. 
I63At 647 H. 
164At 647 l. 
165At 649 G-H. 
I66At649 H. 
167At 650 A. 
168&1 Chemical Workers Union and others v CF: Industrial (Ply) Ltd t/a Panvel (1988) 9 ILJ 639 (IC) 
at 649 1. 
169Scc SlaKmenl (Ply) Ltd v Building and Con.~/ruclion and A /lied Workers L'nion and others (1994) 15 
ILJ 979 (A) at 989 D-F. 
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practice complained of.,,170 
Nevertheless, it is a sound principle that when employers give instructions they should take into 
account the sensibilities of their employees.17I The court, however, would be slow to conclude 
that insensitive conduct on the patt of the employer affected an otherwise lawful and reasonable 
instruction with unreasonableness. The courts should not apply wisdom after the tact. 
4.3.5 Employees taking matters into their own hands. 
In normal circumstances, a lawful and reasonable order should be obeyed in the employment 
relationship. In relation to the use of legitimate avenues for expressing grievances, it was 
highlighted in Madlala (:'mpra) that the applicant had sufficient avenues for him to openly discuss 
his fears with his employers, these he should have exhausted and not merely refused to obey the 
insttllction. 172 
"An employee may not refuse to carry out an instruction which is, on the face of it, 
reasonable because he feels that it may cause him to be late. He must obey the instruction 
and if it has that consequence raise the particular problem it causes him with his 
employer. ,,In 
The court will not necessarily hold an instruction unreasonable where the employees are, so to 
speak, taking the law into their own hands. This was the issue in Mabusa and others v D Cooper 
COI],oralioll (Ply) Ltd174 where the employees had embarked on a strike with the aim of forcing 
the employer to acknowledge the union of the employees and speak to their representatives. The 
employer ordered the employees to return to work, the command was refused, and the employer 
responded by dismissing the workers. The dismissal was held to be justified and fair because the 
workers had other legitimate avenues of dealing with the grievance, and the union itself attempted 
17°/Juilding and Construction and Allied Workers Union and others v Siagmel11 (Ply) Ltd (1992) IJ ILJ 
1168 (LAC) alll72 C-D. 
l7JEl/man v Mossgas (PM Ltd (1) (\995) 16 LLJ 946 (IC) before John AM. 
172Madlala v V:Yl1ne and Tedder tla 1170rnville li.·ngineering (1990) II ILJ 394 (IC) at 397 A-C. 
I73At 396 1-397. 
17\1985) 6 JLJ 473 (IC). 
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to discourage the strike. 175 
Clearly a refusal may be deemed unreasonable if the employees had other etlective remedies 
available to them and these were not utilised. 
4.3.6 Reasonable and justified refusals 
A dismissal may be unfair if the circumstances justifY the refusal despite the lawfulness and 
reasonableness of the order. For example, in Matshoha alld others v /<iy 's Metals (Ply) Ud'76 a 
refusal to obey an instruction to work overtime resulted in the employee's dismissal. Although 
there was an express contractual stipulation to the effect that overtime work was compulsory, the 
employer's practice revealed that overtime was not in fact compulsory. All that the practice 
required was that an employee should give a reasonable explanation as to why he was unable to 
work the requested overtime. The applicants had furnished reasons for refusing to work the 
overtime requested, the court found that the refusal was reasonable given the circumstances, which 
were that: the instruction to work overtime was given on short notice, the urgency and importance 
of the overtime work appeared not to have been conveyed to the employees, and the employees 
had already made other arrangements for the period in question. Though the order was 
contractually valid and lawful, it was held that the dismissals were not faiT in the light of the 
company's past dealings with overtime, and the refusal was thus reasonable. 
On the other hand, on the facts of the case, the refusal may be held to be unreasonable. 177 In 
Corohrid Natal (Ply) Ltd and Construction and Allied Workers Unioll 178 the employee was 
dismissed for failing to carry out a duty which had been introduced 18 months before his 
17'''The workers disobeyed this lawful order 10 return to and resume their work. This entitled the 
employer to disllIiss summarily the applicants. In view of the way in which the instruction to return to, and 
reSliJIle their work, was couched, the court is satisfied that the workers were sUllImarily dismissed on Iheir 
r~lilllre 10 return and resullle their work. ... Docs it mallcr then that the respondent refused ... lo negotiate wilh 
the trade union. I think not. This was not suflicient reason to go on strike. The applicants had a remedy under 
the Act. The trade union correctly advised the workers to return to their work as it (the trade union) would 
approach the matter in a different manner." Afahuso and others v D Cooper Corporation (Ply) Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 
473 (Ie) at 477 H - 478 C. 
176(1983) 41LJ 107 (Ie). 
177Sec also: Thuhane v lIendler:; Industrial Carriers 119971 2 BLLR ] 31 (Ie) at 138 I. 
17R(l991) 12lLJ 1140 (Arbitration), before Albcrtyn, Arbitrator. 
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dismissal. 179 After a number of warnings he was finally dismissed. 180 The change in duty was 
accepted by all the drivers, except for the employee, for which each received an extra weekly 
allowance, including the dismissed employee. 181 As a result of the disobedience the company was 
losing RlOOO,OO a day.182 The arbitrator found that the instruction was not unreasonable, as all 
the other drivers performed the new duty and did not regard it as unreasonable,183 and that the real 
reason why the dismissed employee did not comply with the new instruction was that he regarded 
it as being beneath his status. The instruction was lawful and reasonable; the refusal being 
unreasonable and the arbitrator concluded that the decision to dismiss the employee was fair. 184 
Clearly much turns on the circumstances of the individual cases. 
The investigation into the reasonableness of the refusal is much the same as in the assessment of 
the reasonableness of the instruction. The reasonableness of the instruction and that of the refusal 
are inversely correlated. 
4.3.7 Shop stewards. 
Notwithstanding the above, in the employment context not all employees are equal. A shop 
steward wears two hats in his or her relationship with senior officials and management. \\'hen the 
shop steward approaches and negotiates with senior officials or management in his or her capacity 
as shop steward he or she does so virtually on an equal footing and thus "the ordinary rules 
applicable to the normal employer-employee relationship are then somewhat relaxed".185 This, 
however, should not be interpreted as a licence for rudeness, disrespectfulness or insolencel86 
because the shop steward is still an employee. In the role of shop steward, the normal ordinary 
I 79Corobrick Natal (Pty) Ltd and Construction and Allied Workers Union (199]) 12 ILJ 1 ]40 
(arbitration) at 1 ]40 I-J. 
I~e was warned in July 1989 to perform the new term, on 11 September he was again confronted. 
also on 13 September. On 14 September upon returning to the company without performing the new duty a 
disciplinal)' case was opened, on 19 January 1990 he was issued with a final written warning. He ignored the 
instruction, on 3] January] 990 he was again instructed to perform the duty, on 25 June he was found guil~' 
and was dismissed. (sec 1143 in general) 
ISIAt 1142 F-G. 
I82At 11421. 
IlllAt 1145D. 
184 At 1147 I. 
'"~Fo()d and Allied Workers Union v lIarvestime Corporation (Ply) Ud (1989) ]() ILJ 497 (Ie). per De 
Villiers M at 498 D - F. 
J"''AI 498 E. 
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rules relating to employee's conduct would to a certain extent have to be relaxed in order for the 
employee to be effective in protecting the interests of employees. This is highlighted in Nguha alld 
others v Hermes LaundlY Works CC187 where the applicants were applying for reinstatement 
pending a determination in temlS of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. The 
applicants were aJi members and shop stewards of the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) and 
employees of the respondent. 18B An Industrial Council meeting between BAWU and the 
respondent had been arranged. The applicants asked one of the members orthe close corporation 
whether they could attend the abovementioned meeting in order to represent the other members 
of the union as their shop stewards. Only one of the five shop stewards was given permission to 
attend the meeting, the other four were refused and were specifically instructed not to leave the 
company's premises and not to attend the meeting. This instruction they disobeyed and went to 
the meeting, they were then dismissed for gross insubordination. 189 The Industrial Court found 
that the applicants had established that their dismissals were prima facie unfair because the other 
applicants were shop stewards and wished to attend the meeting to perform their "duties" as shop 
stewards. The respondent did not take proper account of the above, and should have. 19o The 
dismissal was therefore not warranted. 
"I would like to add to the question of sanction that the case 1 referred to above, 
('lI/lillan PO'rf.'er 1~'qllipmel1t, and an article by Landman' A Unitary Theory of Industrial 
Discipline' SA Mercantile Law Journal vol I at 67 make it clear that one of the aspects 
an employer has to take into account in deciding on the appropriateness of the sanction, 
is the interests of other employees. It is contrary to the interest of other employees and 
counter-productive as far as sound labour relations is concerned, to discipline in the 
severest possible manner, namely, by dismissal, a shop steward who makes himself guilty 
of an infraction because he is performing his functions as a shop steward."191 
From the above it would seem clear that shop stewards find themselves in a unique situation in that 
they are employees with special duties to serve the interests of other employees. It is in the 
fulfilment of these duties as a shop steward that the employer should permit some type of latitude 
in demanding obedience to orders and should not victimise the stewards. Notwithstanding the 
above, if the shop steward is disobedient and the disobedience is not related to his or her functions 
187(1990) II ILJ 591 (Ie) before Dc Kock M. 
188Nguha and others v Ilermes Laundry Works CC (1990) 11 ILJ 591 (Ie) at 592 J-593 A. 
I 89Al 593 B-D. 
IQ()AI 593 F-G. 
I'll AI 594 D-G. 
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and duties as a steward then that conduct is to be judged as any other normal employee, rudeness 
or insubordination for their own sake would not be tolerated. In the arbitration of Mondi Paper 
Co Ltd v Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union and another,192 an employee was being 
disciplined for his action in a nationwide stayaway. The employee had disregarded notice on two 
separate occasions to attend a disciplinary hearing. Apparently the union intended discussing the 
consequence of the stayaway with the applicant's head office, as a result the employees decided 
that in the interim they would not submit themselves to disciplinary action. Following this failure 
to attend the disciplinary hearings the employee was given a final warning in his absence. The 
production manager summoned the employee to his office to inform him that a final warning had 
been issued. The employee arrived at the manager's office, with another employee who was a 
shop steward. The shop steward disrupted the meeting to such an extent that the warning could 
not be given. 
"After an exchange of words, the second respondent left the meeting, taking Mr Motha 
along with him, in defiance ofan express request by Mr Morgan (production manager) that 
Mr Motha should remain. After they had left the office, the second respondent told Mr 
Motha to disobey Mr Morgan's instruction to return to the meeting."193 
The Labour Appeal Court was of the opinion that the disruption ofthe meeting was unjustified, 
"[e]ven ifMr Morgan's conduct was unprocedural, and there was no evidence to show that it was, 
the second respondent's remedy was not simply to defy management and disrupt the meeting", 194 
and consequently the dismissal of the shop steward was valid. 
"The respondent's attorney submitted that the shop steward was entitled to pursue the 
interests of the union members fearlessly, vigorously and robustly, and that he should be 
permitted the latitude to do this. She referred us in this regard to remarks made in Food 
& A /lied Worker's Union v Harvestime Corporation (Ply) Ltd (1989) 10 llJ 497 (lC), 
concerning the position occupied by a shop steward. It was in this context, as I 
understand it, that the submission was made that there was nothing in the conduct of the 
second respondent which represented a challenge to the authority of management. No 
doubt a shop steward should fearlessly pursue the interests of the members he represents, 
and he ought to be protected from against being victimised for doing so. However this is 
no licence to resort to defiance and needless confrontation. I do not agree with the view 
of the court a quo that the fact that he is acting in his capacity as a shop steward serves to 
'mitigate' conduct which objectively is unacceptable. Notwithstanding the position to 
which he has been elected, a shop steward remains an employee, from whom his employer 
192(1994) 15 ILJ 778 (LAC) per Nugent J with Mlambo and Watt-Pringle. assessors, who concurred. 
193Mondi Paper Co Ltd v Paper Printing Wood and Allied W()rker.~ Union and another (1994) 15 ILJ 
778 (LAC) at 779 H-J 
194Al 7KO C. 
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is entitled to expect conduct appropriate to the relationship. I agree with the finding of 
the court a quo that the second respondent's defiance of management's authority 
amounted to insubordination. It is clear too that his conduct was deliberate, and in my 
view warranted disciplinary steps being taken against him.,,195 
Clearly the shop steward's conduct was objectively unacceptable, as his duties and functions as 
a shop steward were not frustrated nor limited to provoke his insubordination, nor was his conduct 
necessary to protect the employee's interests. Due to his insubordination not being justified, he 
was guilty ofa deliberate defiance of the manager's authority. 
4.4 Conclusion. 
Insubordination is the act of intentionally cha1lenging the employer's authority, and disobedience 
is such an act. Disobedience was gradually seen as the only form of misconduct which conveyed 
the intention of challenging the employer's authority. The breach, which under the common law 
contract of employment justifies dismissal, under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction may justify 
dismissal provided the dismissal is fair. What is fair depends on the surrounding circumstances of 
the case, and is a value judgement of the objective circumstances surrounding the labour practice. 
This requirement of fairness is to be present throughout the labour practice. 
In giving the instruction, the employer must issue a lawful and reasonable instruction. There is 
obviously no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a reasonable order under the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction, at best it seems that a fair order is a reasonable order. If the instruction is 
reasonable and lawful and the employee refuses to obey, wilfully, is the dismissal permitted? 
The employee's intention is to be understood and interpreted in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, especially in the search for circumstances that may justify the refusal. Though the 
refusal might be wilful it may nevertheless be, in light of the surrounding circumstance, reasonable 
and justified. Once intention has been established the enquiry moves to the degree of the detlanct! 
exhibited. 
If the employee in fact disobeyed a reasonable and lawful order, both wilfully and unreasonably, 
then the employee is guilty of insubordination. Once the reason for the dismissal has been shown 
19'Al 780 D-H. 
104 
to be valid the enquiry moves to consider whether the misconduct was so serious as to warrant 
dismissal. What is serious depends on the facts of the case and the implications of the misconduct, 
in particular the effect the misconduct had on the employment relationship. 
It is with the addition offaimess that the employer has been restricted in the exercising of his or 
her contractual right, which has the effect of strengthening the employee's position in the 
employment relationship. This limitation of the employer's contractual right to demand the 
employee's obedience is further restricted if the employee is a shop steward. Shop stewards acting 
in their "role" as steward should be given, in performing their union activities, more latitude in 
their conduct towards employers, but shop stewards are, nevertheless, employees. 196 
Essentially, the contractual right ofthe employer to demand that the employee not challenge his 
or her position of authority has been limited by the addition of the fairness. 
1965CC Acrylic Products (P,-J,~ Ud v ('WIll and another 11997) 4 BLLR :no (LAC). 
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Chapter 5 
INSUBORDINATION UNDER THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
5.11ntroduction 
tn this chapter dismissal for insubordination under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter 
"the Act") will be discussed. This will be achieved by setting out what constitutes a dismissal 
under the Act, and the requirement of fairness in relation to dismissal. The interpretation and 
application of the Act is discussed in relation to the above. 
5.2 Dismissal for misconduct 
Dismissal as defined by the Act incorporates the following forms of termination: 
I. when an employer terminates a contract of employment, with or without notice; or 
2. when an employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed telm contract of 
employment, on the same or similar terms; or 
3. when an employer refused to allow an employee to resume work after she took maternity 
leave in terms of any law, collective agreement or her contract of employment; or 
4. was absent for up to four weeks before the expected date, and up to eight weeks after 
the actual date, of the birth of her child; or 
S. when an employer offers selective re-employment to some but not all employees who 
were dismissed for a similar or same reasons; or 
6. an employee terminated the employment contract because the employer made continued 
employment intolerable for the employee. 1 
If the termination of the employment relationship falls under any of the above "categories" then 
that "termination" is a dismissal. Consequently, dismissal only occurs when the termination of th~ 
employment relationship falls squarely within one of the above "categories". 
A dismissal was held to have occurred when the employer's action created the impression that the 
employee no longer had a job. 2 This impression would be supported by the conduct of either 
parties in the relationship. The employer would accordingly be held to have dismissed the 
IScction 186 of Act 66 of 1995. 
2SATlJU v Marine Taxis CC [1997 J 6 BLLR 823 (CCMA) at 827 D-F. 
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employee where such action or inaction on his or her part created the impression of a dismissal. 
In Van Tonder v International Tobacco Cd one of the preliminary points which had to be 
decided was whether Van Tonder, the employee, had been dismissed. The facts, briefly, were that 
after a disciplinary hearing Van Tonder and a co-accused were informed that a decision had been 
taken that the parties were to be dismissed. The parties were offered the following options: either 
they could appeal against their dismissal or resign. They were informed that the benefit of the 
resignation would be that the company would not inform prospective employers that the parties 
had been dismissed. The parties were then given ten minutes in which to form their decision. Van 
Tonder then signed his letter of resignation. 4 At the enquiry into the substantive fairness of the 
dismissal the company argued that Van Tonder had resigned, by virtue of signing the resignation 
letter, and was not dismissed. The Tribunal referred to section 186 of the said Act and pointed 
out that a dismissal occurred when the employer terminated the contract of employment with or 
without notice, and found "that because the Company told Mr Van Tonder that a decision had 
been taken to dismiss him, before offering him the option of resigning, the Company had in fact 
dismissed him, and thus his contract of employment terminated at that point.,,5 
The Act states that when an unfair dismissal is alleged, the employee bears the onus of establishing 
the existence of that dismissal.6 It is the employee's duty not only to show that the employment 
relationship was in fact terminated, or that the employee was left with the impression thereof, but 
that the termination constituted a dismissal-which it would if it falls squarely under any of the 
categories listed in section 186 of the Act. An example of an employee failing to shift the above 
mentioned onus is Engelbrecht v Cape Truss Manufacturing. 7 Herein employees embarked on 
a work stoppage on the last working day of the year, because the workers were not expecting to 
work but rather to clean up the workplace and then to hold the customary end of year "braai 
vleis". The employer's managing director approached the employees and after some discussion 
all the employees, except for Engelbrecht, ~Jfeed to finish the remaining work before the festivities 
31 1997J 2 BLLR 254 (CCMA). 
4At 255G-1. 
~ At 255J - 256A. 
6Scction 192 (1) of Act 66 of 1995: "In any proceedings concerning any dismissal, the employcc must 
establish the existence of the dismjssal." 
71199714 BLLR 411 (CCMA) 
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began. Engelbrecht refused to work stating: "Ek sal rue werk, gee net my geld, ek wil nou loop."g 
The managing director enquired whether he was resigning. When this was confirmed, the 
managing director paid Engelbrecht ofr and issued him with a letter stating that Engelbrecht's 
immediate resignation was accepted and his blatant refusal to work and disregard for management 
was noted. 9 Engelbrecht's version of the same event was that when the managing director 
addressed the staff Engelbrecht asked whether they were to be paid for that day only to be told, 
"Hou jOll mond, jy loop vandag." In light of the above conflicting versions and because 
Engelbrecht did not bring witnesses to substantiate his dismissal; that the employer had two 
affidavits which supported its position; and that the contemporaneous letter bore out the 
employer's version, the CCMA found that Engelbrecht did not discharge the onus on him to show 
that he was dismissed. 10 
5.3 Fairness of the dismissal 
Ollce the employee successfully proves that he or she was dismissed, the enquiry shifts to th~ 
employer who must show that the dismissal was fair. J I This is achieved by meeting two related 
requirements. Firstly, that the dismissal was for a "fair reason"and, secondly, that the dismissal 
was effected in a procedurally fair manner.12 In other words; the employer must satisfy the 
traditional distinction between substantive and procedural fairness. 
With reference to the fair reason for dismissal, the Act expressly limits what type of reasons are 
BAt 432 B. 
9At 432C 
)0 At 433 B-D. See also with the employee failing to shin the onus Afashaba v Van lJer Merwe [19971 
12 BLLR 1644 (CCMA) especially at 1647 A-C. 
I)Seetion 192 (2) of Aet 66 of 1995: "trthe existence ortlle dismissal is established, the employer must 
prove that the dismissal is fair." 
12Section 188 of Act 66 of 1995: 
"( t) A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove-
(a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason-
(I) related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or 
(2) based on the employer's operational requirements; and 
(b) that the dismissal was etTccted in accordance with a fair procedurc. 
(2) AllY person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair reason or whether or not thc 
dismissal was elTccted in accordance with a rair procedure must take into account any relevant code of 
practice issued in tenns of this Act." See also the Code of Good Practice Schedule 8, Item 2(1): 
"A dismissal is unfair if it is not clTectcd for a fair reason and in accordance with a fair procedure, even if it 
complies with any notice period in a contract of employment or in legislation governing employment. Whetber 
or Jlot a dismissal is for a fair rcason is determined by tbe facts of the case, and the appropriateness of dismissal 
as a penalty. Whether or not the procedure is fair is determined by rcferring to the guidelines set out below." 
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permitted for dismissal. A reason may be fair for dismissal when it relates to the employee's 
conduct, or capacity, or the employer's operational requirements. 13 These reasons are the only 
reasons permitted for dismissal,14 provided, of course, that the reason itself is fair. 
An employee, under the Act, has the right not to be unfairly dismissed/ 5 this right is also 
entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 16 
What constitutes "unfairness" is not defined in the Act. 
"Under the 1956 LRA the courts acting under their general unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction identified a variety of employment practices which they pronounced unfair! 
The new LRA contains no general "open textured" definition of unfair labour practice, but 
has instead substituted for it specific statutory provisions which delineate the arena of 
permissible employer actions. The "residual unfair labour practice" has, however, been 
added in Schedule 7 to catch unfair actions which cannot be pigeon-holed in the Act 
itself ,,17 
This "residual unfair labour practice" definition deals with issues not covered by specific provisions 
of the Act and is intended to cover situations which will ultimately be dealt with by specitlc 
legislation.1s According to the Act certain reasons for dismissal are automatically unfair, but where 
a finding of fairness follows automatically there is no onus to be discharged by the employer. 19 
What constitutes an automatically unfair dismissal is any infringement of the protections relating 
to the "right of freedom of association" and to members of workplace forums,20 or if the reason 
i:lThe reason for the dismissal is important because dilTerellt procedures for each is sct out in the Act. 
The first two reasons for dismissal, misconduct and incapacity, arc adjudicated by the CCMA (Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration) while thc latter, operational requircments, is adjudicated by the 
Labour Court. Sec Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 89. 
I1Section 188 of Act 66 of 1995. 
15Section 185. 
i<iSection 23(1) of Act 108 of 1996: 
"Everyone has the right to fair labour practices." 
17Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 135. 
1HGrogan Workplace Law 1996 page 74. 
19Section 187 of Act 66 of 1995. 
20See section 5 of Act 66 of 1995. "(I) No person may discriminate against an employee for exercising 
any right conferred by this Act." Subsection (a) states that the employer may not require a person I1otlo be a 
member of a union or work place forum. (b) or prevent the employee form exercising any right conferred in the 
Act. 
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is one of those listed in section 187?J 
it is clear that the employer should show that the reason for the dismissal was fair. Accordingly 
the employer will need to prove that the employee was dismissed for a reason and that the reason 
was fair. If the employer is unable to prove that there was a reason for dismissing the employee 
then the dismissal is unfair. In Bophalli v J)evillic 1'ran.v)()rt22 an employee returned from vacation 
to resume his duties when he was informed that he should find his own truck and drive it himself. 
He was then instructed to leave and to return some days later to collect mOllies due, which he did 
There was no explanation or reason offered to him as to what he was being paid for and 
accordingly the dismissal was substantively unfair. 23 
Whether the reason for the dismissal is fair depends on and is determined by the facts of the case 
which includes assessing the "appropriateness" of the sanction dismissal,24 which will depend on 
and be determined with reference to the facts of the case, as was the case under the 1956 unfair 
21"(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair lithe cmployer, in dismissing the cmployee, acls contrary to 
section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is-
(a) thaI the employee participated in or supporled, or indicated an intention to participate in or 
support, a strike or protest action that complies with Ihe provisions of Chapter 4; 
(b) that the employee refused, or indicaled an inlenlion to refuse, to do any work normally done by an 
employee who at the time was taking parI in a strike Ihal complies with the provisions of 
chapler 4 or was locked out, unless that work is necessary 1.0 prevent an actual danger 10 life, 
personal safety or health; 
(c) to compel the employee 10 accept a demand in respect of any mailer of mutual inlerest between the 
employer and employee; 
(d) that the employec took aclion, or indicated an intention to take action, against Ihc cmployer by-
(1) excrcising any right confcrrcd by this Act; or 
(2) participating in any proccedings in tcrms of this Acl; 
(c) I.he employee's pregnancy, inlended pregnancy, or any reason related to her pregnancy; 
(f) that the employer unfairly discriminatcd against an employee, directly or indireclly, on any 
arbilrary ground, including, but 110t limited race, gender, sex, elhnic or social origin. colour. 
scxual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language, marital status or family responsibility. 
(2) Despile subsection (I )(f) -
(a) a dismissal may be fair if thc reason for dismissal is based on an inherent requirement of the 
particular job; 
(b) a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the nonn<ll or <Igrccd retiremenl age 
for persons cmployed in that capacity." 
27119971 4 BLLR 428 (CCMA). 
21Al429 B-D and 430C. Sec also see also Mllkatsi v Mamel/o pre-schoo/11997j 5 BLLR 637 
(eCMA), .... 'e/epe v Potlako Transport ,I.,Tervices 1199715 BLLR 677 (CCMA) at 679 D-F, and .!ohnson v 
lJiamol1d f/ie/d\' Securi(v :;"ervices CC 119971 7 BLLR 922 (CCMA) wherein the employer's conduct was found 
10 be "reprehensible and does nothing to promote labour relations, productivity or a sound economics." at 924F. 
21Hem 2(1) of Schedule 8 of Act 66 of 1995. 
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labour practice jurisdiction. It is important to note, as does Rudd e I al,25 that the legislature does 
not llse the distinction of "valid" and "fair" reasons for substantive fairness. 
"Instead it used the term 'fair reason' to refer to what, in the context in which it appears, 
seems to be now referred to as a 'valid reason' and, instead of using the tetm 'fair reason' 
to deal with the sanction aspect of substantive fairness, reference is made instead to the 
appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty. Although, in the area of interpretation of 
statutes, a change in wording is usually indicative of a change in legislative intent, it is 
submitted that the difference in wording was probably not intended to signify a deviation 
from the cUlTently accepted 'valid and fair' terminology hut either constituted rather loose 
and sloppy drafting or, alternatively, arose from a perhaps somewhat misguided attempt 
to make the language of the 1995 LRA more accessible and user-friendly".26 
I t would seem that nothing much would turn on this "problem" as the assessment of fairness is 
dependent on all the relevant facts of the case. In this assessment both the reason for the dismissal 
and the appropriateness of the sanction must be substantively fair in·the light of the facts. There 
does not seem to be any justification for retaining the valid and fair terminology because the 
tribunal must decide whether or not the dismissal was fair in all respects. 
The Act requires that the employer must prove that the dismissal was both substantively and 
procedurally fair. Seeing that there is no definition of what constitutes fairness, it is submitted 
that the CCMA will rely on relevant judgements made under the 1956 Labour Relations Act as 
guides for those matters which are not contrary to the general purpose or object of the Act. 
Section 188 raises two questions in relation to the substantive fairness of the dismissal which need 
to be answered: Is the employee !:,'lliJty of the misconduct (being the reason for the dismissal); and, 
is dismissal an appropriate sanction for the misconduct? In answering these questions one must 
rely all the code of good practice. 21 
5.4 Applying and Interpreting the Act 
The Act is defined as including "the section numbers, the Schedules, except Schedules 4 and 8, 
2SRudd and Van Zyl Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act 1996 page 65. 
26Rudd and Van Zyl Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act 1996 page 65. 
27Scclion 1(2). 
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and any regulations made in terms of section 208,28 but does not include the page headers, the 
headings or footnotes"?) In relation to the application and interpretation orthe Act; the Act itself 
commands that any person who applies the Act must interpret its provisions to give effect to the 
Act's o~iec;t, COllstitutional requirements and International h,W obligations. 
"Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions-
(a) to give effect to its primary objects; 
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and 
(c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic." 30 
The purpose of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace.3! This purpose is to be achieved by fulfilling the primary objects 
of the Act, which are-
"(a) to give efiect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the 
Constitution; 
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Labour Organisation; 
(c) to provide a fhmework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and 
employers' organisations can-
( I) collectively bargain to determine wages, tetms and conditions of employment and other 
matters of mutual interest; and 
(2) formulate industrial policy; and 
(d) to promote-
(]) orderly collective bargaining; 
(2) collective bargaining at sectoral level; 
(3) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; and 
(4) the effective resolution of labour disputes." 32 
J ammy31 argues that the Act, by the inclusion of the above, has obliged courts to engage in 
"purposive interpretation". Purposive interpretation occurs when the court interprets the 
provisions of a statute in line with the "purpose" or "object" of the legislation. Purposive 
2RSection 208 of Act 66 of 1995: 
"The Minister, after consulting NEDLAC and when appropriate, the Commission, may make regulations not 
inconsistent with this Act relating to -
(a) allY matter that in terms of this Act mayor IlIllst be prescribed; and 
(b) any matter thallhe Minister considers necessary or expedienllo prescribe or have governed by regulation 
in order 10 achieve the primary objects of this Act." 
2"Section 213 of Acl66 of 1995. 
10SectiOll 3 of Act 66 of 1995. 
)'Section t of Acl66 of 1995 . 
.l2Scction 1 of Act 66 of 1995. 
1'Jammy Interpreting the New Act: Gelling f)own to Business with the [,ahour Appeal Court 1997 
page 90(J. 
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interpretation, Jammy argues, was given new focus when used in the interpretation of the interim 
constitution/4 and became a standard approach to constitutional interpretation. 35 Jammy 
highlights that although purposive interpretation has been adopted in the interpretation and 
application of the constitution neither S v Zuma and others,3(, nor the decisions following, 
suggested that the purposive approach that had been adopted with regard to the constitution 
should also be adopted in relation to other statutes. 37 So where does this directive for applying 
the purposive interpretation come from? Jammy continues: 
"The injunction in the Labour Relations Act that the Act should be interpreted 'in 
compliance with the Constitution,38 is not a directive that the Act should be interpreted 
purposively. Rather, it should be taken to mean that having applied a purposiw 
interpretation to the Constitution, the Act should then be interpreted ( where possible) in 
accordance with accepted methods of statutory interpretation, in such a way so as to 
conform with the constitutional purpose so distilled. Seen in this light, it will always be 
the purpose of the Constitution that is determinative, not the purpose of the Act, or any 
particular provision thereof. ... In addition to requiring the Act to be interpreted so as to 
comply with the Constitution, s3 of the Act also requires interpretation so as to give effect 
to the Act's primary objects."39 
It is clear that legislation should be interpreted in light of constitutional provisions, but this is not 
a directive for purposive interpretation of the statute, rather in the Act itself the Act sets out the 
this directive by stating its own object.40 Therefore in "cases of textual ambiguity purposive 
interpretation should be a first, rather than a last resort. ,,41 But, the Act does not rank its objects, 
J1.<'Kentridge AJ adopted the view that the meaning of a guaranteed right or freedom contained in the 
Constitution was to be ascertained with reference to the purpose of stich guarantee."Jammy Interpreting the 
New A ct: Getting Down to Business with the Lahour Appeal Court J 997 page 906 at page 909 relying on S v 
2ullla and others 1995 (2) SA 642 (cq at 651 E-O. 
"Jalllmy Interpreting the New Act: Gelling /)011'17 to Business with the I,abour Appeal Court 1997 
page 90(, at page 909 relics on S v Makwanyane and another 1995 (3) SA 391 (cq. 
)u 1995 (2) SA 642 (cq. 
I'This was emphasized in the decision in Alaliso I' C'ollll1la1uling (dlicer. }'ort Hlizabeth Priso/l and 
another 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE). In that judgement Froneman J stated: 
"The interpretation ofthe constiLution will be directed at ascertaining the foul1dnlional values inherent in the 
Constitution, whilst the interpretation of particular legislation will be directed at ascertaining whether that 
Icgisi<ltion is capable of an interpretation which conforms with the foundational values or principles of the 
Constitution. Constitutional interpretation in this sense is thus primarily concerned with the recognition and 
application of constitutional values and not with a search to find the literal meaning." At 597 0-1. Sec Jammy 
Inlerpreting the New Act: (;etting Down to Business with the Labour Appeal Court 1997 page 909. 
3RS 3(b). 
39Jammy Interpreting the New Act: Getting Down 10 Business with the I,abour Appeal Court 1997 
page 910. 
Ill/bid 
~%id page 911. 
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and therefore different emphasis could bring about different findings as to faimess. 42 It is clear that 
in applying and interpreting the Act, "purposive interpretation" will have a major impact in the 
development of labour law in South Aft·ica. 
The interpretation and application of the Act in relation to misconduct, according to section 
188(2) states that the tribunals must take illto account the code of good practice, Schedule 8. 43 
The code of good practice, being Schedule 8, is not part of the Act, but it is, nevertheless, 
instructive. Any person who is "considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair 
reason or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure must take 
into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this Act."44 NEDLAC45 may 
prepare and issue codes of good practice, which include changing or replacing any present code 
of practice. These relevant codes of good practice must be taken into account when applying and 
interpreting the Act. 46 This would, it is submitted, include an employer. 
The code, however, has as its key principle: 
"that employers and employees should treat one another with mutual respect. A premium. 
is placed on both employment justice and the efficient operation of business. While 
employees should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are entitled to satisfactory 
conduct and work performance from their employees. ,,47 
~2"A number of different objects are expressed in the Act. These objects arc not always harmonious, 
and the outcome of any attempt at purposive interpretation may often depend on which of the objccts is given 
priority. The Act itself docs not rank its primary objects according to their importance. The disagrccmcnt 
betwecn the majority and minority views in the Business South /~rrica decision illustrates this."Januny 
interpreting the New Act: Getting Down to Business with the Labour Appeal Court 1997 page 914. 
~'See also section 203(3). 
~~Section 188 (2) of Act 66 of 1995 . 
. 1\"means the National Economic Development and Labour Council established by section 2 of the 
National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act, 1994 (Act 35 of 1994)". Section 213 of Act 66 of 
1995. 
¥'Section 203 of Act 66 of 1995: 
"0) NEDLAC may-
(a) prepare and issue codes of good practice; and 
(b) change or replace any code of good practice. 
(2) Any code of good practice, or any change 10 or replacement of a code of good practice, must be published in 
the Government Gazelle. 
(l) Any person interpreting or applying this Act must take into account any relevant code of good practice." 
~7Schcdule 8 item 1(3) 
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The code of good practice in schedule 8, deals with some of the key aspects of dismissal for 
reasons related to conduct and capacity. The code stresses that it is intentionally general, that 
each case is unique, and departures from the Code may be justified in proper circumstances.48 
Further, the code is not intended as a substitute for collective agreements or the outcome of joint 
decision-making by a employer and a workplace forum, especially when that outcome relates to 
disciplinary codes and procedures.49 
it is in the balancing of these competing interests of the employer and employee that the court and 
tribunals are to make their decisions as to fairness, particularly in light of the purpose and object 
of the Act. In dealing with fair reasons for dismissal the code states that: 
a) "A dismissal is unfair if it is not effected for a Ulir reason and in accordance with a fair 
procedure, even if it complies with any notice period in a contract of employment or in 
legislation governing employment. Whether or not a dismissal is for a fair reason is 
determined by the facts of the case, and the appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty. 
Whether or not the procedure is fair is determined by referring to the guidelines set out 
below.,,50 
b) "[the] Act recognises three grounds on which termination of employment might be 
legitimate. These are: the conduct of the employee, the capacity of the employee, and the 
operational requirements of the employer's business.,,51 
c) "[the] Act provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason tor the dismissal 
is one that amounts to an infringement of the fundamental rights of employees and trade 
unions, or if the reason is one of those listed in section 187. ,,52 
d) "where the dismissal is not automatically unfair, the employer must show that the reason 
for dismissal is a reason related to the employee's conduct or capacity, or is based on the 
operational requirements of the business. If the employer fails to do that, or fails to prove 
that the dismissal was efiected in accordance with a fair procedure, the dismissal is 
unfair. ,,53 
Specifically in relation to dismissals for misconduct the code states that generally "it is not 
appropriate to dismiss an employee for a first ofience, except if the misconduct is serious and of 
such graVity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable.,,54 
48Schedule 8 item I (1). 
49Schedule 8 item 1 (2). 
50Scheduie 8 item 2 (I). 
51 Schedule 8 item 2 (2). 
52Schedulc 8 item 2 (3). 
53Schedulc 8 item 2 (4). 
54Schedule 8 item 3 (4) the emphasis is minco 
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Examples of what constitutes a serious misconduct are offered, subject to the "rule" that each case 
should be judged on its merits: "gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of the 
employer, wilful endangering of the safety of others, physical assault on the employer, a fellow 
employee, client or customer and gross insubordination. Whatever the merits of the case for 
dismissal might be, a dismissal will not be fair if it does not meet the requirements of section 
188. ,,55 Subparagraph 4 of paragraph 3 merely lists examples of serious misconduct that might 
justify instant dismissal, the list is in no way meant to be exhaustive. 56 
I n deciding whether or not to dismiss, the employer "should in addition to the gravity of the 
misconduct consider factors such as the employee's circumstances (including length of service, 
previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances), the nature of the job and the 
circumstances of the infringement itself. ,,57 The aforegoing is merely a guideSR and the tribunals 
are called upon to adjudicate on the effect the misconduct has on the employment relationship, 
accordingly it is all these factors which are relevant in assisting the tribunal in deciding on the 
fairness of the dismissal. In applying the sanction of dismissal the employer should do so 
"consistently with the way in which it has been applied to the same and other employees in the 
past, and consistently as between two or more employees who participate in the misconduct under 
consideration."s9 That is, like cases should be treated alike.60 Unless they are different, "an 
employer may be justified in differentiating between employees, guilty of the same offence on the 
basis of differences in the personal circumstances of the employees (such as the length of service 
and disciplinary record) or the merits (such as the roles played in the commission of the 
misconduct) ... "(,J Notwithstanding the above, the trust relationship between the employer and 
employee is one of the paramount factors to be taken into account.62 
~'Schcdule 8 item 3 (4). 
"i,<.,'/GASA v Kemk/ean I (ygiene ,<":yslems 119971 4 BLLR 494 (CCMA) at 50 I E. 
~7Schedule 8 item 3 (5), for a good illustration of the relevant schedule sec S1GASA v Kemk/ean 
l~ygiel1e ,<":vslems 1199714 BLLR494 (CCMA) at 50IF-J. 
58,WGASA v Kemklean Hygiene ,')yslems Jl997) 4 BLLR 494 (CCMA) at 501F. 
59Schedule 8 item 3 (6). 
6°Earfy Bird Farms (Ply) Ltd v Mlamho 119971 5 BLLR 541 (LAC) at 545 G, which relics on NUMSA 
Ilenred FreuhaufTrailers (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 546 (A) at 463 G-J. 
61Jbid at 545H. 
62See Swiles v Pep Stores (Pty) Ltd 1199714 BLLR 503 (CCMA) wherein the breach ofthe position of 
trust the employee holds in relation to the employer was emphasised in justifying dismissal, in spite of long 
service and clean record. 
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In relation to disciplinary procedures, prior to dismissal, the code stresses that employers should 
adopt disciplinary rules which establish the standard of conduct required of employees. These 
rules will vary from business to business but the rules "must create certainty and consistency in the 
application of discipline. This requires that the standards of conduct are clear and made available 
to employees in a manner that is easily understood. Some rules or standards may be so wen 
established and known that it is not necessaty to communicate them."63 The concept of corrective 
or progressive discipline as an "approach regards the purpose of discipline as a means for 
employees to know and understand what standards are required of them. Efforts should be made 
to correct employee's behaviour through a system of graduated disciplinary measures such as 
counselling and warnings. ,,64 
Nevertheless, consensual disciplinmy codes and procedures will take precedence over the code 
uf guod practice.65 Employees and employers would be well advised to set out exactly what is 
expected of employees and what the consequences uf misconduct would be. This would clarify 
both the employee's and employer's rights and duties within the relationship towards each other. 
5.5 Dismissal for insubordination under the Act 
As this thesis focusses on dismissal for the misconduct of insubordination, the following summary 
of what the employer should remember, in attempting to dismiss an employee for insubordination 
under the Act, is submitted. 
The dismissal should not go against the primary object of the Act, or the Constitution, or the 
public internatiunal legal obligations of the Republic. In other words, if the employee was 
exercising any of these rights or achieving the Act's object then the dismissal, if it is not 
automatically unfair, may be held unfair in that the conduct of the employer is frustrating the 
purpose of the Act. It is obvious that the reason for the dismissal must not fall within the 
automatic unfair dismissal or infringe any fundamental rights of the employee or trade unions. 
Under this broad umbrella the employer may exercise his or her legal rights. 
ii3Item 3(1) of Schedule 8 of Act 66 of 1995. 
61ltem 3(2) of Schedule 8 of Act 66 of ] 995. 
65Rudd and van Zyl Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations Act 1996 page 76. 
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Insubordination is a fonn of misconduct and thus falls under section 188, but for the dismissal to 
be legally valid it must be fair. Dismissal is a sanction oflast resort, therefore the Act requires that 
the misconduct must be serious or so grave that it caused the relationship between employer and 
employee to become intolerable. Gross insubordination is given as an example of a serious 
misconduct, but again this is merely an example and whether the misconduct was so serious or 
grave as to cause the relationship to be intolerable will depend on the facts of the case. 
It is in assessing the circumstances of the case that the person should take special account oftne 
following: 
a) The employee's circumstances; 
b) The nature of the job; 
c) The infringement itself; 
In Commercial Catering alld Allied Workers Union of SA and another v Woollm Ltd t/a 
Woolworlhs (Randhllrg) the court equated insolence with impudence, cheekiness, disrespect or 
mdeness and distinb'llished it from insubordination.66 Unlike in chapter 2 where it was argued that 
insolence was a challenge of the employer's authority. in the Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers I fnion (1' ,)'A and another v Woollru Ltd f/a Woo!worlh\' (Randhurg) insolence does not 
constitute a challenge directed to the employer's authority but rather is disrespect directed at 
authority. Though both forms of misconduct are directed towards the employer's position of 
authority, insubordination is behaviour which challenges this authority while insolence is behaviour 
which shows contempt for such authority. It could be argued that in the right context, the 
employee's disrespect could constitute a challenge of the employers authority and thus be 
insubordinate behaviour. Notwithstanding the above, insubordination, under the unfair labour 
''''Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 96."Jt is clear that (even though he can be both at the same time) 
an employee can be insolent (impudent, cheeky. disrespectful or rude) without necessarily being insubordinate 
(disobedient or challenging authority). Mere disrespect for the employer (or insolence, impudcnce, cheekiness 
or rudeness) cannot by itself constitute insubordination which by its very nature requires disobedience or an 
outright challenge to authority. As has been fully explained abovc, insubordination can manifest itself in the 
refusal to obey a reasonable and lawful command or in the challenge (or resistance) to or defiance of ... the 
authority of the employer. It is, of course, rcquired that the insubordination must be deliberate (wilful) and 
serious .... This is not to say that contemptuousness of authority (insolence, impudence, cheekiness, disrespec: 
of rudeness) cannot constitute a ground for dismissal (provided, of course, that it is wilful and serious). One 
should. however, always distinguish between insubordination on the one hand and insolence on the other hanJ 
because they are definitely not the same kind of oJJencc." Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union oj 
,'»1 and ol1ofher v Wooltru Ltd fla Woolworth ... (Randburg) at 3) 5 0 - H. 
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practice jurisdiction of the 1956 Act is any conduct which is evidence of a wilful challenge of the 
employer's authority, of which disregarding the employer's authority or disobeying his or her 
instructions is evidence of such an intention. It is clear that under the Act insubordination is a 
misconduct and consists of the wilful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable instruction given 
within the bounds of the employment relationship. There is no reason to doubt why the tribunals 
under the Act would difter materially in their understanding of what constitutes insubordination. 
That is conduct by the employee which is a calculated breach of his or her duty to obey the 
employer's instructions.67 
Under the unfair labour practice of the 1956 Act a lawful instruction was one that did no!: 
contradict legislation, and fell within the contractual relationship of the parties, and was 
reasonable - reasonableness as understood in light of fairness. What was reasonable will depend 
on the HlctS surrounding the dismissal. No strict formula or complete list can be offered to cover 
all the factors that would have a bearing on the reasonableness of the instruction. It is clear that 
besides the instruction having to be fair, the Act states that the employer when giving the 
instruction should not fall foul of the purpose and object of the Act. Any instruction given which 
would frustrate the purpose of the Act may cause that instruction to be unreasonable and unfair. 
This submission is supported by the automatic unfair reasons for dismissal and also by the primary 
object of the Act. Thus any instruction which contradicts or limits the employee's "fundamental 
rights" in the Constitution or the Act - strike, freedom of association, picketing, workplace 
forums - ifnot already automatically unfair, may be unfair in that it frustrates the purpose of the 
Act. 
If the illstruction is shown to be lawful and reasonable the employer will have to show that the 
employee refused to obey the instruction, and that such refusal was both wilful and unreasonable. 
Again this would depend on the facts surrounding the case. Those facts which justify the refusal 
go to mitigate the wilfulness of the deliberate refusal; while those facts which do not, go to 
aggravate the employee's wilfulness - which in turn highlights the seriousness of the misconduct. 
It should be shown that the employee intended to challenge the authority of the employer by 
refusing to obey the lawful and reasonable instruction. If the employer successfully shows that 
67Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 96. 
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the employee wilfully and unreasonably refused the lawful and reasonable order then the employer, 
having established the reason for the dismissal, will have to justify the dismissal by proving that 
the dismissal was an appropriate sanction. 
In the assessment of the appropriateness of the dismissal the "gravity" of the misconduct will be 
assessed and it is here that many factors will have to be taken into account, of which the sensitivitj 
of management, the general circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the persond 
circumstances of the employee, the nature of the job, the nature of the infringement, and the 
employee's period of service will all play an important role. 
"The court's assessment of the gravity of the insubordination (or indeed of whether the 
refusal to obey an instruction amounts to insubordination at all) will depend on a number 
of factors, including the action of the employer prior to the alleged insubordination, and 
the reasonableness or otherwise of the order which the employee defied. ,,68 
Furthermore, in order to justifY dismissal under the Act, the insubordination has to be "gross". 
What is actually "gross behaviour" depends on the facts of each case, especially the effect the 
misconduct has on the employment relationship. If the insubordination was so gross, or serious, 
or grave that it caused the relationship between the employer and employee to become intolerable 
then the sanction of dismissal would be appropriate. Grogan interprets "gross" as indicating that 
the insubordinate conduct "must be serious, persistent and deliberate,69 and that the employer 
should adduce proof that the employee was in fact guilty ofinsubordination."70 The test is whether 
the misconduct makes the relationship intolerable. 
"Intolerability is, of course, a word of wide and flexible meaning. One must assume, 
however, that an employment relationship becomes intolerable when the relationship of 
trust between employer and employee is irreparably destroyed. There is no magic formula 
tor determining when such a point has been reached. However, a clue is to be found in the 
forms of misconduct chosen by the legislature as examples justifying dismissal. While they 
do not form a clear genus, they all betoken a wilful breach by the employee of norms 
essential to the maintenance of the productive enterprise. The list is also noteworthy for 
what it omits. But it is clearly not meant to be exhaustive."71 
6RGrogan Workplace Law 1996 page 97. 
69Grogan Workplace Law relies on the following at page 97 footnote 40: 
Chemical Jf'orkers Industrial Union & anolher I' AECf Paints (Ply) Ud (1988) 9 ILJ 1046 (IC); Humphries & 
Jewell (Ply) Ltd v Federal Council o/Retail & Allied Workers Union & others (1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC); 
Armitage ,"J'hank~ SA (Ply) Ltd v Mnize (1995) 14 ILJ 61 (LAC). 
70Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 97. 
71Grogan Workplace Law 1996 page 92. 
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Rudd and van Zyl mention that: 
"Perhaps what is envisaged here would be, for example, in the case of insubordination, the 
fact that the offence was committed in the presence of other employees or clients of he 
employer. Arguably, of course, a factor like this might fall under the gravity of the offence 
factor. ,,72 
No doubt, what is serious depends on the misconduct's impact and efiect on the employment 
relationship, or, put differently, the consequences of the insubordinate conduct. The effect ofthe 
misconduct on the employment relationship and grossness of the misconduct are all indicators of 
the seriousness of the misconduct. The seriousness of the misconduct will in turn indicate the 
appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction. 
As an example ofthe appropriateness of the dismissal, in the arbitration award of Dube v ~""al1dtol1 
Sun alld Towers / IltercOlllinentai,7J the employee was found guilty of the following charges and 
dismissed: 
1. Threatening physical abuse to his line manager - Mr Pernusch. 
2. Insolence. 
3. Ignoring a direct instruction or insubordination.74 
The facts may be summarised as follows: the complainant Mr Dube was employed as a waiter in 
a five star hotel with intercontinental status. When the waiter's bills where being cashed up after 
lunch Mr Dube asked aggressively what he was to do with the bill of a customer who had walked 
out without paying. Mr Dube's immediate superior responded that Mr Dube would have to settle 
the unpaid bill himself in accordance with the normal rule. Mr Dube refused to do so and the 
superior continued to cash up the other waiters. When a Mr Pernusch walked past - who was the 
superior ofMr Khobhotlo - he was called over by Mr Khobhotlo to sort out the problem with Mr 
Dube because he had refused to pay the outstanding bill. "Mr Pernusch instructed Mr Dube to 
make arrangements to do so, ifso instructed by his manager, to which Mr Dube responded loudly, 
'Who is this? This f. .. ing man is not my manager and I am not going to pay.",75 It was this 
outburst which formed the basis of the aggressive posture that the employee took towards Mr 
72Rudd and van Zyl Guide to the 1995 Labour Relations A ct 1996 page 76. 
731199713 BLLR 302 (CCMA). 
74At 303 A- C. 
75At 303 G. 
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Pernusch and said in Zulu "[ will kick you, you white pig."76 
In relation to the charge of refusing to obey a lawful and reasonable instIUction, which the CCMA 
held was insubordination, the CCMA concluded that the dismissal was appropriate. 
"However as L have pointed out, what is clearly the most serious infringement in the 
present case was Mr Dube's threatening and abusive conduct towards his superiors in the 
management line, and particularly his statement to Mr Pernusch which Mr Mothibe for the 
company had occasion to point out to him during cross examination was a racist statement 
hardly conducive to the building of race harmony and good racial relations betweea 
employers and employees in the new South Africa .... There is evidence ... that the words 
allegedly addressed by Mr Dube to Mr Pernusch in Zulu were insulting and degrading to 
the latter in a manner comparable to a white man calling a black man a 'kaffir'. Whilst 
insults and abuse of this kind are as hurtful and objectionable if spoken to an employee of 
one's own rank and position as to a superior like Mr Pernusch, what aggravates the 
otTence in the latter case is the potential to undermine the staff's respect for his position 
and authority and that of others in the line structure, respect for and recognition of which 
is obviously required if management is to retain the control and order necessary to manage 
a business. It is a ttite principle restated many times by our labour courts that our common 
law contract hinges on the element of subordination which in turn require employees to 
abide by lawful and reasonable instructions by line superiors, failing which the latter would 
not be enabled to fulfil their managerial responsibilities." 77 
What also aggravated the seriousness of the offence and rendered dismissal appropriate, from the 
company's perspective, was that the insulting and insubordinate behaviour towards the superior 
took place in front of clients and stafT. 78 The arbitrator found, "that the offence was such as to 
justify the sanction of dismissal and that it will be intolerable for the company to continue the 
employment relationship in these circumstances.,,79 
5.6 Conclusion 
It has been shown that the dismissal for insubordination under the Act is to be treated in much the 
same manner as under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. The employer has to have a valid 
and fair reason for dismissing, and the misconduct must be serious enough to warrant the sanction 
of dismissal. 
insubordination is the wilful and unreasonable refusal of the employee to obey a reasonable and 
76 At 303 G-J. 
77 At 30GE-307 A. 
78At 3()7 A. 
NAI 308 C. 
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lawful instruction orthe employer. The 1995 AcL further restricts the employer's and employee's 
conduct by demanding that their conduct falls within the purpose of the Act, and does not 
contradict the constitution, international obligations and object of the Act, and it is within these 
parameters of the above and fairness that the employer's and employee's conduct will be judged. 
123 
Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction. 
At this point an overview of the main points raised in this thesis will be summarised so that some 
of the implications thereof can be discussed in the light of the reasoning of Nugent J in Cobra 
Walerlech v National Union of Metalworkers (iSA, 1 who feels that certain contractual rights may 
Hot be relevant under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, as a result of their limitation during 
the development of the employment relationship. 
2. Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that contract is the source of the employment relationship? It is the contract 
which expresses or contains the true intention of the parties, and as such contains the true nature 
of the parties' intended relationship. It is this contract between the parties which should be 
approached in enquiring into the nature of the relationship. The obligation that the employee 
occupy a position of subordination in the employment relationship is an essential term of the 
employment contract.3 This de facto position of subordination is evidence of the employee's 
contractual obligation to be subordinate. The correlative of the employee's obligation to be 
subordinate is the employer's contractual right to demand that the employee act according to his 
or her contractual obligation. The breach of the employer's contractual right will be a breach of 
the contract of employment and justifY dismissal, provided the breach is material, because the term 
is one of the e~~\'el1tialia ofthe contract, and would constitute insubordination. Insubordination is 
then any conduct which breaches the employer's contractual right to demand that the employee 
be subordinate, accordingly no conclusive list may be otTered. Notwithstanding this it may be 
highlighted that disobedience and disrespect no doubt constitute insubordination.4 
Under the common law the employment relationship was treated as any other contractual 
relationship. And in relation to the defining of the nature of insubordination the courts tended to 
associate disobedience with insubordination, and to a lesser extent insolence. Disobedience 
1(1995) 16 ILJ 607 (LAC). 
2Sce chapter one, 
3See chapter two. 
~See chapler Iwo. 
124 
constituted the wilful refusal of the employee to obey a lawful and reasonable instruction. What 
was lawful depended on the law and contract between the parties, and what was reasonable 
depended on what in law was unreasonable with reference to public morals. Because the 
employment relationship under the common law was understood as a contractual arrangement the 
courts did not interfere therein on grounds of equity or fairness. Therefore in light of the common 
law interpretation of the nature of the misconduct insubordination, the employer's contractual 
right was restricted to include disobedience and, to a lesser degree, insolence. Furthermore the 
contractual right of the employer was restricted, understandably so, in requiring the employee to 
obey all lawful and reasonable instructions, which was reasonableness narrowly construed i1S 
opposed to fairness and equity. The employer was restricted by the contractual agreement 
between the parties and only instructions which fell squarely therein were lawful, an employee was 
obliged to obey these instructions. The above were the limitations placed on the employer's 
contractual right to demand that the employee occupy a subordinate position in the relationship. 
With the advent of the unfair labour practice the Labour Courts were no longer bound to the 
common law but rather to equity and fairness. The determination of fairness was dependent on 
a value judgement derived from the circumstances of the case, in which unlawful conduct was 
unfair, but lawful conduct had to be shown to be fair. Under the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction, insubordination constituted a challenge directed at the employer's position of 
authority, and was distinguished from insolence. This intention of challenging the employer's 
authority could be manifested by the employee's wilful disobedience, or disregard of the 
employer's authority. Insolence, on the other hand, did not constitute such a challenge to the 
employer's authority and hence did not constitute insubordination. 
Though the requirement of fairness was added for the protection of the employee, which is 
understandable, it still does not detract from underlying consequence that the addition of fairness 
the legislature limited the "prerogative of management". This is a limitation of the employer's 
right to command the employee. It is clear from the Labour Court's treatment of insubordination, 
alid their understanding thereof, that the contractual right of the employer to demand the employee 
be subordinate was limited. This point is further supported with reference to the employer's 
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treatment of shop stewards. 5 
Under the 1995 Labour Relations Act dismissal for insubordination is fair provided that the 
employee committed the offence and the sanction of dismissal was appropriate. That the employee 
committed the act would depend on whether or not the employee wilfully and unreasonably 
disobeyed a lawful and reasonable instruction. This investigation would depend on the facts of 
the case. If the employee in fact committed the breach the enquiry shifts, as in the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction, to the appropriateness of the dismissal. The appropriateness of the dismissal 
would be determined in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct, and the effect the 
misconduct had on the employment relationship, in particular if the misconduct caused the 
relationship to become intolerable. Stated as such there seems to be no difference in the manner 
that the dismissal for a misconduct is dealt with under the 1995 Act compared to the 1956 Act. 
but there are indeed differences. 
The 1995 Act moves further in its enforcement of "positive rights" in limiting the employer's 
contractual right. Clearly the main thrust of the 1995 Act is to prevent the employer from acting 
ill a manner contrary to measures aimed at achieving collective bargaining or the realisation of 
constitutional rights, the stated purpose of the Act. Therefore no instruction should fiustrate the 
purpose of the Act by acting against the primary objel-iives thereof; and/or the Constitution and/or 
international obligations. The disobedience of a employee which was aimed at fultilling or 
enabling the employee to enjoy the objectives of the 1995 Act or the rights under the constitution 
or international obligations would be justifiable. If the "primary objectives" of the Act were 
frustrated by the conduct of either party, then the purpose of the Act would be frustrated and the 
conduct accordingly held unfair. If what has been said above is hue, then the employer's 
contractual right to demand the employee's obedience is further restricted by the fundamental 
rights of the employee as enshrined in the Constitution, international obligations, and measures 
created to enable a framework to facilitate collective bargaining, employee participation in decision 
making, and effective resolution of labour disputes. 
Clearly what has been traced throughout the thesis is the development and understanding of 
'See chapler 3. 
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insubordination as a form of misconduct which is a breach of the employer's contractual right to 
oblige the employee to be subordinate. What has been shown in this thesis is the restriction or 
limitation of the employer's contractual common law right to demand subordination in the 
employment relationship. This has been achieved by the requirement of fairness and now by the 
interpretation and application ofthe 1995 Act. That there has been a limitation of the employer's 
contractual right cannot be doubted, but what are the implications of this limitation? 
No doubt a positive implication is that the employee's position in the employment relationship has 
been stren!,rthened, and the employer's authority has been curtailed in a general attempt to foster 
a healthier and more peaceful working environment, to enable collective bargaining and mutual 
decision making. However, what of the essential term of the employment relationship that the 
employee has an obligation to be subordinate? 
Nugent J in ( 'ohm Walertech v National I filion (~f Metalworkers of SA 6 expressed the view that 
the le!,>islature by introducing into our law the remedy against the commission of an "unfair labour 
practice" shifted the relationship of employment from the contractual domain to the new domain 
of fairness. Nugent J continued that he had difticulty with the notion of a contractual "right" 
which was unenforceable, because in the context of the "unfair labour practice" a contractual right 
being sought to be relied upon which could not be enforced amounts to no right at all. As a resltlt 
of the new enquiry into fairness, employers and employees have to conduct their relationship on 
certain new norms, which have been left to the courts to "shape and mould" in line with the 
concept of fairness, which entails a value judgement. 7 
"While rights which are recognized in other branches of the law may playa role in making 
that value judgement they are not decisive, and nor ought they necessarily be the starting-
point from which the enquiry proceeds. What relevance such rights may have will lie in 
their underlying values rather than their mere existence." 8 
As a result the true enquiry in each case, for Nugent J, is whether the conduct at issue was in 
contlict with the norms envisaged by the concept of fairness. And in that context the only "right" 
held by the employer and employee is one that is consistent with those norms.9 lfwe agree with 
6(1995) 16 ILJ 607 (LAC). 
7At 611C-J. 
8At611C-J. 
QAl6148-C. 
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the thinking of Nugent J and hold that the contractual right of the employer to demand 
subordination in the employment relationship has been limited to such an extent that it i~ 
superficial to talk of a "contractual right" as such then what would be the implications of the above 
be? 
Clearly, if there is no "contractual right" to demand subordination then there is no " contractual 
obligation" on the part of the employee to be subordinate. Consequently, one of the essentialia 
of the common law contract of employment is missing and therefore there is no longer a 
contractual relationship of employment proper. Consequently it would seem that the legislature 
may have made such inroads into the common law contract of employment that the previously 
essential common law term of subordination may no longer be a requirement of the employment 
relationship. 10 
IOSCC Ilarl v I'ickels 1909 TS-TH244 and Zieve v National Meat Suppliers Ltd 1937 AD 177. 
